


Copyright Price.


Dr. S. K. Bhattacharya
Librarian

Uttarpara Joykrishna Public Library
Govt. of West Bengal

OUR NORTHERN BORDERS

INDIA-CHINA BORDER DISPUTE

The issue of the Chinese aggression has been, and is today, the overriding issue before us and every thing else has to be considered in that context. The freedom and honour of a country must be given the first place and, if a country cannot defend them, then other matters lose significance

Dr. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan

M A R C H 1963
FIRST EDITION

Library Edition : Rs. 10=00 or \$3.00 or 18s.
Popular Edition : Rs. 6=00 or \$2.00 or 12s.

PRINTED IN INDIA
BY RAJ ART PRESS DEPUTY GUNJ DELHI AND

Published by
THE BOOK TIMES COMPANY
25 B/1 Rohtak Road
New Delhi 5

**TO THE INDIAN SOLDIERS
WHO LAID THEIR LIVES
HEROICALLY
FOR THE
DEFENCE & GLORY
OF OUR
MOTHERLAND**

Edited by

RANA SATYA PAUL
B.A. (Hons.), M.A., J.D.

OUR NORTHERN BORDERS

INDIA-CHINA BORDER DISPUTE

Contents

I WINDS OF CHINESE EXPANSIONISM

EDITORIAL RANA SATYA PAUL <i>Editor 'Vital Speeches & Documents of the Day'</i>	10
---	-----------

II OUR NORTHERN BORDERS

1 HIMALAYAN FRONTIERS HISTORICAL DIVISION Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India	19
2 THE INDIAN ALIGNMENT RANA SATYA PAUL	26
3 CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS RANA SATYA PAUL	33
4 THE DISPUTE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW DR. K. KRISHNA RAO Legal Advisor, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India	36

III THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL

1 TREACHERY UNBOUNDED GOVERNMENT OF INDIA	42
2 SEPTEMBER 8, 1962.....AND AFTER SUDARSHAN KUMAR RANA Joint Editor 'Vital Speeches & Documents of the Day'	49
3 THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL RANA SATYA PAUL	55
4 ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL : A CALCULATED PLAN EL MERGURIO Chilian Newspaper	61

IV THE WILL TO FIGHT

1 THE WILL TO FIGHT JAWAHARLAL NEHRU Prime Minister of India	64
2 PEACE NOT WITHOUT FREEDOM DR. SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN President of India	75

IV THE WILL TO FIGHT (Contd.)

3 FIGHT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES BAKSHI GHULAM MOHAMMAD Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir State of India	78
4 NOW NOT BUDDHA BUT JAWANS BANARSI DAS Minister U.P. Government	80

V AGGRESSION AND INDIA

1 UNPRINCIPLED SINO-PAK PACT RANA SATYA PAUL	84
2 THE ARMY AND ECONOMICS H. V. R. IENGAR former Governor of the Reserve Bank	95
3 DANGER TO NON-COMMUNIST ASIA TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN Prime Minister of Malaya	102
4 CLOUDS OVER INDIA DR. HEINZ PENTZLIN	108
5 AGGRESSION AND INDIA PROF. HAMAYUN KABIR Minister Government of India	111

VI CHINESE EXPANSIONISM

1 CHINESE MILITARISM SARDAR K. M. PANIKKAR Chancellor Jammu & Kashmir University	116
2 DRAGON TOWARDS BHUTAN G. F. HUDSON	119
3 A DRAGON WITH MEMORIES ECONOMIST, LONDON	121
4 CLOAK AND DAGGER S. L. POPLAI	124

VII THE NAKED AGGRESSION

A CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS RANA SATYA PAUL	130
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	159

I

Winds Of Chinese Expansionism

EDITORIAL

RANA SATYA PAUL

WINDS OF CHINESE EXPANSIONISM

True to her traditions, the communist China gave another shock to the democratic world, and for the first time, to the communist world also, when she unleashed a massive, ruthless and barbarous attack on the biggest democratic nation and second most populous country in the world. On October 20, 1962 India witnessed vandalism on her frontiers what other countries in Asia had witnessed from China during the long course of history. Chinese militarism and its policy of expansionism was again out for a hunt and this time China's vicious eyes fell on India—the most ardent supporter of international peace and disarmament and international cooperation and universal brotherhood for the benefit of the mankind, the protagonist of non-alignment and the upholder of the Charter of the United Nations.

The whole of the democratic world proclaimed their deep sympathy for India. The Communist world branded this Chinese crime as anti-Marxism. The notorious exceptions in the two worlds were Pakistan and Albania.

Expansionist China's territorial ambitions are embedded in her traditions. The present communist regime headed by Mao Tse-tung, the man who wants to conquer the whole of the world through a gun's barrel, has, since its birth over thirteen years ago, a solid record of her territorial ambition, disturbing international peace and security, and shooting trouble in the near and far off lands.

Communist China's territorial ambitions seem to be, like Germany of Hitler, unsatisfiable and unlimited. China wants to bring back to her fold all the territories which once even remotely belonged to Imperial China. China wants all the territories which have absorbed even a bit of Chinese culture. China wants all the territories wherein inhabit a substantial number of overseas Chinese. China wants all the lands which are strategically important for her expansionist march. China wants a 'living space' for rapidly over-growing population. And, China wants rich rice and wheat producing areas to feed her hungry multitude. China is out for a holocaust in Asia of much greater dimensions in 1960s what Europe saw in 1950s. The battle of nerves is already on. The Dragon has already tasted the Asian blood.

Confrontation with India over the boundary question is simply a pretext. China wants to blow off India from the Asian scene. If India is beaten, China is right to believe that there would be none on the Asian continent who would not accept the suzerainty and overlordship of China. She has taken this to heart and is out to humiliate India. Her

show of might on the Indian borders was an attempt to cow down the already vacillating weak nations of Asia in her race against India.

India has lived along with the Chinese imperialism and aggression for the last over ten years. And, if India wants to live with honour, and as an independent sovereign nation, she would have to continue to live with her chauvanist neighbour for at least half a century more, defending her own borders, freedom and independence, and the freedom of many more of Asia's small countries. Destiny has imposed on India high burden what half a century ago it had imposed on Europe and America, with the emergence of a communist regime in Moscow. India cannot be complacent and allow the Dragon to expand her fangs. If the Western democracies failed to understand the Chinese mind, and India lagged behind China in building a strong military force armed with modern weapons and supported with an all-round economic prosperity and a strong industrial base, Free World would lose the whole of free Asia.

There is nothing in the north of China. Russia blocks the west. Pacific ocean opens new avenues in the east. The myth of impregnable Himalayas is broken and there lies India in the south. The Americans are defending the waters of Pacific. India must seal for the invaders the great Himalayan wall. China is well protected in the north and the west. China is not a sea power and would not, therefore, jeopardise her existence on a sea venture. Geographically, China is a great land Power. China possesses biggest armed forces on the land supported by a population that ranks highest than any other country. China is a country which has been ruled traditionally by militarists and is always out for territorial expansion. At present, China is ruled by a communist regime headed by Mao Tse-tung who has no faith in peaceful co-existence, and, is out for a world communist domination, to be achieved through a gun's barrel, unmindful about the atomic destruction. And, amongst all the non-communist countries in Asia, where India alone has some strength to cross swords with the mighty dragon to contain her on the land, makes the Indian borders all the more insecure and vulnerable. The knowledge of the part which circumstances would force India to play—to contain China within her present frontiers vis-a-vis India and defend the non-communist world from further Chinese encroachment—makes China all the more hostile towards India. China has started to reckon India as her arch enemy that would ultimately frustrate her in her attempt to occupy the whole of Southeast Asia. Since her birth communist China has not spared the United States of America. Till her death China would not spare now India. All her diplomacy in Asia and in the world would be directed towards this end.

To succeed in her so vicious desire and in her aim to colonize the Free Asia, and, so, to browbeat India, China is working on a three pronged strategy against India.

First : China would do her best to thwart India's great attempt to build her economy both in industry and agriculture comparable to none in the whole of Asia including China.

For the reason, China would continue to keep open the border issue for an indefinite period. This would divert much needed indigenous and foreign resources from economic development and building a

sound industrial base to unproductive military installations, armaments and ammunitions. The military build-up against China, though would not allow India to produce more for her people to consume, China believes, it would not allow India even for a pretty long time a military superiority over her. Right from the first year of her Independence, Indian military budgets, as per her national income, were proportionally much be low compared with Chinese. Moreover, China had received a lot of military equipment from Russia which out proportions the small equipment India has purchased during the last fifteen years.

While keeping the border issue alive, China would force India to spend not only on non-productive military appliances or establishments or expansion of ordinance factories but, to spend crores of rupees in the Himalayan wilderness, like construction of roads and bridges, which would be of no economic utility.

China believes that what military assistance India receives from the Western democracies would be readily counter-balanced by military aid to Pakistan or by the latter's growing hostility toward India which would force India to keep her substantial armies uselessly engaged on the border with Pakistan.

Moreover, China believes that this would make India rather home-conscious and would force her to neglect the affairs of the other non-communist nations in Asia giving China a free hand, there.

And, above all, China believes that keeping border issue alive would not only force on India a heavy economic burden and a strain on the Indian administration, but also, would demoralise the common man—the real backbone of a nation. This would, China believes, help the local pro-China communists to come into power in India.

Second : China would do her best to isolate India along the entire area from the countries whose boundaries are contiguous with India.

China has already occupied the buffer State of Tibet. India has recognised the Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and has lost by agreement all the extra-territorial rights which once India enjoyed in Tibet.

Partition has forced on India a new thousands of miles of hostile frontiers. Most mischievously China has concluded with Pakistan a 'boundary agreement' for the contiguous boundary of Pakistan-occupied territory of Kashmir and China. China and Rakistán are now working on a new trade agreement and the former would not lose any opportunity that helps her to further alienate Pakistan towards India.

China is also courting Nepal very much vigorously and would not leave for long Nepal to retain her neutral status between India and China. China may force Nepal to accept her tutelage.

Burma is already neutral. And as it appears she would not in the near future come out to help India militarily against China if any such situation arises.

In her attempt to isolate India, China has succeeded to conclude border treaties with Nepal, Burma, Outer Mongolia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. For this China had to pay a heavy price because nowhere except with Pakistan she could make any territorial gains. The territorial gains from Pakistan are too only of nominal character. Why does China not want a boundary settlement with India on the traditional and customary Indian alignment? Answer lies in the fact that China regards India her enemy. Her border agreements with other nations is merely an attempt to isolate India. China knows that if she ever succeeds to beat India, she would not have to exert much to settle accounts with these small nations. Communist China has a shameless face to break the covenants and she would not hesitate to break these all boundary treaties when that suits to her designs.

The world knows that India has some special treaty relations both with Sikkim and Bhutan. This is in no way contrary to international law and practice. In the context of Chinese expansionist designs, it is not surprising to note that China has not even once committed herself recognising India's special relations with both these Himalayan countries. China has claimed a substantial portion of Bhutan as Chinese, and at a opportune time, would not hesitate to march her armies into Bhutan in one or another pretext. China knows such an attempt would even make Assam more vulnerable for Chinese occupation.

China has already laid claim on almost whole of NEFA area of India. She would do her best to encourage further anti-Indian elements in Naga Land to demand an independent and sovereign status for Naga Land.

China has in the east a coastline of hundreds of miles in the Pacific ocean. If China wants to dominate the Southeast Asia she cannot allow herself to remain for long land-locked in the South. China is very much eager to have an access to the Bay of Bengal. Burma is the target. China would like Burma either to be neutral to the extent that she might allow her forces an access to the sea or to have a People's Republic there to come to Chinese assistance against India to capture the whole of Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim. In the latter case Burma would be lured for her cooperation to have a substantial slice of Assamese land. Either China or Communist Burma would lay claim on Andaman & Nicobar Islands.

Third : China would do her best to push India out of the Afro-Asian neutral bloc and smash India's moral leadership in Asia and amongst the newly independent countries. China wants to acquire unquestioned leadership of the whole of Asia to the extent that she might be able to dictate terms to the Asian countries. China wants an empire with its satellites in Asia what Russia possesses in Europe. The task which she as set is a Himalayan one and she can do only at the cost of India alone.

China has already tried her best to tarnish India's neutral character for the military help she has received from the Western countries when China attacked India. China wants the Asian and African countries to believe that India has discarded the semblance of non-alignment on the receipt of the arms aid. On the contrary China would not like to tell how much military aid she has so far received from the Eastern bloc.

how much armaments she possesses compared to the militarily weak India and the rest of Asia.

Attached to it, China would do her utmost to alienate Russia against India. Once she ever succeeds to convince Russia against India, it would not be difficult for China to force Russia to toe her line vis-a-vis democratic nations of the world.

She would continue relentlessly to fan anti-Indian hysteria in Pakistan. She would attempt to strain the relations between Indonesia and India. China would oppose the formation of Malaysia, with a hope that India might extend her moral support to Malaya on the issue and this would alienate Indonesia against India.

This is the Three Pronged Strategy of China against India. It poses a very great threat not only to the security and independence of India but in a way to the whole of the non-communist Asia. Let Sun Yat-sen, a great Chinese, warn again India and the non-communist Asia that "... If China, when she becomes strong, wants to crush other countries, copy the Great Power's imperialism, she will be a great disadvantage to the world and not an advantage."

II

China found Chiang Kai-shek too slaggard and unfit for her imperial designs and kicked him and his henchmen out of China. China wanted a real master who could satisfy her traditional territorial hunger. This she found in Mao Tse-tung and his communist regalia. This Mao Tse-tung promised to satisfy, but, before he could march, he told his people that "everything has been build up by the means of the gun... every Communist must grasp the truth that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.....we can even say that the whole world can be remoulded only with the gun. As we are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not desire war; but war can only be abolished through war—in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hands."

Thus he planned and with a gun's barrel he entered into South Korea, Tibet, Indo-China, Burma and when Indo-China was divided into three independent States later, he entered into Vietnam and Laos. Thus encouraged, he crossed even the borders of his one time good friend—India. Mao's hunger for land was insatiable.

This is rather surprising that China regards herself victim of the imperialism of Russia, Japan, Britain and America. China believes that these imperialist Powers; having taken advantage of her helplessness in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had stolen much of her land, or, had kept in check the Chinese to expand in the same fashion as other imperial Powers did expand in that period. China now feels this as a high time, when the other imperial Powers are going back to their own shores, to move the wheel of colonialism once again but, now not by imperialist Powers of the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries but rather by the old Imperial Power of Asia—China.

This is China's ultimate goal. And, this China does not propose to achieve through a peaceful process. Mao is the true follower of Marx-Lenin-Stalin. Mao looks in the world only two philosophies working—Capitalism and Communism—and from opposite ends. One must dominate the other; they cannot co-exist. Mao Tse-tung has a religious belief in the ultimate victory of communism over capitalism and he hopes thi scould be possible only through war.

China has no respect for the policy of non-alignment and it looks to her sheefly a farce. To the Chinese none is neutral between the two blocs. If a country does not subscribe to the communist camp that country automatically, by all means, is anti-communist, and, a stooge of the American camp. For the Chinese, such a country has no right to exist and needs to be wiped off, or, brought under the hegemony of the Chinese communist serfdom.

China, the Middle Kingdom, does not believe having common boundaries with none else except the communist countries. The nation that has contiguous boundaries with China and does not believe in the Marxiain religion, by all international communist standards, must be washed clean with a red bath. And, if there happens to be a communist country in opposition to Mao's gospel, that nation needs to be corrected by force, if the need comes to.

Again, about the neutral and non-aligned countries, China does not look everything bad as far as their temporary existence is concerned. For the Chinese communists, these are the happy areas wherein China could nurse communist forces to overthrow the constitutionally constituted local Governments. Neutrality provides to the Chinese ample opportunity to influence the local leaders, or, sabotage the local Administration.

China's profession of international peace and justice is a most intriguing piece of jugglery of her foreign policy. Thousands of pigeons fly from Peking to all the four directions of the world taking to the millions of the 'oppressed' peoples of the world a message of 'consolation' and a promise for an early 'freedom' and 'eternal peace' through the invading Red Army. This is not all. For the Chinese, international peace cannot be possible unless and until the present 'Middle Kingdom' of the world reaches to its 'natural' dimensions engulfing all the big and small nations of Asia. China has succeeded to establish internai 'peace' by gagging all the opposition and in the same way would like establish the peace of Asia.

This is the China with her Three Pronged Strategy that poses a threat to India and thus to the whole of Free Aria.

III

Right from the day the communists toppled down the Chiang Kai-shek regime in China, the communists were aware that in their expansionist march in the East and South of Asia they would have to face the two biggest democracies the world. The communist China had set its expansionist goal and had marked her enemies the day it was

born. Immediately they took arms against the American forces and waited for the opportune time to take arms against their second enemy—India. Were not the Chinese Ambassador's letter to the Government of India an indication of aggression which were to follow a few years later when he most threateningly wrote ".....China's main attention and policy of struggle are directed to the East, to the west Pacific region.....China will not be so foolish as to antagonise the United States in the East and again to antagonise India in the West..... You can wait.....We cannot have two centres of attention?" So thus, when China was able to close her Pacific front she opened the second front in the Himalayas.

With this enemy on her borders, the enemy which is a living threat to her independence, security and economic development, the enemy which is working on a plan to isolate India in Asia, the enemy which is jeopardising the freedom and independence and existence of the smaller nations of Asia, India cannot be complacent. With this enemy in the East, America and other Western countries cannot be at peace in the West. With such an expansionist comrade in the camp, Khruschev cannot avert a nuclear war and keep the bloc intact. Communist China is the enemy of the human race, the enemy of humanism, the enemy of the world, the enemy of the democratic institutions, the enemy of the working classes, the enemy of her friends, the enemy of international law and institutions, the enemy of the Charter of the United Nations and the enemy of all the nations of the world (except Pakistan and Albania) who have with one voice condemned the Chinese barbarious attack on the most peace-loving nation of the world.

China needs to be corrected.


India needs to be vigilant and prepared. The Dragon would move. And, when it moves the next time, it must be crushed so that the small and big nations might live in peace, mutual harmony and mutual cooperation with *Panchsheel* as the governing principles vindicating the Bandung spirit.

II

Our Northern Borders

- I Himalayan Frontiers**
- II The Indian Alignment**
- III Chinese Territorial Claims**
- IV The Dispute and International Law**

INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY



HIMALAYAN FRONTIERS

India's northern frontier is a traditional one, in the sense that it has lain approximately where it now runs for nearly three thousand years. The areas along this frontier, which is nearly 2,500 miles long from the Kuen Lun mountains in the far north to the junction with Burma in the east, have always been a part of India. At times they were independent principalities, and in other periods they were incorporated in large empires like the Mauryan and the Gupta ; but always the people and the rulers regarded themselves as Indians and remained within the Indian fold. Occasionally Tibetan rulers overran these areas ; but these invasions were always exceptional and temporary, and never did these territories become part of Tibet. It is a long and continuous tradition that lies behind the present frontier of India.

This northern frontier of India is for much of its length the crest of the Himalayan ranges. The Himalayas have always dominated Indian life, just as they have dominated the Indian landscape. One of the earliest Sanskrit texts, though its exact date is uncertain—the *Vishnu Purana*—makes it clear that the Himalayas formed the frontier of India. It states that the country south of the Himalayas and north of ocean is called Bharat, and all born in it are called Bharatiyas or Indians.

उतरं यत्समूद्रस्य हिमाद्रेश्चैव दक्षिणम् ।
वर्ष तद्भारत नाम भारती यत्र सन्ततिः ॥
*uttaram yat samudrasya himadres caiva daksinam
varsam tad (tam) bharatam nama bhurati yatra santatih.*

The earliest reference to the Himalayas is in the *Rig Veda* which was written about 1500 B.C. It states that the Himalayas symbolise all mountains (10th Mandala, 10th Adhyaya, Sukta 121.4.). The *Kena Upanishad*, written sometime about 1000 B.C., speaks of Uma the daughter of the Himalayas—उमा हैमवतीम्, *Umam haimavatim*. The legend is that Uma, the daughter of the Himalayas, revealed the mystic idealism of the *Upanishads* to the gods. This is an imaginative expression of the historical fact that the thought of the *Upanishads* was developed by the dwellers in the forests and fastnesses of the Himalayas. For centuries thereafter, the striving of the Indian spirit was directed towards these Himalayan fastnesses. Siva was the blue-necked, snow-crowned mountain god ; Parvati was the spring-maiden daughter of the Himalayas ; Ganga was her elder sister ; and Meru, Vishnu's mountain, was the pivot of the universe. The Himalayan shrines are still the goal of every Hindu pilgrim.

These references to the Himalayas continue down the centuries, and show that the inhabitants of India had a first-hand knowledge of this region. The *Mahabharata*, written sometime after 400 B.C., states that all the rulers of

India took part in the war. The list of kingdoms may not establish the historical fact of their participation in the war, but it is adequate evidence of geographical knowledge. It has even been held that the Pandavas—'pale-face'—belonged to a yellow-tinted, Himalayan, non-Aryan tribe which practised polyandry. The *Papancha-Sudani* says that one branch of the Kurus lived in the trans-Himalayan region known as Uttara-Kuru. In the days of *Aitareya*, *Brahmana* and the *Mahabharata* some of the Kurus were still living beyond the Himalayas. The unity of this whole Himalayan region during the period is shown by the statement in the *Sabhaparva* of the *Mahabharata*, that Arjuna, on one of his campaigns, returned from Pragjyotisha (Assam) to Uluka (in northern Punjab), through the inner, outer, and adjacent belts of the Himalayas. In fact, Pragjyotisha was a name transplanted from the eastern Punjab to Assam. Arjuna is also stated to have defeated the people living around lake Manasarowar. The Himalayas became a symbol of steadfastness and dignity. The *Bhagavad Gita*, describing the perfection of the Almighty, states that of immovable things he is the Himalaya—स्थावराणः हिमालयः: *sthavaranam himalaya*. The *Ramayana* probably of about the same date as the *Mahabharata*, compares the steadfastness of Rama to the Himalayas सथैर्येण हिमवानिव । *sthairyena himavaniva*. It also says that king Amurtaraja founded the city of Pragjyotisha, and his grandson Viswamitra practised *tapas* upon the banks of the Kausiki, flowing through the Himalayas in the north-west part of the Pragjyotisha region.

After the period of the Epics, we are on firmer historical ground. It is highly probable that both Gautama the Buddha and Mahavira belonged to the Himalayan tribes. The empire of Chandragupta Maurya, towards the end of the 4th century B.C., comprised the whole of India north of the Narbada, as well as Afghanistan. Kautilya's *Artha-astra* refers to the worship of mountains, and looks on the Himalayas as divine mountains. The distribution of Asoka's inscriptions shows that his empire included Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Nepal, and the whole of India except Assam upto Mysore and Madras. Inscriptions have been found near Kalsi, in the northern part of Dehra Dun district, and at Lalitapatan in the Nepal valley. Further evidence of the inclusion of the Himalayan terrain in Asoka's empire is provided by Rock Edict XIII, which refers to the Nabhapamtis of Nabhaka, probably identical with Na-pe-i-hra, referred to by the Chinese pilgrim Fa-Hien early in the 5th century A.D. as being located near Kapilavastu.

The next great development in Indian history was the establishment of the Kushan Empire in north-west India in the first century A.D. These rulers belonged to the Yueh-chi tribe of nomads in Central Asia. But they were neither Tibetans nor Chinese; the description we have of them is that of large pink-faced men, who came under Hindu and Buddhist influence. One of the later rulers was called Vasudeva, a Hindu name. In fact Kadphises II came into collision with the Chinese who were now for the first time entering into relations with Central and West Asia. Kadphises was defeated by the Chinese, but his successor Kanishka avenged this defeat; and a Chinese prince is reported to have lived in Kanishka's court as a hostage. At its height the Kushan empire included the Central Asian provinces of Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan, and extended to the borders of Parthia and Persia. But it was essentially an Indian empire, in that Indian influences percolated into these provinces, while Central Asian influences on India were superficial. The Kharoshthi records discovered in what is now Chinese Turkestan bear traces of Indian names like Krishnasena and Indian titles like Devaputra. The Kharoshthi script and the Prakrit language were introduced. Even the Sassanians of

the third century A.D. regarded Bactriana as virtually an Indian kingdom and the Oxus as a river of the Buddhists and the Brahmins. Kanishka was a Buddhist, and Buddhist texts as well as a large number of other Kushan documents have been found in numerous places in Central Asia where Indian colonies had flourished. During the days of the Kushan empire, which straddled the mountains which now form India's northern boundary, India's political and cultural influence swept deep into China.

If, however, the Kushans were of foreign stock who became, if we may use the phrase, 'naturalised' Indians, the Guptas, who ruled the greater part of India from about 320 to 647 A.D., were of Indian stock. Samadragupta, the second of the line, thoroughly subdued the princes in the northern plains, and the boundary of his empire ran along the Himalayas. On his coins appears the figure of the goddess Haimavati. Kamarupa (Assam), Nepal, and Kartripura (Kumaon and Garhwal) are said to have been tributary kingdoms situated on the frontiers of his dominions. The literature of the period shows that the Himalayas were a part of India, and the people were familiar with it. Kalidasa in the *Raghuvamśa* says that Raghu conquered areas to the north of the Himalayas, from Hemakuta (Kailas) to Kamarupa, thereby suggesting that this Indian kingdom (which is now Assam) stretched even beyond the Himalayas. His *Kumarasambhava* opens with a verse in which the Himalayas are referred to as a measuring-rod spanning the wide land from the east to the western sea—a metaphor suggesting that the culture developed in the Himalayan regions could serve as the measuring-rod of the cultures of the world.

प्रस्त्युतरस्या दिशि देवतात्मा हिमालयो नाम नगाधिराजः ॥

पूर्वापरी तोयेनिधी वर्गाह्यस्थितः पृथिव्या इव मुनदण्डः ॥

*asty uttarasyam disi devataitma
himalayo nama nagadhirajah
purvaparau toyanidhi vagahya
sthitah prthivya iva manadandah*

The Himalayas are said by him to be the source of precious gems and medicinal herbs. His graphic descriptions of the Himalayan scenes read like those of one who has first-hand knowledge of this region. Another drama, written perhaps by a younger contemporary of Kalidasa, the *Mudrarakshasa*, states that the empire of Chandragupta II Vikramaditya extended from the Himalayas to the southern ocean.

The Gupta empire was finally destroyed by the Huns invaders from Central Asia, but their power was in turn broken by Yashodharman, king of Malwa, in about 530 A.D. The Mandasor pillar inscription says that his authority was acknowledged over the vast area bounded by the Himalayas in the north, the Mahendra mountains in the south, the Brahmaputra in the east and the ocean in the west. Harsha, who became king of Kanauj in 606 A.D., also established a vast empire in northern India. Banabhatta says that he exacted tribute from "an inaccessible land of snowy mountains"—obviously some Himalayan state. At the assembly he organized at Kanauj in honour of the Chinese pilgrim Hieun Tsang, one of the tributary kings present was the king of Kamarupa. Hieun Tsang has given an account of all the Indian kingdoms through which he passed. Immediately south of the Hindu Kush mountains was Kapisa, ruled by a Kshatriya king. East of the Sindhu, the first important state was Kashmir. It consisted not only of what is now

Kashmir but also a considerable part of the Punjab. East of the Yamuna lay the kingdoms of Mo-li-pa-lo, Suvarnagotra, Nepal and Kamarupa. Mo-li-pa-lo is Mar po, the actual name of Ladakh. Suvarnagotra was a state in the Himalayas which was said to be ruled by women.

After Harsha, a Tibetan king, Sron-btran-sgam-po*, annexed Nepal, defeated the usurper who had occupied Harsha's throne, and occupied Tirhut. But this Tibetan occupation of Indian territory was short-lived. In 731 Yasovarman, one of the later rulers of Kanauj, sent an embassy to China, probably to seek the assistance of the Emperor of China against his enemies in India. But nothing came of this mission, and Yasovarman was defeated by the king of Kashmir, Lalitaditya Muktapida.

Tibetan and Chinese influences, in fact, never gained a permanent footing on the Indian side of the Himalayas throughout the centuries of Hindu rule in India. The Himalayan regions often changed hands, but it was almost always between Indian rulers. Only once—and that too for a very short period—did a part of this territory come under Tibetan sway. Ladakh was an Indian state, and its kings traced their descent from the Sakya family. Spiti was ruled by Hindu rajas who bore the surname or suffix of Senas. In the possession of the Parasuram temple at Nirmand is copper-plate deed, probably of the 7th century A.D., granted by Raja Samudra Sena. The *Kulantripiha Mahatmya* mentions two Rajas of Spiti by name, belonging to the 7th century. They too have the suffix of Sena. Garhwal seems to have been, in the later period, part of the kingdom of Brahmaputra. The earliest dynasty of which records exist is that of the Katyuris. Hieun Tsang wrote that in Kamarupa (Assam) the chief ruler was a Hindu, Bhaskaravarman, who claimed to be a Kshatriya. That this kingdom was a large one which included most of what is now the North-East Frontier Agency is established by evidence derived from various sources. Ptolemy, the Egyptian geographer who wrote in the 2nd century A.D., describing "India beyond the Ganges", refers to the Dobassa mountains, which are the eastern extremity of the Himalayas. In the *Kalika Purana* it is said that the Kamakhya temple (situated near what is now Gauhati) was in the centre of Kamarupa; and it is added in the *Vishnu Purana* that the kingdom extended round this temple in all directions for 100 *yojana* or about 450 miles. Even allowing for exaggeration, this would include the whole of present Assam, East Bengal and even Bhutan. This is borne out by Hieun Tsang, who estimated the territory of Kamarupa as being 10,000 *li*, or an area with a circumference of 1667 miles.

It was indeed, from the north-west and not from the north that India was successfully invaded. The Moslem conquest of India was really begun in the last quarter of the twelfth century by Mohammad Ghuri. For the next five hundred years, various Moslem rulers established their authority right upto the Himalayas. In fact, the northern boundary of India dwindled in significance, attention being centred more on the north-west. Two Moslem rulers tried to conquer Tibet and push their frontier beyond the Himalayas. In 1265, Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar crossed into Tibet via Assam with a large army. He is said to have reached "the open country of Tibbat", but thereafter he was obliged to retreat, and on his way back was routed by the King of Kamarupa. In 1325, Muhammad Tughlak sent another expedition, but this one perished in the Himalayan passes. The disastrous results of these two efforts served to

*It may be mentioned, as a matter of curiosity, that according to Tibetan medieval chronicles, the founder of the Tibetan royal dynasty was the son of an Indian king.

limit the territorial ambitions of Indian rulers to the Himalayas. To the Moguls, these mountains were a natural barrier imposed by God, to be watched carefully but not to be crossed. But they extended their authority upto them. Babar's authority was that of a pioneer and, therefore, rootless; and the rule of Humayun, who for a time even lost his throne, was always weak. But Akbar had by 1576 consolidated Mogul authority in these Himalayan areas. Thevenot, a French traveller who visited India in 1666, wrote that the province of "Ayoud or Haoud" contained "the most northern countries that belong to the Great Mogul". Ayoud and Haoud have been interpreted by Cunningham as corrupt forms of Himavat, which the Greeks called Emudos and Imaus. This seems the correct interpretation, and not that "Ayoud" is Oudh, for Thevenot mentions certain areas as being part of Ayoud which we know were not in Oudh. But even if the latter interpretation is accepted, it does not nullify the conclusion that the Mogul empire in this region extended upto the Himalaya, for the *Ain-i-Akbari* says that the northern boundary of Oudh province was the mountains. Military officers called *faujdars* were stationed all along the Himalayan border to keep the turbulent hill-chiefs under control and to collect tribute from them.

More varied was the history in this period of the areas at the two extremities of the northern frontier—Kashmir and Assam. They were both parts of India, and there were clearly contacts between them. The *Rajatarangini*, the Kashmir chronicle of the 12th century, mentions that Samdhimat and Lalitaditya Muktapida visited Kamarupa. But the Moslem rulers did not find it as easy to subdue these two areas as they had found the rest of northern India. In 1586, Akbar annexed Kashmir, but Ladakh remained independent. In 1640, she went to war with Tibet and acquired the whole of Ngari Khorsum (south-western Tibet) including Mount Kailas and Lake Manasarowar. But a few years later, the fortunes of war swung the other way, and Ladakh was forced in 1664 to accept the suzerainty of the Mogul and seek his military assistance. Emperor Aurangzeb sent an army which defeated the Tibetans, but when the Mogul army retired, the Tibetans returned and imposed terms on King Delegs Namgyal. He seems to have surrendered Spiti, which had by this time become part of Ladakh, but promptly received it back as part of the dowry on marrying the Tibetan commander's daughter. Ngari Khorsum was returned to Tibet, but the village of Minsar was retained. From about 1690, the gyalpos or chiefs of Ladakh began to pay tribute to the governors of Kashmir.

In Assam, the Hindu kings—the Varman, the Salastamba and the Pala dynasties—found themselves, from the eighth century onwards, under the pressure of the Ahoms, a branch of the Shan tribe. Finally, in 1228, the kingdom came under the rule of Chukupha, who is said to have been the first to assume for himself and his people the name of Ahom—"the pearless"—and to have given this name, now softened to Assam, to the country. The new rulers successfully resisted Moslem efforts to subdue them. In 1554, the Ahom ruler adopted the Hindu religion and changed his name, Chatamba, to Jaiyadhaja Singh. From then onwards, the Ahom kings always took Hindu names; and the Ahom Shans, adopting the language and customs as well as the religion of the conquered people, became absorbed in the Hindu fold. Aurangzeb sought to conquer Assam; but though the Ahom raja surrendered in 1662, he regained his territory four years later.

In the 18th century, European Powers entered the Indian political scene, but as they moved in from the sea-coasts, they did not at the beginning affect

the northern frontier regions of India. Though the Mogul empire was disintegrating, central and northern India remained in Indian hands. The central sector of the Himalayan range was the boundary of the kingdom of Oudh, while west of it sprouted small kingdoms, whose only visitors were pilgrims to Hindu shrines and whose chief article of commerce was ice for the courts. In 1801, Wellesley first thrust British influence into Oudh, and it gradually increased and culminated in annexation by Dalhousie in 1856. In the early years of the 19th century, the Gurkhas of Nepal had occupied Garhwal and the neighbouring hill states, and turning their attention to the plains came into clash with the British. War dragged on for three years, from 1813 to 1816, till the Gurkhas were finally defeated; and by the Treaty of Sagauli, the Raja of Nepal recognized British sovereignty over these border areas. In the Punjab, Ranjit Singh had set up a strong Sikh Kingdom. In 1818-19, he occupied Kashmir; and between 1834 and 1841, Ladakh was conquered by Gulab Singh of Jammu, then a feudatory of the Sikhs, and annexed to his kingdom. In 1841, one of Gulab Singh's generals invaded western Tibet. He was defeated and expelled, but when the Tibetans, with the aid of the Chinese, advanced to Leh, they were in their turn driven back. A peace treaty was signed in 1842. Four years later, Kashmir came under the suzerainty of the British. Gulab Singh was recognized as the Maharaja of the whole area, including Ladakh; but some months later, Spiti was taken over by the British in exchange for certain other territory, and added to Kulu district. The Punjab itself was finally annexed by the British in 1849.

Assam was annexed in 1838. But in the north, east and south, there were numerous tribes over whom the Ahom rulers had gradually lost control. The British policy was one of acquiring loose political control over these areas, with the minimum of interference compatible with the protection of these tribesmen and restraining them from raiding either Indian or Chinese territory. Administration had gradually to be pushed up into these regions, and the frontier between Assam and Tibet ascertained. This was not just a question of political division. The tribesmen in the north—the Monbas, Akas, Daflas, Miris, Abors and Mishmis—were ethnically different from the Tibetans. Towang inhabited by the Monbas had been part of India for centuries and Tibetan influence had grown in it only since the early years of the nineteenth century.

The leaders of the Aka tribes bound themselves in 1842 and 1844, in return for stipends, to maintain the peace. Over forty years later, in 1883, they raided a forest office, and a military expedition was despatched against them. They, however, only surrendered in 1888 and signed an Agreement under which their stipends were to be restored after a probation of two years. Thereafter, they kept the peace, and when Nevill visited the area in the winter of 1913-14 he found the rajas and people friendly. "The most excellent relations", he reported, "were established with the Akas. I believe this friendliness will be permanent". But less amenable from the start were the Daflas. Though they agreed informally in 1835, 1847 and 1852 to curb their raiding activities, they did not desist from attacking their fellow-tribesmen living on the plains. In 1874-75, the British sent a military force into the hills. There were no disturbances after that, but nor was there any cordiality towards the British. When Nevill's mission visited the area in 1913, it was ill-received and he even opened fire on one occasion.

With the Miris and Abors, two tribes in close relation with each other, the British were at first on friendly terms. But there was a conflict in 1848 and a serious raid ten years later; and a British military expedition

OUR NORTHERN BORDERS

into the hills was turned back. A second expedition was sent the next year, and the Abors overawed into submission. Three treaties were signed between November 1862 and January 1863, and a fourth in 1866, with various branches of the tribe. One curious feature of the agreements with the Abors was that the stipends were to be in kind, of articles such as hoes and salt which could be distributed among the whole community. It was in a sense a recognition of the democratic nature of the Abor system of government. In 1893 they attacked an outpost, and in consequence an expedition was sent. It was by no means a success. The Abors were never really subdued, and in March 1911, an Assistant Political Officer who ventured into the area was murdered. Once more an expedition was sent to punish the Abors and exact reparation, and advantage was taken of the occasion to ascertain the frontier with Tibet.

In the north-eastern corner of India lived the Mishmi tribes. The British concluded no written engagements with them, and despite numerous raids for long took no stricter measures than occasional blockades. In 1899, what Lord Curzon termed a "miniature army" was sent, but with little result. In 1910, it was learnt that the Chinese had occupied Rima in Tibet, entered the Delei valley in Mishmi country and planted their flag at Menilkrai also in Mishmi territory. The Assam Government, therefore, recommended that the Mishmis should be brought definitely under British control. A friendly Mission was sent in 1911, and as Tibetan settlements and influence were discovered round Walong, road-building was commenced and British administration carried into this area.

The British, therefore, took nearly seventy-five years to secure all the territory that had been formerly parts of Assam. But by 1912-13, administration of this northern region of Assam had been established sufficiently to necessitate the formation of two large units, the Sadiya and Balipara Frontier Tracts. Sufficient information about the frontier had also been acquired to enable the definite delineation of the Assam-Tibet boundary. Throughout the tribal areas, whatever the difficulties of the British administrators, normally their problems were not complicated by the presence of Tibetan influence and control.

Indeed, this broad survey of the frontier areas from the earliest days down to modern times shows that India's present northern frontier is along its whole stretch the historic frontier. Few, if any, land frontiers in the world can claim as strong a sanction of long and unbroken tradition.

THE INDIAN ALIGNMENT

April 29, 1954. SINO-INDIAN AGREEMENT ON TRADE AND INTERCOURSE BETWEEN TIBET AND INDIA was signed. The signatories affirmed in the Preamble to abide by the Five Principles (*Panchsheel*) i.e. (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence.

Premier Chou En-lai of China came down to New Delhi in June 1954 and solemnly ratified the agreement on June 3, 1954 and declared with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that 'if these Principles are applied not only between various countries but in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence'.

But, the events that followed were to prove that Premier Chou was telling a lie to the millions of his cheering audience who had taken him by his words. China had already consolidated her suzerainty as well as sovereignty over Tibet and she was hastily preparing her expansionist march further southward. Within a few weeks of Premier Chou En-lai's departure from India, China laid claim on Bara Hoti on July 17, 1954, a place in the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh, and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Indian police from the area. China's fantastic territorial claims which were to culminate in her ruthless aggression on October 20, 1962 had already started.

The border between India and China extends over 2,640 miles (this includes 140 miles and 300 miles of boundary of Sikkim and Bhutan respectively with China : Sikkim and Bhutan are attached to India by special treaties and their protection from any external threat is India's responsibility). The entire length of this* border has been either defined by treaties or recognised by customs or by both.

The entire length of the boundary between India and China has never been demarcated on the ground and is not controlled by any single treaty. But, this does not mean automatically that there is no agreement on the location of the Indian alignment. For centuries, the present Indian boundary has remained the same. Dozens of treaties justify the correctness of the Indian alignment. Chinese assertion that she had never accepted this alignment is a total negation of the traditions. For centuries, the Tibetan Government and, till recently, the Government of China, had never questioned the traditional boundaries of India.

Moreover, at the time of the signing of the Sino-Indian Agreement in regards to Tibet and India on April 29, 1954, and during Premier Chou's

visit to India in June 1954, no border question was raised by the Chinese authorities. This made quite clear and established the fact that there was no border dispute between the two countries. In fact, this was believed that the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 had settled all the outstanding problems, if there were any between China and India.

DESCRIPTION OF THE INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY

Western Sector: This sector covers the boundary between Jammu & Kashmir State of India and Sinkiang and Tibet.

The India-China boundary starts from the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan at approximately Longitude $74^{\circ} 34'$ East and Latitude $37^{\circ} 3'$ North and runs eastward through the Kilik Pass (Long. $74^{\circ} 41'$ E and Lat. $37^{\circ} 5'$ N), Mintaka Pass (Long. $74^{\circ} 51'$ E and Lat. $36^{\circ} 59'$ N), Kharchanai Pass (Long. $75^{\circ} 1'$ E and Lat. $36^{\circ} 59'$ N), Parpik Pass (Long. $75^{\circ} 26'$ E and Lat. $36^{\circ} 57'$ N), and the Khunjerab Pass (Long. $75^{\circ} 28'$ E and Lat. $36^{\circ} 51'$ N). These passes lie on the watershed between the Hunza river flowing into the Indus system in India and the Qara Chukar river flowing into the Yarkand system in Sinkiang. From the Khunjerab Pass the boundary lies along a spur down to the north-western bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh river which it crosses at that point and ascends the crest line of the Aghil mountains. It then runs along the crest of the Aghil watershed through the Aghil Pass (Long. $76^{\circ} 37'$ E and Lat. $36^{\circ} 11'$ N) the Marpo Pass (Long. $77^{\circ} 14'$ E and Lat. $35^{\circ} 43'$ N) and the Shaksgam Pass (Long. $77^{\circ} 28'$ E and Lat. $35^{\circ} 34'$ N) to the Karakoram Pass (Long. $77^{\circ} 50'$ E and Lat. $35^{\circ} 31'$ N).

From the Karakoram Pass the boundary lies along the watershed between the Shyok (belonging to the Indus system) and the Yarkand, and runs through the Qara Tagh Pass (Long. $78^{\circ} 20'$ E and Lat. $35^{\circ} 43'$ N) to cross the eastern bend of the Qara Qash river (north west of Haji Langar) and to ascend the main Kuen Lun mountains. Thereafter the boundary runs through the Yangi Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 25'$ E and Lat. $35^{\circ} 55'$ N) along the crest of the mountains separating the Yurungkash basin from those of the lakes in Aksai Chin. It leaves the main crest of the Kuen Lun mountains at a point approximately Long. $80^{\circ} 21'$ E and descends in a south-westerly direction, separating the basins of the Amtogor and Sarigh Jilganang lakes in India from those of Leighten and Tsoggar lakes in Tibet, down to Lanak Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 34'$ E and Lat. $34^{\circ} 24'$ N).

South of Lanak Pass the boundary passes through the Kone Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 29'$ E and Lat. $34^{\circ} 9'$ N) and the Kepsang Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 30'$ E and Lat. $34^{\circ} 8'$ N), which lie along the watershed between the Chang Chenmo and Chumesang in India and the streams flowing into the Dyap Tso in Tibet. Thereafter the boundary lies along the southern bank of the Chumesang and the eastern bank of the Chang-lung Lungpa, skirts the western extremity of the eastern half of Pangong lake, lies along the watershed between the Ang stream flowing into the western Pangong lake and other streams flowing eastward, cuts across the eastern part of Spanggur lake and follows the northern and eastern watershed of the Indus through the Chang Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 22'$ E and Lat. $33^{\circ} 1'$ N) upto the Jara Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 33'$ E and Lat. $32^{\circ} 47'$ N). A little south of Jara Pass it turns south-westward, crosses the Indus about five miles south-east of Demchok, and following the watershed between the Hanle river and the tributaries of the Sutlej river it passes through the Chard-

ing Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 24'$ E and Lat. $32^{\circ} 32'$ N) the Imis Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 2'$ E and Lat. $32^{\circ} 23'$ N), and the Kyungzing Pass (Long. $78^{\circ} 46'$ E and Lat. $32^{\circ} 38'$ N). Thereafter it turns westward and crosses the Pare river about five miles south of Chumar to reach Gya Peak (Long. $78^{\circ} 24'$ E and Lat. $32^{\circ} 32'$ N).

Middle Sector : This sector covers the boundary between the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh States of India and the Ari district of Tibet.

From the Gya Peak the boundary follows the watershed between the Spiti and Pare rivers and crosses the Pare river a mile south of the village of Kauirik. South of the Pare river the boundary ascends one of the ranges leading to the high peak of Leo Pargial (Long. $78^{\circ} 45'$ E and Lat. $31^{\circ} 54'$ N), crosses the Sutlej at its bend, and following the Zaskar range lies through the Shipki Pass (Long. $78^{\circ} 44'$ E and Lat. $31^{\circ} 51'$ N), the Raniso Pass (Long. $78^{\circ} 49'$ E and Lat. $31^{\circ} 38'$ N), and the Shimdang Pass (Long. $78^{\circ} 44'$ E and Lat. $31^{\circ} 29'$ N). Thereafter it follows the main watershed between the Sutlej and the Ganges basins and lies through the Thaga Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 7'$ E and Lat. $31^{\circ} 26'$ N), Tsang Chok Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 13'$ E and Lat. $31^{\circ} 20'$ N), Muling Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 18'$ E and Lat. $31^{\circ} 13'$ N), Mana Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 24'$ E and Lat. $31^{\circ} 4'$ N), Niti Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 52'$ E and Lat. $30^{\circ} 58'$ N), Tun Jun Pass (Long. $79^{\circ} 58'$ E and Lat. $30^{\circ} 53'$ N), Kungrig Bingri Pass (Long. $80^{\circ} 13'$ E and Lat. $30^{\circ} 38'$ N), Darma Pass and the Lipu Lekh Pass (Long. $81^{\circ} 2'$ E and Lat. $30^{\circ} 14'$ N), to join the tri-junction of the India, Nepal and Tibet boundaries.

Eastern Sector : This sector covers the boundary between Sikkim and Bhutan and North East Frontier Agency of the Assam State of India and Tibet.

East of Nepal the boundary follows the watershed between the Tista river system, and the Yaru Chu and the sources of the Amo Chu in Tibet, and crosses the Natu and Jelep Passes. Thereafter it crosses the Amo Chu, and following the watershed between the Amo Chu and Paro Chu, joins the Great Himalayan Range at Chomo Lhari and runs east along the crest of that range upto the Mela Pass (Long. $91^{\circ} 40'$ E and Lat. $27^{\circ} 57'$ N). There it runs south and, about 13 miles from the Mela Pass, turns east, crosses the Namjang river, and following the crest of the Great Himalayan Range which is also the watershed between the Chayul Chu in Tibet and the Kameng, Kamla and Khru rivers in India, proceeds east and north east. Thereafter it crosses the Subansiri river and then the Tsari river just south of Mygtyun and taking a north easterly direction crosses the Tunga Pass (approximately Long. $94^{\circ} 10'$ E and Lat. $28^{\circ} 59'$ N). It then runs east, crosses the Dihang and ascends the watershed between Chimdruf Chu and Rongta Chu in Tibet and the Dibang and its tributaries in India. The boundary crosses the Yonggyap Pass (Long. $95^{\circ} 36'$ E and Lat. $29^{\circ} 13'$ N) and the Kangri Karpo Pass (Long. $96^{\circ} 5'$ E and Lat. $29^{\circ} 28'$ N) in this sector. It crosses the Luhit river a few miles south of Rima and joins the tri-junction of the India, Burma and China boundaries near the Diphu Pass.

AUTHENTICITY OF THE INDIAN ALIGNMENT

(A) Geographical Facts and Principles

This is a natural phenomenon that people tend to settle upto and on the sides of mountain ranges; and the limits of societies and nations are formed by mountain barriers. If the mountains form natural barriers between two socie-

ties it is logical then that the dividing line between the two countries should be identified with the crest of the range which normally forms the watershed dividing the major volume of the waters flowing into the two countries. This watershed principle is now a well recognised principle of customary international Law.

Indian boundary alignment conforms overwhelmingly with this watershed principle. This is not a theoretical deduction based on the rights and wrongs of abstract principles. This is based upon the geographical facts and has received the sanction of traditions and customs of centuries and is not a matter of accident or surprise.

(B) Documentary Evidence

Indian alignment is not only natural, based on the watershed principle, but, is traditional and customary and has been recognised by both sides. Indian officials at the Conference (1960) of the Officials of the two countries on the Boundary Question had sufficient documentary evidence to prove and support the Indian boundary alignment, both of the recognition in tradition and custom, and, of the exercise of regular administrative authority. The Indian evidence contained definite references to the alignment and to the areas of dispute, and provided the strongest possible proof to establish that these areas upto the boundary were traditionally parts of India.

THE WESTERN SECTOR

The boundary between Tibet and Ladakh, long sanctified by customs and traditions, was confirmed twice by treaties of 1684 between Ladakh and Tibet and of 1842 between Ladakh on the one hand and Tibet and China on the other hand. This was further confirmed in subsequent diplomatic correspondence between the British Indian Government and the Chinese Central Government and in a local agreement reached by the border authorities of the two States in 1852.

That the treaty of 1842 referred the boundary as the 'old established frontiers' merely confirms that even as early as in the 17th century the boundary between Tibet and Ladakh was well known and the frontiers did not require any formal delimitation. The Chinese Imperial Commissioner, in his letter of 1847, stated that the ancient frontier between Ladakh and Tibet was so clear and well-fixed that there was no necessity to proceed with the joint demarcation which had been proposed by the British Indian Government. Cunningham who toured this area in 1846 confirmed that the eastern boundary of Ladakh "is well-defined by piles of stones, which were set up after the last expulsion of the Sokpo or Mongol hordes in A.D. 1687 when the Ladakhis received considerable assistance from Kashmir". Later, this area was surveyed by Indian officials, and, once a detailed first hand knowledge was obtained of the region, official Indian maps began to show the boundary with precision. Even the Chinese maps of 1883, 1917 and 1919 showed the boundary in this area as depicted in official Indian maps today.

"Thus", Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Premier Chou on September 26, 1959, "it is clear that for nearly two centuries the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet was well-known and recognised by both sides,

There was a constant flow of trade between Ladakh and Tibet during these centuries as provided for by these treaties, and no boundary conflicts ever arose."

THE MIDDLE SECTOR

Apart from the natural and geographical basis, literary and religious tradition and ancient chronicles uphold the Indian alignment in a very precise manner. The area now claimed by China in this sector is from the beginning of history a part of various Indian kingdoms. Hieun Tsang who visited this area in the 7th century confirmed its existence in India. A wealth of evidence is available for each of the areas in dispute to establish that the Indian authorities have always exercised effective administrative and civil jurisdiction over these areas.

Moreover this traditional boundary along the watershed has always been accepted by both sides. Traill, the first British Commissioner in Tibet, recorded in 1815 that it had been recognised by the Tibetan Government. In 1890 and 1914 the alignment in the Barahoti sector was formally communicated to the Tibetan authorities.

THE EASTERN SECTOR


(a) **Sikkam** : The boundary between Sikkam and Tibet lies along the crest of the Great Himalaya and the Donkya ranges, which form the watershed between Teesta River in Sikkam and the Yaruchu and the sources of the Amochu in Tibet. This natural traditional and customary boundary between Sikkam and Tibet was confirmed by the Convention signed by Britain and China at Calcutta in March 1890.

(b) **Bhutan** : The Bhutan-Tibet boundary is also a natural, traditional and customary one. It follows the crest of the Himalayan range which forms the main watershed between the Amo Chu and the waters flowing into Ram Chu, Punakha, Thimbu, Tongsa and Bumtang rivers in Bhutan.

(c) **NEFA** : The geographical principle of watershed division between China and India stands also true in this area of the India-China border which has been accepted by centuries by the peoples of the two countries. The boundary is traditional and customary and is of historical and legal validity. Ethnically the area is inhabited by the tribes who are totally different from the Tibetans.

Ancient Indian literature is full of the accounts that proves this tribal area as being the part of India. *The Mahabharat*, *the Ramayana*, *the Kalika Purana*, Kalidas's *Raghuvamsa*, *Bhagavata Purana*, *Vishnu Purana* and *Yogini Purana* are full of references of the existence of this area in India.

Till the eighth century Kamarupa (Assam) was ruled by the Hindu dynasties of the Varmans, the Salastambas and Palas. Later, these dynasties came under the pressure of the Ahoms, a branch of the Shan tribe, who finally in about 1228 A.D., became masters of Kamarupa and gave the territory their name Ahom, now known as Assam. The Ahom rulers held sway in this area for nearly six centuries till they were finally displaced by the British authorities in India in 1826. During the last years of Ahom rule, control over the tribal people in the north weakened, but authority was re-established



Map 2

Map signed on 27th April 1914 by British, Chinese and Tibetan representatives during the Simla Conference. The McMahon Line agreed to on 24/25th March 1914 is also shown in this map. The Chinese were aware of this line and it was by no means secret. The line _____ (originally red) on the map marked the external boundary of Tibet. The line _____ (originally blue) marked the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet.

by the then Government of India. At no time, however, the sovereignty over these areas was lost by the rulers of Assam or was acquired by the Tibetan. The tribal areas south of the traditional watershed boundary have always been part of India.

The old traditional boundary in this sector obtained the added sanction of treaties in 1914 when the Indo-Tibetan Boundary Agreement of 24-25 March 1914 and the Simla Convention of July 3, 1914 between India, Tibet and China was concluded.

The boundary agreement was concluded between Tibet and India by an exchange of letters between the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries. The traditional Indo-Tibetan boundary was further confirmed when the Plenipotentiaries of India, China and Tibet intialled on 27th April 1914 the map* attached to the Convention showing the red line (McMahon Line) dividing India and also forming 120 miles of Tibet-Burma boundary line. This map was finally ratified by the Plenipotentiaries of India and Tibet.

The Tibetans never protested against the Indo-Tibetan boundary as agreed upon in 1914. On more than one occasion they acknowledged its existence and affirmed that they had no wish to dispute its validity. When the McMahon Line was verbally re-affirmed by the British Indian Representative in 1936 and 1938, the Tibetan Government replied that they were fully aware of the terms of the 1914 agreement.

Besides, while signing the Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet and India, and committiing their country to the *Panchsheel*, the Chinese Government were aware that the Constitution of the Republic of India, adopted after lengthy discussions in open sessions of the Constituent Assembly, made specific mention in its Sixth Schedule of the Tribal area of Assam and the North East Frontier Agency, which the Chinese Government claim as Chinese territory. In the 1954 Agreement the Chinese Government affirmed their respect for the territorial integrity of India. Further, in discussion with the Prime Minister of India in 1954 and 1956-57, the Prime Minister of China did not give any indication whatsoever that his Government disputed the Indian boundary alignment and had a large territorial claim. But, on the contrary, he gave the impression that the revision of the maps was essentially a procedural issue, which would be made in due course. Th refore, it is obvious that the Chinese Government have changed their position since 1954 for expanding her territory further southward.

CHINESE TERRITORIAL CLAIM

This is rather paradoxical that China asserts too her boundary alignment with India as 'traditional and customary' and needs not to be changed but, rather affirmed by a formal treaty between the two countries giving to the 'traditional and customary' Chinese boundary alignment with India a legal status. This 'traditional and customary' alignment, China believes, is not negotiable. But, whereas the alignment claimed by India confirms to the watershed principle for the entire length of the boundary, China refutes the principle. The Chinese 'traditional and customary' alignment conforms to different geographical features. Apart, China adheres to the theory of territorial expansionism and believes that any territory which during the long course of history had ever belonged to the Chinese Imperial throne, is and shall remain forever a Chinese territory. China believes that 'the formation of a traditional and customary line must also be through a process of change and could not have been predestined or mechanically determined by a certain geographical feature'.

Whereas the Indian alignment along the entire boundary is natural, traditional and customary, and precise, the Chinese claim line is devoid of any precision and is vague. Moreover, this claim line had never been definite, permanent or static. With every Chinese march southward, this 'traditional and customary' alignment moved too.

The one objection which China has raised against the natural, traditional and customary Indian alignment is that this alignment has never been recognised by any single boundary treaty between the two countries and has never been delineated on the ground. Agreed. But, can China produce even a single treaty to sustain her traditional and customary alignment at any segment not to talk of the entire alignment? Can China point out a single stone that delineates the boundaries between the two countries on the basis of the Chinese 'traditional and customary' alignment? China has no answer.

ALIGNMENT CLAIMED BY CHINA

Western Sector : This sector of the traditional customary line is divided into two portions, with Kongka Pass as the dividing point. The portion north of Kongka Pass is the boundary between Sinkiang and Ladakh, and the portion south of it is that between Tibet and Ladakh.

The portion between Sinkiang and Ladakh for its entire length crosses along the Karakoram Mountain range. Its specific location is as follows: From the Karakoram Pass it runs eastwards along the watershed between the tributaries of the Yarkand River on the one hand and the Shyok River on the other to a point approximately $78^{\circ} 05' E$, $35^{\circ} 33' N$, turns south-westwards and runs along a gully to approximately $78^{\circ} 01' E$, $35^{\circ} 21' N$ where it crosses

the Chipchap River. It then turns south-east along the mountain ridge and passes through peak 6,845 (approximately $78^{\circ} 12' E$, $34^{\circ} 57' N$), and peak 6,598 (approximately $78^{\circ} 13' E$, $34^{\circ} 54' N$). From peak 6,598 it runs along the mountain ridge southwards until it crosses the Galwan River at approximately $78^{\circ} 13' E$, $34^{\circ} 46' N$. Thence it passes through peak 6,556 (approximately $78^{\circ} 26' E$, $34^{\circ} 32' N$), and runs along the watershed between the Kugrang Tsangpo River and its tributary the Changlung River to approximately $78^{\circ} 53' E$, $34^{\circ} 22' N$, where it crosses the Changlung River. It then follows the mountain ridge in a south-easterly direction up to Kongka Pass.

The portion between Tibet and Ladakh starts at Kongka Pass where it turns south-west along the mountain ridge, crosses the junction of the Chang Chenmo River and the Silung Barma River, ascends the mountain ridge again and passes through Mount Tamate (approximately $78^{\circ} 55' E$, $34^{\circ} 10' N$), continues southwards along the Chang Chenmo Mountain, passes through peak 6,107 (approximately $78^{\circ} 39' E$, $34^{\circ} 04' N$), and then again south-eastwards along the mountain ridge up to Ane Pass. From Ane Pass southwards, the boundary line runs along the mountain ridge and passes through peak 6,127 (approximately $78^{\circ} 46' E$, $33^{\circ} 50' N$), and then southwards to the northern bank of the Pangong Lake (approximately $78^{\circ} 49' E$, $33^{\circ} 44' N$). It crosses this lake and reaches its southern bank at approximately $78^{\circ} 43' E$, $33^{\circ} 40' N$. Then it goes in a south-easterly direction along the watershed dividing the Tongada River and the streams flowing into the Spanggur Lake until it reaches Mount Sajum. It then follows the mountain ridge southwards, crosses the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River at about $79^{\circ} 10' E$, $33^{\circ} N$, runs along the watershed east of the Keyul Lungpa River and south of the Hanle River up to Mount Shinowu (approximately $78^{\circ} 45' E$, $32^{\circ} 43' N$). It then runs westwards and crosses the Pare River at its junction with a small stream (approximately $78^{\circ} 37' E$, $32^{\circ} 37' N$) to reach the tri-junction of China's Ari district and India's Punjab and Ladakh (approximately $78^{\circ} 24' E$, $32^{\circ} 31' N$).

Middle Sector : This sector of the traditional customary line, starts from the terminal point of the western sector, runs southwards along the watershed between the Pare and the Chuva Rivers on the one hand and the other tributaries of the Spiti River on the other, and passes through peak 6,526 (approximately $78^{\circ} 30' E$, $32^{\circ} 21' N$) on this watershed. Several kilometres west of the junction of the Chuva and the Spiti Rivers, the boundary meets the Spiti River and, running along it, reaches its junction with the Pare River (approximately $78^{\circ} 36' E$, $32^{\circ} 02' N$).

South of the junction of Pare and the Spiti Rivers, the boundary passes through peak 6,791 (approximately $78^{\circ} 45' E$, $31^{\circ} 54' N$) and runs southwards along the mountain ridge until it crosses the junction of the Siang-chuang and Hupsang Rivers approximately 7 kilometres west of Shipki Pass, continues along the mountain ridge southwards, and passes through peak 5,642 (approximately $78^{\circ} 50' E$, $31^{\circ} 37' N$), Tapulung Pass (approximately $78^{\circ} 50' E$, $31^{\circ} 35' N$) and Gumrang Pass (approximately $78^{\circ} 49' E$, $31^{\circ} 25' N$).

The boundary line crosses the Jadhganga River west of Tsungsha and then runs eastwards passing through Mana Pass. From Mana Pass to Mount Kamet and after passing through Mount Kamet, the boundary line runs along the mountain ridge.

In the area of Wuje (approximately $79^{\circ} 58' E$, $30^{\circ} 50' N$) Sangcha (approximately $80^{\circ} 09' E$, $30^{\circ} 46' N$) and Lapthal (approximately $80^{\circ} 08' E$,

$30^{\circ} 44' N$), the boundary line follows a continuous mountain ridge south of these three places, through Ma Dzo La (approximately $79^{\circ} 55' E$, $30^{\circ} 50' N$) south of Niti Pass, skirts the southern side of the U-Dra La River, and arrives at U-Dra La not far south-west of Kungri Bingri Pass.

From near U-Dra La the boundary line follows the watershed separating the tributaries of the Siangchuan River and the Map Chu River on the one hand and the Dhaul Ganga and the Kali Rivers on the other, passes through Darma Pass to reach the tri-junction of China, India and Nepal in the vicinity of Lipulek Pass.

Eastern Sector : This sector of the traditional customary line in the Eastern Sector, from the tri-junction of China, India and Bhutan (approximately $91^{\circ} 30' E$, $26^{\circ} 53' N$) eastwards up to approximately $93^{\circ} 47' E$, $27^{\circ} 01' N$) and then north-eastwards to the vicinity of Nizamghat which is just north of the traditional customary boundary line, roughly follows throughout the line where the southern foot of the Himalayas touches the plains on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra River.

From the starting point of the eastern sector to Nizamghat, the boundary line crosses the Chungli River at approximately $92^{\circ} 07' E$, $26^{\circ} 52' N$; crosses the Bhoroli River at approximately $92^{\circ} 51' E$, $26^{\circ} 55' N$; crosses the Ranga River at approximately $93^{\circ} 58' E$, $27^{\circ} 20' N$; crosses the Subansiri River at approximately $94^{\circ} 15' E$, $27^{\circ} 34' N$; crosses the Tsangpo River at approximately $95^{\circ} 19' E$, $28^{\circ} 05' N$, north-east of Pasighat, and crosses the Dibang River at approximately $95^{\circ} 40' E$, $28^{\circ} 15' N$.

From Nizamghat the boundary line turns south-eastwards into mountainous terrain and runs along the mountain ridge up to where it meets the lower stretch of the Tsayul River, passing through peak 3,295 (approximately $96^{\circ} 06' E$, $28^{\circ} 12' N$), Painlon Pass and peak 3,575 (approximately $96^{\circ} 17' E$, $28^{\circ} 08' N$).

The boundary line meets the lower stretch of the Tsayul River at approximately $96^{\circ} 31' E$, $28^{\circ} 04' N$, then runs along this river until it leaves it at approximately $96^{\circ} 54' E$, $27^{\circ} 53' N$ and runs in a south-easterly direction up to the tri-junction of China, India and Burma.

Chinese 'traditional and customary' alignment between India and China which is totally illegal and lacks any natural or traditional validity makes a very sinister reading. It not only neglects the Indian claims over the territory now illegally held by Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir State of India, but ignores the special relations of India with Sikkim and Bhutan. On May 8, 1962 the Chinese Government issued a communique announcing that the Government of China and Pakistan had entered into an agreement "to locate and align their common border". The fact is that there is no common border between these two Countries. Pakistan is occupying a part of Indian territory in Kashmir which has contiguous boundaries with China. China had never earlier recognised Pakistan's illegal occupation over Kashmir, but gave clear indication of her recognition of the legal and just rights of India over that part of Kashmir held by Pakistan. The new move is towards her various attempts to irritate India.

THE DISPUTE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

A striking feature of the legal arguments put forward by China in the Sino-Indian dispute is that the premises on which she bases her case, are, to put it mildly, devoid of any sanction in international law. Not only has China been arguing in an eclectic manner, contrary to international law, but also, she has very often enunciated so-called rules of international law which are known only to herself. This aspect of the matter cannot be overstressed.

The first point in this regard is the Chinese practice of stating arbitrarily certain "principles", applying them in particular instances when it suits her convenience and rejecting them whenever inconvenient.

This practice is totally at variance with the established concepts of international law. Judge Alfaro has pointed out in the *Preah Vihear Case* :

"Disputes have been decided against litigant States on the general basis of inconsistency between the claims of States and their previous acts. Inconsistency is (and has been for many years) a practice at which the combined efforts of justice and international harmony must be directed."

The most important of China's arguments fall on the ground on this basis alone.

The Chinese definition of an international boundary is clearly expressed in the Chinese Note of April 3, 1960 to India. The note says :

"..... according to internationally accepted principles, an international boundary signifies a *demarcation line* up to which neighbouring states exercise their sovereignty over their respective territories and must be jointly defined by the States concerned."

On this basis they sought to repudiate the Sino-Indian Boundary saying that it had not been marked on the ground. That this definition is incorrect is evident and it has been so proved elsewhere.

For the present, however, it is enough to consider the statement made by the Chinese officials on another occasion.

In the course of the talks of the officials in 1960, the Chinese officials referred to the Dokpo-Karpo negotiations between Tibet and Great Britain regarding the boundary in 1924-25. The Chinese officials stated that China had not agreed at that time to certain proposals because "the Chinese side felt that the traditional line was clear and needed no delimitation".

Further, the Chinese officials, in the initial stages of the talks, insisted on the necessity of "formal delimitation" and sought to explain their inability to provide information as to the precise alignment claimed by them on the ground that the Chinese alignment was "broad" and "imprecise" because it was not formally delimited.

However, almost immediately after, they stated that "there is a traditional line" and in the course of the discussions of the officials they repeatedly emphasised that the traditional alignment claimed by them was "precise and clear", that it was "firm and unshakable", "the traditional boundary has been as indicated in the Chinese maps".

Commonsense alone demands that there be some consistency in the arguments advanced in support of one's position !

China, having argued in 1928 that traditional boundary can be precise and final, when it suits her convenience, cannot turn in 1960 round and argue exactly the opposite in another context.

The same principle of international law is applicable to other Chinese arguments. China has disputed Tibet's capacity to sign the Simla Convention of 1914, regarding the McMahon Line Boundary. Chinese argument was that the Tibet had first to get China's permission before doing so. But, at the same time, China has tried to put forward evidence on the basis of negotiations and discussions carried on *independently* by Tibet, with India in 1924-25, regarding a part of the Sino-Indian Boundary. These discussions were held without any prior permission given by China. It is interesting and of legal significance that China should seek to put forward contentions on this basis when she thinks it suits her.

In the same vein are the Chinese arguments regarding so-called system of "political religious entity" said to obtain in Tibet. This so-called system in brief, is to the effect that the abounds of the religious and political powers coincide.

It must be remembered that this system was repudiated, in express terms, in 1914 by the Chinese Government herself. At that time the contention was with regard to the boundary between Tibet and China. The then Chinese Foreign Minister made the remark that "the Lamas might have ecclesiastical authority, but this did not necessarily mean that these places belonged to Tibet".

The Chinese sentiments can be readily understood, for to acknowledge this "system" at that time might mean that parts of China proper would go to Tibet.

But, in 1960, with regard to the boundary between *Tibet and India*, China had no hesitation in basing her case on this very system of Tibetan "religious-political unity" which had been expressly repudiated by her earlier. This might be very convenient for China, but is hardly compatible with international law and her own past professions.

Nowhere is the Chinese misconception of international law more evident than in their views on the operation of "protests" and of the rule of estoppel. There China was concerned with refuting the legitimate Indian arguments regarding the inexplicable Chinese silence till 1959 over their alleged claims.

India had pointed out that this silence on the part of China in the face of the repeated Indian statements regarding the boundary alignment, as well as China's past practice, had legal significance. China, having remained silent for so long even when several opportunities presented themselves, could not, in law, raise any claims later.

In order to refute this, China came out with the following statement in the course of the talks of the officials in 1960 :

"The Chinese side does not know on what international law the Indian side has based itself. The contention that silence means acquiescence reflects not at all the accepted principles of international law."

This statement needs no elaborate refutation, for its absurdity is patent. It is enough to say that several decisions of international tribunals have emphasised the significance of recognition and acquiescence, e.g. The *Palmas Island Case*, the *Lotus Case* the *Minqui vs Erechos Case*, the *Preak Vihear Case* etc. A former judge of the International Court of Justice, the late Judge Lauterpacht, has stated .

"The absence of protest may in addition in itself become a source of legal right inasmuch as it is related to—or forms a constituent element of—estoppel or prescription. Like these two generally recognized legal principles, the far-reaching effect of the failure to protest is not a mere artificiality of the law. It is an essential requirement of stability—a requirement even more important in the international than in other spheres."

This attitude of China is incomprehensible, because she herself has promptly protested in other contexts at alleged infringements of her rights. Several score protests have been made by her regarding alleged over-flights by U.S aircraft. She has promptly protested at every suggestion favouring the "two-China's" theory. In this context one would like to ask, what is the purpose of Chinese protests in these cases ?

It is clear, therefore, that the very inconsistencies in the law of the Chinese arguments render them null and void.

They also throw light on the *mala fides* with which China has sought to press her alleged claim. In fact even the statement made by Premier Chou-En-lai in 1959, regarding the extent of the Chinese claims has been revised and in 1960, we find claims for approximately another 15,000 sq. miles being put forward. But this is not all. In the course of their recent large scale invasion into India, the Chinese troops have crossed even the limits claimed by them in 1960.

This is by every standard of International Law and morality, a deliberate and unprovoked act of aggression.

PREAK VIHEAR CASE

The *Preak Vihear Case* relates to a territorial dispute between Cambodia and Thailand regarding a temple situated at Preah Vihear. This area is near the Thai-Cambodian boundary which in that region is the watershed. The Court, in its Judgement of June 15, 1962, upheld Cambodia's case.

One of the main conclusions of the Judgement is, that Thailand, by her silence and failure to protest against the boundary line shown in a map received by her from France, (the then protecting power of Cambodia), recognised, adopted and acquiesced in that boundary line and thus conferred on it a binding character. The Court, found that this binding character was not offset by acts of administration performed over a long period by the Siamese authorities.

India's stand regarding the watershed principle, the concept of acquiescence and the fact that a boundary settlement once made should be final, all find corroboration in this Judgement.

In the first instance, China has sought to deny the rule that silence means acquiescence. To quote from an official Chinese statement, "The Indian side also contended that according to International Law, if one side does not raise an issue when it has an opportunity to do so, it has no longer the right to set forth its views on the issue" ... "The Chinese side does not know on what International Law the Indian side has based itself. The contention that silence means acquiescence reflects not at all the accepted principles of International Law".

But what does the World Court has to say in this regard ? The Court unhesitatingly rejected the argument now put forward by the Chinese in this case. The Court pointed out, "The circumstances were such as called for some reaction, within a reasonable period, on the part of the Siamese authorities, if they wished to disagree with the map or had any serious question to raise in regard to it. They did not do so, either then or for many years, and thereby must be held to have acquiesced".

This principle of the Court is amplified in Judge Alfaro's separate opinion, where the learned judge points out, "Passiveness in front of given facts is the most general form of acquiescence or tacit consent ... Failure to protest in circumstances when protest is necessary according to the general practice of States, in order to assert, to preserve or to safeguard a right, does likewise signify acquiescence or tacit recognition".

Clearly, China's main arguments fall to the ground when considered in the light of the World Court's pronouncement. Having remained silent for all these years, even in the face of categoric assertions by India of sovereign rights and publication of maps, China has no ground to seek to open the boundary question now.

We will now turn to the Chinese contention that a boundary ought to be settled by a formal treaty and that the alignment should necessarily be demarcated, or marked on the ground.

What does the World Court has to say in this connection ? The Court has placed emphasis on the intentions of the parties : the conduct of the parties on the basis of this intention, can in itself constitute a valid binding agreement between the States. No formal acknowledgement or instrument is necessary to implement this.

Question can be posed : Why did China not raise the boundary issue for a long while, even though fully aware of the Indian conception of the boundary ? What is the significance of the fact that it was India who every time promptly

protested against Chinese maps and incursions ? Why did China conceal her present claims, even when she signed the *Pa chsheel* declaration which included the principle of territorial inviolability ? What justification is there, for Premier Chou-En-lai's statement, in September 1959 that China had not raised her claims earlier as she felt that the issue was not then "ripe for settlement" ? Is this concealment, compatible with the principle of good faith and with the other principles in the *Preah Vihear* judgement ?

The obvious answers to these questions need not be spelled out.

The World Court's Judgement has also other implications. For instance, with regard to title to territory based on treaties, the Court has very clearly stated that the acts of sovereignty, required to keep up the title in such cases need only be minimal. Even though the other party to the Treaty might have performed acts of administration in a particular area, this could not override the recognition of title by Treaties.

In the present case, the Indian title to all the disputed areas is rooted in various treaties and other agreements which have been confirmed over the years by the conduct of both Tibet and China.

Thus, even though Tibet or China might have performed acts of administration surreptitiously in some of the uninhabited border areas, they could not override the treaties by which they have recognized these areas to be part of India. This argument is particularly applicable to the NEFA area and to the Chinese claim that Tibet had exercised jurisdiction over Tawang and other areas.

Further, even if Tibet or China had performed acts of administration, they were only local in nature ; the right of India to exercise sovereignty in these areas was not disputed at the diplomatic level.

Similarly, the Court's views on the relevance of historical, archaeological, ethnic, religious and allied factors to a case where the issue turns on treaty settlement, are also very significant.

The Court pointed out that in such a case these factors were not legally decisive since a treaty is in existence. Thus, as regards the Sino-Indian boundary question, the various treaties which have as their results the delimitation of the boundary, would nullify any historical, cultural and allied evidence which China could bring forward.

It is relevant to point out that the bulk of the so-called Chinese evidence relates to religious ties between the disputed areas and Tibet and the claim that some place names in these areas, according to them, appear to derive from the Tibetan language.

The Court, moreover, stated, as a general principle, "Where two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the primary objects is to achieve stability and finality". Judge Fitzmaurice points out : "This factor should, therefore, prevail in resolving any doubts in favour of, or against, a part of the frontier, the validity of which is now called into question". In this light, it is clear that China's attempt to reopen the boundary question, which has been settled over the years and affirmed by treaties, is without any basis in law whatsoever.

III

The Line Of Actual Control

I Treachery Unbounded

II September 8, 1962...And After

III The Line Of Actual Control

IV Attack And Withdrawal : A Calculated Plan

TREACHERY UNBOUNDED

For many years after 1949, when the People's Republic was established, there was no reason to believe that the Chinese authorities either were unaware of the traditional boundary or disputed its alignment. In 1950 the Chinese Government expressed their gratification over the desire of the Government of India "to stabilize the Chinese-Indian border" and the Government of India replied that "the recognized boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate". The Chinese Government questioned neither the location nor the recognition of this boundary, and the Government of India saw no reason to assume that there was any doubt regarding the boundary. On various occasions in 1951 and 1952, Indian interests in Tibet were discussed, but the Chinese Government never suggested that there was any frontier issue to be negotiated. The only cause for doubting whether the Chinese authorities accepted the traditional boundary was the fact that different alignments were being shown on Chinese maps. The alignments included about 36,000 square miles of territory on the north-eastern frontier and an area of about 15,000 square miles in north-eastern Ladakh within China. On 20th November 1950, Prime Minister Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha that "the McMahon Line is our boundary, map or no map. We will not allow any body to come across that boundary". This definite and public declaration of policy was not questioned by the Chinese authorities. When the discrepancies between Indian and Chinese maps were brought to the notice of the Chinese Government, they replied that their maps were based on old maps of the Kuomintang period and they did not assert any claims on the basis of these maps. Nor did they challenge the official Indian maps which were showing the traditional alignment.

In December 1953, negotiations were begun for an agreement between the two countries on trade and intercourse between Tibet and India. This would have been the obvious occasion for the Chinese Government to raise any questions regarding the frontier. But they did not say anything to suggest that the traditional alignment shown in the Indian maps was unacceptable to them. In October 1954, when our Prime Minister visited China, in the course of his talks with the Chinese leaders he briefly mentioned to them that he had seen some maps published in China which showed a wrong boundary between the two countries. He added that he presumed that this was an error and that so far as the Government of India were concerned, they were not greatly worried about it, because the boundaries of India were quite clear and not a matter of argument. The Chinese Prime Minister replied once more that these maps were really reproductions of old maps drawn before 1949 and the Chinese Government had had as yet no time to revise them.

From 1954, however, Chinese personnel persistently visited the Bara Hoti area in Uttar Pradesh; and in the summer of 1956 a Chinese survey party came into the Spiti area, and armed Chinese personnel intruded into Nilang-Jadhang and crossed the Shipki pass. Protests from the Government of India

remained unanswered. However, when Mr. Chou En-lai visited India towards the end of 1956, in his talks with the Prime Minister he referred to the Sino-Indian boundary and more especially the so-called McMahon Line. He said that he had accepted the McMahon Line as the border between China and Burma and whatever might have happened long ago, in view of new developments and friendly relations which existed between China and India, he would accept this border with India also. At that time Prime Minister Nehru recorded the substance of his talk with the Chinese Prime Minister in the following words: "Premier Chou referred to the McMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted that Line. He had gone into this matter in connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by British Imperialism, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line. They had, however, not consulted the Tibetan authorities about it yet. They proposed to do so".

The two Prime Ministers discussed this matter at some length. After Mr. Chou En-lai had made it clear that the Chinese Government intended to accept the traditional boundary between India and China, Mr. Nehru mentioned that there were no frontier disputes between the two countries but only some very minor border problems. It was decided that these petty issues should be settled amicably by the representatives of the two Governments meeting together on the basis of established practice and custom as well as watersheds.

Despite this, Chinese incursions into Indian territory continued. In 1957, a patrol party was noticed in the Spiti area, and a road running for about a hundred miles across Aksai Chin, which is a part of India was completed. The next year they came to Khurnak fort in Ladakh, arrested an Indian patrol party in Aksai Chin, and intruded into Sangchha Malla and Lapthal, both on the Indian side of the traditional boundary of Uttar Pradesh. When the Government of India protested at these Chinese activities on the Indian side of the border, the arrested Indian patrol party was released, but no reply was sent with regard to the other incidents.

In July 1958, there was published in an official Chinese magazine a map of China, which included within Chinese territory four of the five Divisions of the North-East Frontier Agency, some areas in north Uttar Pradesh and large areas in eastern Ladakh. The Government of India drew the attention of the Chinese authorities to this, and suggested that as the people's Government had been in office for nearly nine years, necessary corrections in Chinese maps should not be delayed any longer. The Chinese Government replied that the boundary line in Chinese maps was being drawn on the basis of old maps published before 1949. They added, however, that they had not yet undertaken a survey of their boundary nor consulted with the countries concerned and they would not make changes in the boundary on their own. This remark implied that they regarded the boundary between India and China as an open issue which should be the subject of discussions. Thereupon, Mr. Nehru, in a letter of 15th December 1958 to the Chinese Prime Minister, pointed out that this suggestion could never be accepted by India. "There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries".

Mr. Chou En-lai replied to this letter on 23rd January 1959. He suggested that the boundary should be determined after surveys and mutual consultations, and till then the two sides should maintain the *status quo*. Mr. Nehru in his reply of 22nd March again pointed out that the boundary as shown by India on her official maps was not only based on natural and geographical features but coincided with tradition and over a large part was confirmed by international agreements.

In July an armed Chinese detachment entered the region of Western Pangong Lake in Ladakh and established a camp at Spanggur ; and in August armed Chinese forces intruded into Khinzemane and overpowered the Indian outpost at Longju, both in the North-East Frontier Agency. On 8th September Mr. Chou En-lai wrote to Mr. Nehru asserting that there was no agreement between the two Governments on the alignment of the boundaries and, for the first time, he laid claims to extensive areas of Indian territory. He proposed that an overall settlement should be sought through negotiations. Pending this, as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing *status quo* on the border.

Mr. Nehru in his reply of 26th September, made it clear that there could be no question of discussing the whole northern boundary of India, which had been settled for centuries by history, geography, custom and tradition. As the terrain of the Sino-Indian border made physical demarcation on the ground in many places impossible, minor border rectifications in some places were perhaps required, and the Government of India were willing to have discussions for such a purpose. But any such discussions would have to be on the basis that the frontier was, on the whole, well-known and beyond dispute. The Government of India could not discuss the Chinese claim to over 50,000 square miles of what had been for many decades, and in some places for centuries, an integral part of Indian territory. Mr. Nehru pointed out in this connection that the suggestion that an independent Government of India were seeking to reap the benefit from past British aggression against China was not only false but had caused deep resentment in India.

Mr. Nehru once more stated the position of the Government of India that, pending discussions on the frontier alignment in particular sectors, the *status quo* should be maintained and both sides should respect the traditional frontier. At no place were Indian personnel to be found on the Tibetan side of the traditional frontier ; but Chinese personnel were at various places in eastern Ladakh and in occupation of Longju. Mr. Nehru refuted in detail the assertions made by Mr. Chou En-lai regarding various sectors of the boundary. He showed that the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet as delineated on Indian maps was the traditional boundary and that China had been a party to the 1842 treaty. In the Middle Sector there could be little doubt about the boundary, for the 1954 agreement between India and China had specified six passes in this area and these had been recognized by implication as border passes. In fact, the Government of India had always been in control of the Indian ends of these passes. As for the so-called McMahon Line, the Chinese representative at the Simla Conference had been fully aware of the boundary that had been settled between India and Tibet and the Chinese Government had not then or later raised any objection to it. In the circumstances, the boundary settled between India and Tibet in 1914 should, in accordance with accepted international practice, be regarded as binding on both Tibet and China. Moreover, this alignment had represented correctly the customary boundary in the area.

Mr. Nehru emphatically repudiated the allegation that the Government of India had recently "invaded and occupied" a number of places in Tibet and showed that it was in fact Chinese personnel that had crossed the Indian border in a number of places.

- This letter of the Prime Minister gave sufficient evidence to show that the present frontiers of India are her historic frontiers. The administration, too, has been extended right upto the frontier. Even the uninhabited areas of Ladakh have been visited regularly by reconnaissance parties, and it was only recently that they found the Chinese gradually coming into the area. The Chinese Government, however, have so far given no adequate reply to Mr. Nehru's letter but continue to remain in occupation of Longju in the North East Frontier Agency and of a considerable stretch of territory in Ladakh. On 20th and 21st October, an Indian police patrol in the legitimate discharge of its duties was attacked and nine persons were killed by the Chinese near the Kongka pass, about 50 miles within Indian territory. When the Government of India lodged a protest, the Chinese Government rejected it stating that the place where the incident occurred was indisputably Chinese territory. On 4th November the Government of India rebutted this assertion in detail. They said that there was no doubt about India's northern frontier, which had been shown with precision on official maps, and the area where the clash took place was well within Indian territory. The Chinese Government, however, had never made any precise statement as to where they claimed their frontier to lie.

On 7th November, Mr. Chou En-lai proposed that to maintain the *status quo* on the border and to create a favourable atmosphere for a settlement of the boundary question, the armed forces of China and India should each at once withdraw 20 kilometers from the so-called McMahon Line and, in Ladakh, from the line upto which each side exercised actual control. He added that to discuss further the boundary and other questions the two Prime Ministers should meet in the immediate future. Mr. Nehru replied on 16th November that he agreed that the two Governments should reach an agreement without delay which would eliminate risks of border clashes. He pointed out that the Government of India not posted any armed personnel anywhere at or near the international boundary and had only recently, after the incidents involving Chinese troops, asked the army to take over responsibility for the protection of the border. The border outposts had been instructed not to send out any forward patrols, and if this suggestion were accepted by the Chinese Government as well the risk of border clashes would be completely eliminated. The Government of India could not agree to any arrangement even as an interim measure which would maintain the forcible Chinese occupation of Longju, which was in Indian territory; but if the Chinese withdrew from it, Indian personnel would not re-occupy it. As for Ladakh, Mr. Nehru suggested that the Government of India would withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government had shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps, which, so far as the Government of India were aware, were their latest maps, on condition that the Chinese Government withdrew their personnel to the east of the traditional boundary shown on official Indian maps. In this sector, since the facts of possession and the extent of jurisdiction exercised by either party were disputed, there were no means of ascertaining the prevalent *status quo*. So Mr. Nehru's counter proposals were the only practicable means of achieving a separation of the forces and thus avoiding border clashes. Regarding a meeting of the two Prime Ministers, Mr. Nehru felt that to ensure its success some preliminary steps should be taken and the foundation for discussions laid. Immediate efforts should, therefore, be concentrated on reaching

an interim understanding which would help to ease the tension, and thereafter necessary preliminary steps should be taken.

In his letter of 17th December, Mr. Chou-En-lai rejected Mr. Nehru's counter-proposals for interim measures to be taken to avoid clashes. No reply was given to Mr. Nehru's letter of 26th September and the Note of 4th November, in which sufficient evidence had been adduced to substantiate the traditional alignment of the boundary as shown on Indian maps. Instead, Mr. Chou-En-lai suggested that the two Prime Ministers should meet on 26th December, 1959 either in China or in Rangoon. Mr. Nehru replied on 21st December, 1959 deeply regretting that Mr. Chou-En-lai had not accepted the very reasonable proposals put forward by the Government of India to secure an immediate lessening of tension along the border. He was always ready to meet and discuss with the Chinese Prime Minister the outstanding differences between the two countries; but there could be no agreement of principle when there was such complete disagreement about the facts. He would, therefore, prefer to wait for the Chinese Government's promised reply to his letter of 26th September, and the Note of 4th September, before discussing what should be the next step.

The Government of China sent what purported to be replies to the Indian letter and note, on 26th December 1959. Instead of meeting the carefully substantiated arguments put forward by the Indian Government, these letters only reiterated the Chinese stand. It was asserted that the boundary had not been delimited in the Western and Middle Sectors, that the 'McMahon Line' was illegal and that the alignment shown on Chinese maps was the traditional one. The Government of India, in their note of 12th February, 1960, produced additional evidence in refutation of the Chinese contentions.

On 5th February, 1960 the Prime Minister Mr. Nehru, wrote to Premier Chou En-lai stating that while the Chinese contention that the boundary was undelimited was unacceptable, he would be glad to meet Premier Chou En-lai in Delhi. The two Prime Ministers met in Delhi in April. They failed to resolve the differences, but agreed that the officials of the two Governments should meet to examine all relevant documents in support of the stands of the two Governments and report. Meantime, every effort should be made to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas.

The officials of the two Governments met at Peking, Delhi and Rangoon and submitted their Report to the two Governments. The Government of India published the Report in full on 14th February, 1961. While the Government of China published it only a year later, in April, 1962. The Report showed that the evidence in support of the Indian case was overwhelmingly superior to that brought forward by the Chinese side. Evidence of tradition, custom and usage left no doubt that the boundary alignment shown by India was the long-established one. The Chinese could produce hardly any evidence of tradition and custom. Treaties, agreements and diplomatic exchanges of different periods confirmed the traditionally accepted boundary. The Indian side also produced a large mass evidence of explorations, surveys, maintenance of trade routes, and collection of revenue establishing continuous administration of the areas now claimed by China. On the other hand the Chinese side produced only a few vague and imprecise documents of very date which were inconsistent with their claims and arguments and contradictory in fact. Indeed, many items of evidence cited by them were found to prove the Indian case.


The fact that the alignment claimed by the Chinese was wholly arbitrary was also clear from the fact that in addition to the inconsistencies already prevailing in Chinese maps. The alignment shown in the Chinese map officially given at the talks in 1960 was altogether different in the Ladakh area from the alignment shown in the 1956 map which was endorsed by Premier Chou En-lai in December, 1959. The former alignment covered some 2000 square miles more of Indian territory.

During and after the talks of the officials, the Chinese authorities, instead of taking steps to reduce the tension on the border, continued to intrude into Indian territory to consolidate the areas occupied by them. Thus in June and September, 1960 the Chinese intruded into Taktsang Gompa, in the Eastern Sector, and into Sikkim. In October, they came up to Hot Spring in Ladakh. In August, 1961 they established three new checkposts near Nyagzu in Ladakh and constructed roads linking these posts with near bases. Early in 1962, they conducted aggressive forward patrolling in the Western Sector. They even protested against the presence of Indian troops on Indian soil, and on 30th April, threatened that they would not only patrol the entire Western Sector but would consider patrolling along the entire boundary. The Government of India, however, while performing their duty of taking measures to defend their territory, continued to strive to settle the problem by peaceful means. On 14th May, 1962 they repeated their offer, first made in November, 1959, that both India and China should withdraw their troops behind the alignments claimed by China and India respectively in Ladakh and thus reduce the prevailing tension. The Chinese Government not only rejected this resonable offer but proceeded to set up new military posts. In July they created a serious incident by encircling an Indian post in the Galwan Valley. In September a Chinese force stepped across the established boundary in the Eastern Sector.

Alongside these aggressive activities, the Chinese Government sought, in December 1961, to secure the conclusion of a new trade agreement in place of the 1954 Agreement which had lapsed. India pointed out that Chinese had reversed their aggressive and expansionist policies and restored the proper atmosphere for the observance of the Five Principles underlying the 1954 Agreement, there could be no negotiations for another agreement. In August, 1962 the Government of Indian invited the Government of China to send a representative to examine means of restoring the *status quo* and producing the proper climate for considering the boundary question. In September India reiterated this position and agreed to the Chinese suggestion that representatives should first meet in Peking ffrom 15th October.

The Government of China, however, seem to be in no mood to create such an atmosphere. Their aggressive activities continued. Moreover, in May, 1962 they entered into an agreement with Pakistan for delimiting the boundary with that part of Kashmir which has been under the illegal occupation of Pakistan. The Government of India have made it clear that Kashmir is legally a part of India and that they would not recognize any agreement reached by China with Pakistan regarding this sector of the Indian boundary.

Map 3



SEPTEMBER 8, 1962.....AND AFTER

By September 8, 1962 China had already occupied 12,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh; in the beginning, through a sheer act of international territorial piracy, and later, in utter disregard to the protests of the Government of India and her proposals for the settlement of the dispute by peaceful means. The establishment of the Indian checkposts in the forward areas were making everyday difficult for the Chinese pirates to jump further southward. China now realised that it was no more possible on the one hand, to beguile India with harangues of India-China friendship and shallow offers of peaceful settlement of the dispute, and, on the other hand, to continue their thrust unhindered, unknown and without any price. Indian determination to defend her borders and to check any further Chinese advancement in the Indian territory was making clear to the Chinese overlords that any further advancement in the Indian territory would mean war.

Traditionally a peace loving nation, India was making hectic attempts to find out a peaceful solution to the problem. On the contrary, the arrogant China was mounting war hysteria against the Government and the people of India and their leader Jawaharlal Nehru, who had become overnight in the Chinese eyes 'a reactionary and a Western lackey who had abandoned nonalignment and killed the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence'. Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan Valley and clashed with the Indian troops in the Pangong Lake area in July 1962. India was making frantic efforts to ease the tension and in her Note of 26th July 1962 appealed to establish the *status quo* and create an appropriate climate to enter into discussion on the India-China boundary question on the basis of the Report of the Officials of the two Governments (1960), in order to save the two nations to come to an open armed clash which would prejudice the peace in the Asian continent.

While India was still making peaceful approaches to China, Chinese troops suddenly crossed the international boundary in the Eastern Sector (NEFA) on September 8, 1962. This was a boundary which they had respected for 12 years since they came into Tibet. While taking some steps for the defence of that border, India continued her efforts to persuade the Chinese to end this fresh aggression by withdrawing from the Indian territory. In her Note of 19th September 1962, the Government of India requested for the end of the 'unilateral aggressive action and alteration of the *status quo* of the long existing traditional boundary' and offered to enter into discussion with China in Peking from 15th October 1962. All the subsequent Notes from the Government of India urged the People's Republic of China to find out, through mutual discussions, ways and means, to bring a peaceful settlement of the problem.

But the Chinese mind was working towards another direction. Instead of withdrawing her forces, China launched a massive attack both in the Eastern and the Western Sectors on our defence forces on the morning of the 20th October

1962. This eliminated reasonable possibilities of settling the differences between the two countries in accordance with normally accepted international principles.

After the Chinese forces had advanced considerably into Indian territory in both the theatres of war, Ladakh and NEFA, Premier Chou-En-lai of China launched a very serious peace offensive under the shadows of booming Chinese guns. Chinese stated in their Statement, issued on 24th October 1962, four days after launching a massive attack, that "Fierce fighting is now going on. This occurrence of this grave situation pains the Chinese Government and the people and disturbs Asian and African countries and people. After all what issue is there between China and India that cannot be settled peacefully? What reason is there for bloody clashes to occur between China and India? China does not want a single inch of India's territory." And in order to work out a 'peaceful settlement' of Sino-Indian boundary question Chinese issued the notorious Three-Point Proposal that :

1. Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and armed forces of each side withdraw twenty kilometres from this line and disengage.
2. Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal the Chinese Government is willing through consultation between the two parties to withdraw its frontier guards in the Eastern Sector of the border to the north of the line of actual control; at the same time both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, that is, the traditional customary line, in the Middle and the Western Sectors of the border.

Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and cessation of armed conflicts shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and the Indian Government respectively.

3. The Chinese Government consider that in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At the time considered to be appropriate by both parties the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking ; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks.

Earlier in the Statement, China accused India for her 'massive general offensive in both Eastern and Western Sectors of the Sino-Indian border'. What a hypocrisy ? A masterly double talk. The aggressor accuses the aggressed for offensive activities and then offers to stop the hostility at the line of actual control. When clarifications were sought about this 'line of actual control' it happened to cover all the territory which Chinese claimed in 1960 in the Western Sector and had occupied after they had launched an attack on 20th October 1962.

On the same day, 24th October 1962, India rejected the Chinese Three Point Proposal in a Press Statement and demanded that if the Chinese offer

for peaceful settlement of the dispute was really genuine she should 'go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to 8th September 1962'. This alone, India asserted, would make possible to enter into negotiations with China to find a solution to the matter. The Statement pointed out that :

- (i) The Government of India wedded to peace and peaceful methods have always sought to resolve differences by talks and discussions, in this case of border differences with the Government of China.
- (ii) On the 16th October, 1962, in a note sent to the Government of China they proposed the restoration of the *status quo* of the boundary as it prevailed before the Chinese aggression in the Eastern Sector on 8th September, 1962, prior to talks and discussions for easing of tension and for creating the appropriate climate for purposeful talks and discussions to resolve the differences between the Governments of India and China on the boundary question.
- (iii) Since then, it is the Government of China which on the morning of the 20th October, 1962, hurled its vast armies at various points on all sectors of the India-China boundary and enlarged the conflict. These Chinese forces have advanced in all sectors into Indian territory and are still advancing. India cannot and will not accept a position under which Chinese forces continue to commit aggression into Indian territory, occupy substantial Indian territories and use these as a bargaining counter to force a settlement on their terms.
- (iv) There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw 20 kilometres from what they call the "line of actual control". What is this "line of actual control"? Is this the line they have created by aggression since the beginning of September? Advancing 40 to 60 kilometres by blatant military aggression and offering to withdraw 20 kilometres provided both sides do this is a deceptive device which can fool nobody.
- (v) If the Chinese professions of peace and peaceful settlement of differences are really genuine, let them go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to 8th September, 1962. India will then be prepared to undertake talks and discussions, at any level mutually agreed, to arrive at agreed measures which should be taken for the easing of tension and correction of the situation created by unilateral forcible alteration of the *status quo* along the India-China boundary.

On October 26, 1962, President Nasser made the following four point proposal to India and China for settlement of the dispute between them :

- Firstly : Fighting be ended forthwith;
- Secondly : Both sides revert to positions they held prior to the recent armed clashes which began on October 20, that is, behind the line where their forces stood on September 8 last;
- Thirdly : Demarcation of a demilitarised zone to separate the forces of the two countries ; and

Fourthly : Opening of negotiations between the two sides to settle all points relating to the border dispute by peaceful means.

China rejected the United Arab Republic's proposal.

On the other hand, Prime Minister Nehru, in his reply to President Nasser on October 27, 1962, stated : "You will see that the suggestions you have made for the consideration of the Chinese Government are broadly the same as those made in my reply to Prime Minister Chou En-lai." (This was a reference to Prime Minister Nehru's proposals quoted above.) Prime Minister Nehru emphasised that the essential primary to any talks and discussions to settle the matter peacefully was the restoration of the *status quo* along the entire India-China boundary as it existed before the further Chinese aggression started on September 8, 1962.

Proposals for settlement of the dispute were also made by the Tanganyika Government in the first week of November 1962. These were :

- (1) Chinese troops to move behind the line that India claims to be the McMahon Line, and the customary line in other sectors of the border;
- (2) Indian troops to move behind the line that China claims to be the traditional and customary line ;
- (3) A commission agreeable to both sides, to keep watch over the entire border with the on-the-spot inspection if necessary, to make sure the terms of the agreement are observed;
- (4) A commission of three nations—one named by India, one by China and the third agreed by both sides—to study and report on the historical facts relating to the traditional and customary, and McMahon lines ;
- (5) India, China, and a third party, if both so desire to use the report as the basis for negotiations to settle the dispute.

This proposal was also rejected by China.

In a letter addressed to the heads of Governments in the Afro-Asian States, Prime Minister Chou En-lai wrote : "Chinese Government consider that in dealing with such boundary questions we should clearly discern that these are issues between Asian and African countries which are not the same as issues between Asian-African countries and imperialist powers. We should be on guard lest we be taken in by the imperialist demand to sow discord amongst us." He added: "The Sino-Indian boundary question should and can only be settled through direct negotiations between China and India." Mr. Chou-En-lai further expressed the hope that Prime Minister Kawawa (of Tanganyika) would agree with him that the positive role of a third party, friendly to both sides, does not lie in getting directly involved between the two sides.

This was an important indication of the Chinese mind. Prime Minister Chou En-lai's statement referred to in the previous para in essence meant that : (a) the Afro-Asian countries should assist China in excluding the non-Afro-Asian countries of the world from giving sympathy and support to the victim of Chinese expansionism ; (b) Afro-Asian countries should also put

pressure on the victim of Chinese aggression to enter into bilateral talks with China, but they should not in any way express their sympathy or support on the merits of the case. In short, in one breath China told the Afro-Asian countries : "Help us to keep the imperialists out of an Asian dispute." In the very next breath China also told the heads of Afro-Asian nations : "Do not get directly involved in this dispute. But persuade India to talk to us on our terms, of course."

Since China launched her three-point "peace" proposal on October 24, 1962, she has not budged an inch. In the incessant and repetitive peace talk in which her spokesmen have indulged, their one fixed position has been : "peace only on the basis of our three-point proposal".

In his letter of November 14, 1962 to the Chinese Prime Minister, Prime Minister Nehru commented on the Chinese three-point proposal in these words: "Your present proposals, in brief, amount in broad terms to this : because, India had been pressing China to remedy the forcible alteration of the *status quo* since 1957 in the Western Sector, China has undertaken, since September 8, 1962, deliberately and in cold blood, a further massive aggression and occupied larger areas of Indian territory and is only now making the magnanimous offer of retaining the gains of earlier aggression plus such gains as it can secure by negotiations from the latest aggression."

A question is often asked why India insists on the restoration of the *status quo* as on September 8, 1962, before she agrees to talk to China ? At his Press Conference on December 31, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru provided the reply. He said: "The September 8 position is based on a certain principle, that is, that the aggression made since September 8 has to be vacated."

Public opinion in many countries has been confused by the incredible complexity of Chinese verbal jugglery. Repeatedly they have argued: "India wants us to withdraw only to September 8, 1962 line. However, we are prepared to withdraw even to the November 7, 1959 line. Yet India would not talk peace with us."

China has done her best, and to some extent succeeded, in confusing the world by insisting that both sides should withdraw 20 kilometers (12½ miles) from the "line of actual control" as on November 7, 1959. What Peking means by this phraseology is clear only to the Chinese. As India has repeatedly explained, there was no line on the ground on November 7, 1959. There were only isolated military posts occupied by Chinese forces as a result of a series of aggressive moves since 1957. If a line joining these posts really represents the Chinese November 7, 1959 line, then India has offered to accept this line as the basis for opening talks.

Here lies the catch. When pressed to indicate what precisely the November 7, 1959 line meant, China replied with a conundrum that it meant the "traditional and customary line". In the words of Winston Churchill, here was a riddle wrapped in an enigma. This "traditional and customary line" is no line *on the ground*. It is an imaginary line outlined in a letter which Mr. Chou En-lai wrote to Prime Minister Nehru on the crucial date : November 7, 1959. In this letter, for the first time, Mr. Chou En-lai had claimed some 50,000 square miles of Indian territory and put forward his "traditional and customary line" which would bring this area of 50,000 square miles under Chinese jurisdiction.

Now it becomes clear that the "line of actual control of November 7, 1959" was in fact nearly the "line of Chinese demand". It has no validity in law, in tradition, in custom or in administrative practice through the long years of history.

In his letter of November 14, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru told the Chinese Premier that if the Chinese Government really meant what it said, then it should take the following three steps in order to vacate the aggression committed since September 8, 1962 :

China should withdraw her troops in the Eastern Sector back to the position held on 7th November 1959, that is, on the other side of the boundary along the Himalayan watershed which they crossed for the first time on September 8, 1962.

In the Central Sector, they should go to the north of the highest watershed ridge.

In the Western Sector, the Chinese forces should go back to the positions they held on November 7, 1959, that is, along the line connecting their Spanggur Post, Khurnak Fort and Kongka La and then drawn to join the main Aksai Chin Road. The Indian forces would go back to various positions they occupied in all the three sectors prior to September 8, 1962.

When Chinese aggression began to be condemned by all peace-loving countries of the world, the Chinese Government hurriedly adopted a plan of unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal in the hope that they would be able to confuse world opinion in the guise of peaceful intentions and, at the same time, succeed in compelling India to come to terms. Their plan misfired.

The corner-stone of the Chinese cease-fire proposal is the old three-point proposal contained in the Chinese peace offensive launched on October 24, 1962. India has already rejected this. Even after the selected withdrawals which the Chinese have offered to carry out, they will remain in possession of 2,500 square miles of Indian territory gained after the September 8, 1962 commanding the vital mountain passes which hold the key to India's safety.

Prime Minister Nehru made a fresh constructive proposal to China on December 10, 1962. Addressing the Lok Sabha on that date, he said that he was prepared to refer the basic dispute of the claims on the frontier to an international body like the International Court of Justice. He said that there can be no fairer or more reasonable approach than this.

The proposal was officially repeated in Government of India's note to the Chinese Government on January 4, 1963. The note says : "It is hoped that the Government of China will respond positively to the proposal made by the Prime Minister of India and indicate that they are sincere in their professions for a peaceful solution of the differences between the two countries." China has ignored the Indian offer for the peaceful settlement of the dispute.


THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL

On September 8, 1962 Chinese forces crossed India's international boundaries in NEFA in Assam State of India. On October 20, 1962, China launched a massive attack all along the border. With an invader's advantages, China met easy successes and occupied Tawang, Jang, Sela, Walong and Bomdila. Security of Assam was in complete danger. In Ladakh, Galwan Valley post, Damchok and Daulat Beg Oldi fell to Chinese and the Chinese forces heavily damaged the Chushul air strip. Military assistance from the U.S.A., Britain and Canada began to pour in to equip the Indian armed forces with the latest weapons. Military missions both from the U.S.A. and Britain landed in New Delhi to asses the military needs of India *vis-a-vis* China and to formulate a long range plan to re-arm the Indian forces with modern weapons. Twice in the month, after Cuba, the world was heading towards a bloody all out war. Both times it had a very narrow escape. China declared a unilateral ceasefire all along the border and announced her withdrawal. India refused to accept the ceasefire terms. However, India did not violate the ceasefire. Fighting came to a halt.

Premier Chou En-lai offered on October 24, 1962 to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru a three-point peace proposals 'in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question'. He urged him further on November 4, 1962 to accept the proposals in order 'not merely to turn the present tide but to restore Sino-Indian relations to the warm and the friendly pattern of earlier days and even improve on that pattern'. While announcing unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962, China reassured that India and China 'should not cross swords on account of this issue and even less allow U.S. imperialism to poke in its hands and develop the present unfortunate border conflict into a war which Asians are made to fight Asians'.

But, do the Chinese really mean peace, or there is more to it that meets the eye ? No one knows the Chinese mind. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, summed up world's doubt in these words : 'The events since September 8, 1962 have completely shattered any hope that any one could have entertained about settling India-China differences peacefully in accordance with normal international principles observed by all civilised governments ... It is this crisis of confidence that has to be dealt with.' India rejected all the Chinese peace offers and refused to accept the unilateral ceasefire and sit on the table with the aggressor unless China vacates the areas occupied after September 8, 1962. However, India accepted the Colombo Power's peace proposals with interpretations furnished by Mrs. Bandaranaike, while, China has refused to accept the proposals in toto.

All the Chinese peace proposals, ceasefire statement, and its subsequent clarifications were dominated by one single phrase, 'the line of actual control', which made impossible for India to agree to any of the Chinese proposals and to find out a workable solution to the problem imposed on India by China



Map 4

unilaterally. 'The line of actual control', as China interprets, is nothing but a demand for surrender dictated from a position of strength. India cannot agree to such proposals.


The insidious phrase 'The Line of Actual Control', that smells naked aggression and occupation of the Indian territory, made its sinister appearance in the diplomatic correspondence of Premier Chou En-lai of China when on November 7, 1959 he wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, that 'in order to maintain effectively the *status quo* of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquility of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometers at once from the so-called McMahon Line in the east, and from the line upto which each side exercises actual control in the west.' Harmless as it looks on the surface, infact China wanted to consolidate what she had nibbled of the Indian territory. China was in fact making an attempt to win over a tacit recognition of her illegal occupation over the territory which by all norms of international customary law belongs to India and has had been the part of India since time immemorial.

This 'line of actual control' of November 7, 1959 was never, however, to remain stationary. The expansionist China, impregnable to any argument, did not feel the least desireability to contain herself. The mobile 'line of actual control' moved further southward in Ladakh and NEFA. The McMahon Line which formed the 'line of actual control' prior to September 8, 1962 was violated and 'the line of actual control' moved many kilometers southward both in Ladakh and NEFA when the Chinese launched a massive attack on October 20, 1962. Where there went the Chinese armed forces they formed the 'the line of actual control' and, what is more puzzling to the ordinary man is that, in Ladakh the area conquered even after October 20, 1962, for the Chinese, was within 'the line of actual control' of November 7, 1959. In Chinese diplomatic terminology when they march in the enemy territory they are in fact defending their own territory from the invaders. Such is the logic.

Adept in the art of double talk, it is rather difficult to understand what the Chinese mean by the 'line of actual control'. Jumping from one territorial claim to another, from one check-post to another, their 'frontier guards' always on their move southward within 'their own territory', and laying claims to large tracts of the land as within 'the line of actual control' when actualy these are unoccupied by Chinese, one is at lost to understand what actually this 'line of actual control' means and where it stands on the map.

In the Three-Point Statement of October 24, 1962, and in his subsequent letter of November 4, 1962 to the Prime Minister of India, Premier Chou agreed to limit the 'line of actual control' "as existed between the Chinese and Indian sides on November 7, 1959 and to put it concretely, in the Eastern Sector it coincides in the main with the so-called McMahon Line, and in the Western and Middle Sectors it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has consistently been pointed out by China." What China claims as 1959 'line of actual control', then, was no line but a series of positions of Chinese forces on Indian territory in Ladakh successively established since 1957, which forcibly and unilaterally altered the *status quo* of the boundary. So far as the Central Sector is concerned, the Chinese forces were always to the north of the Himalayan watershed ridge which is the traditional and customary boundary in this area.

Map 5



In November 1959, Chinese posts in the Western Sector were at Spanggur, Khurnak Fort, Kongka La and along the main Akasi Chin Road. Within three years i.e. by September 1962, the Chinese had constructed a large network of military roads and posts. At certain points the network of military posts was more than one hundred miles to the west of Chinese positions in 1959. The normal deduction would be that the 'line of actual control' would, therefore, be a line connecting Spanggur, Khurnak Fort, Kongka La and proceeding northwards to join the main Akasi Chin Road. But, contrary to the historical facts, China claims that her 'line of actual control' of November 1959 is the same as had been claimed by her officials at the Officials' Conference (1960) as China's traditional and customary alignment in the Western Sector. China claims that this 'line of actual control' of 1959 has never been altered at any time. The fact, however, is that China had grabbed another 5000 to 6000 square miles of Indian territory in that sector since November 7, 1959 when she launched a massive attack on October 20, 1962 and occupied a few thousand square miles more. Projected three years ahead, Chinese reached to a line on November 21, 1962 in the Western Sector, what they had claimed on November 7, 1959 as the line of actual control. What one is to say of this diplomacy ! A Farce; and China wants to mislead the international public opinion.

The Three-Point Chinese Statement of October 24, 1962 contains another vicious offer of 20 kilometers withdrawal by the both sides from the 'line of actual control'. Simple and unharful as it looks, is unpalatable and un-accep-table to India. Under the proposals, China is expected to do nothing but to withdraw 20 kilometers from its forward line leaving a substantial part of the Indian territory under Chinese occupation. On the contrary, India, if she agrees to, is expected to withdraw another 20 kilometers from her own land. Already entrenched in the Indian territory, this three-point Chinese proposal is nothing but a simple farce. Obviously, the propagandists of Peking can amply show to the outside world their 'desire for peace' and for amicable and honourable solution to the problem. But, what they would fail to tell the peo-ples is, that this withdrawal is not from the line of actual control when the pre-sent regime came into power in 1949, or, what they held actually on November 7, 1959, but what they claim as the 'line of actual control' after illegally grab-bing thousands of square miles of the Indian territory. The proposal may very well suit to Chin's expansionist designs. This would leave Chinese forces in command of the passes leading into India while Indian forces would be 20 kilometers to the south leaving the entire Indian frontier defenceless and at the mercy of China for any fresh invasion. The present Chinese invasion which commenced on September 8, 1962, was known because there was a defence post near the border. If there are no border posts at or near the passes, Chinese aggression could in future recur without India knowing about it for quite some time. In short, acceptance of the Chinese proposals would mean :

- (1) India should not dispute Chinese occupation of 14,000 square miles of Indian territory in the Ladakh area.
- (2) Chinese claims should be fully satisfied as far as physical occupation is concerned in the Middle Sector.
- (3) In the Eastern Sector, the accepted boundary, the highest Himalayan ridge, should be given up in favour of whatever interpretation the Government of China decide to put on the McMahon Line and the Chinese should be left in possession of the vital mountain passes which hold the key of India.

This means that the objective of the Chinese three-point proposal 'was to secure for the Chinese side guaranteed occupation of the Indian areas in the Western and Central Sectors which they claimed while they could retain their right to negotiate, and negotiations failing, to enforce whatever territorial adjustment they wanted in the Eastern Sector. India rejected the three-point proposal, and the subsequent Chinese 'peace' proposals, which were, more or less, same as that of 24th October. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru interpreted these proposals as a Chinese demand for Indian surrender and he made this clear to the Chinese that 'this is a demand to which India will never submit'.

In her attempt to restore peace on the border and to find out a peaceful settlement of the dispute, India made a very generous offer to end the hostility and maintain an effective *status quo* pending to a peaceful settlement, that the Chinese should undo the recent aggression which they had committed since September 8, 1962. Contrary to the Chinese 'line of actual control' proposal, which is manifestly not in accordance with facts, India's offer was simple, straightforward and factual and was based on the definite principle that the aggression must be vacated before an agreement for a peaceful consideration could be arrived at. China rejected this logical and generous proposal. Likewise, she rejected the proposals offered by the United Arab Republic and Tanganyika and refused to accept counsels from any other quarter.

Six non-aligned Afro-Asian countries (Ceylon, Indonesia, Cambodia, Burma, United Arab Republic and Ghana) offered, both to India and China, a six-point proposal (known as the Colombo Proposal), requesting both the parties not to resume the hostilities and to sit down on a table to find out a peaceful solution to the problem. The Colombo Proposals were :

1. The Conference considers that the existing *de facto* ceasefire period is a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the Indian Chinese conflict.
2. With regard to the Western Sector, the Conference would like to make an appeal to the Chinese Government to carry out their 20 kilometres withdrawal of their military posts as has been proposed in the letter of Prime Minister Chou En-Lai to Prime Minister Nehru of November 21 and November 28, 1962. (b) The Conference would make an appeal to the Indian Government to keep their existing military position. (c) Pending a final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawals will be a demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon, without prejudice to the rights of the previous presence of both India and China in that area.
3. With regard to the Eastern Sector, the Conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognised by both the Governments could serve as a ceasefire line to their respective positions. Remaining areas in this sector can be settled in their future discussions.
4. With regard to the problems of the Middle Sector, the Conference suggests that they will be solved by peaceful means, without resorting to force.
5. The Conference believes that these proposals, which could help in consolidating the ceasefire, once implemented, should pave the way for discussions between representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entailed in the ceasefire position.
6. The Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response for the proposed appeal will not prejudice the position of either of

the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of the boundaries.

Upon request from the Government of India, the following clarifications of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Colombo Conference proposals were given by the Delegations of Ceylon, U.A.R. and Ghana:

Western Sector : (i) The withdrawal of Chinese forces proposed by the Colombo Conference will be 20 kilometers as proposed by Prime Minister Chou En-lai to Prime Minister Nehru in the statement of the Chinese Government dated 21st November and in Prime Minister Chou En-lai's letter of 28th November, 1962, i.e. from the line of actual control between the two sides as of November 7, 1959, as defined in maps III and V circulated by the Government of China.

(ii) The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will keep to will be on and upto the line indicated in (i) above.

(iii) The demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Colombo Conference proposals. It is as to the location, the number of posts and their composition that there has to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China.

Eastern Sector : The Indian forces can in accordance with the Colombo Conference proposals, move right upto the south of the line of actual control, i. e. the McMahon Line, except for the two areas on which there is difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right upto the north of the McMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo Conference proposals, arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China, according to the Colombo Conference proposals, are Chedong or the Thagla Ridge area and the Longju area, in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments.

Middle Sector : The Colombo Conference desired that the *status quo* in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the *status quo*.

India accepted the proposals. And, as with the previous proposals from the other non-aligned nations and India, China refused to accept the Colombo proposals in toto; that meant total rejection of the peace efforts of the Asian and African neutral bloc. This was not the whole. China refused to accept the advice of her own Communist camp which criticised her in a very bitter tone for her aggression on India and interpreted this Chinese act as anti-Marxism.

ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL : A CALCULATED PLAN

EL MERCURIO (a leading Spanish Daily of Chile dated December 27, 1962) summed up in its Editorial the world reaction to the Chinese treacherous diplomacy and their brand of 'peace'. The Paper wrote: The Chinese Government is trying to make the world believe that they wish peace full of justice and even generous, and that, to their regret, India is turning down this (generous

and peaceful) offer most stubbornly and recklessly. They want us to believe that Peking in the moment of victory, did not only order a cease-fire, but also withdrew its troops from Indian territory and is handing out negotiations without preliminary conditions. A most attractive offer indeed. But unfortunately it does not correspond to the reality of the problem. There exists a cease-fire. The Chinese troops are giving up the conquered land. But the 'line of control'—that Peking wants India to accept before negotiations start, is such that would leave under Chinese control a good deal of territory that until three years back had been accepted by tradition and custom as Indian territory. As a matter of fact, India is requested not only to negotiate under the pressure of a threatening renewal of the hostilities, but also with the odds against her. It is just as the thief who offers to reach a settlement with his victim, if the latter permits him to keep all of the stolen goods.

When the Chinese launched their big offensive against the northeast sector of the Indian border, many a soul suspected at once that the main objective was to get hold of a good portion of territory along the Assam border line, the portion that might be offered back in exchange of control in the Ladakh region, which in any event had already been taken forcibly. This supposition turned out to be true. This is precisely what Peking is proposing under the cloak of a gesture of friendship and generosity.

The attack on NEFA, was not an off hand decision. Its scale, and the way it was performed, shows clearly the way it was conceived and solidly prepared before-hand. It was a deliberate blow upon a defenceless Indian area. Hence it was inevitable that under those circumstances, initial success was achieved quickly. And, they not only occupied a considerable portion of mountainous Indian territory, but the invading army has been able to reach a threatening position from which they are jeopardizing one of the economically most important districts in India. From this "position of strength" obtained through surprise attacks, they switched to cease-fire and offer of negotiations. Evidently, it was a premeditated plan, as cynical as the use of force can be, or any other diplomatic instrument in history.

Soon after getting control on the Tibet; the Chinese started to infiltrate into Ladakh, through the frontier, which was not difficult. This mountainous is not very populated and did not have guards or patrolling to protect her. The Indians bearing in mind the commitments they had acquired at signing the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence' with China, tried to put an end to the latter's raids by peaceful means. But the Chinese moved on to Ladakh and not only seized the actual territory, but also constructed a military road across it, thus uniting Tibet with their own province of Sinkiang. The Indians carried out diplomatic negotiations, for a long time, and refrained from taking practical measures to exert their authority in the zone. The Chinese responded with their massive and double attack on Ladakh and NEFA.

The reasons for choosing this moment for attack may be subject to speculations. Of course, they had to strike before winter's arrival. There could also be some connection with the deterioration of the relations between Moscow and Peking. The fact is clear. All this operation, including the pre-conceived cease-fire and the offer of negotiations, — is part of a plan that started in 1955. Everything has been a deliberate and carefully planned scheme to force India accept, under pressure, the loss of a large portion of their territory.

IV

The Will To Fight

I The Will To Fight JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

II · Peace Not Without Freedom SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN

III Fight For Democratic Values BAKSHI GHULAM MOHAMMAD

IV Now Not Buddha But Jawans BANARSI DAS

THE WILL TO FIGHT

A grave situation has arisen on our frontiers because of continuing and unabashed aggression by the Chinese forces. A situation has arisen which calls upon all of us to meet it effectively. We are men and women of peace in this country, conditioned to the ways of peace. We are unused to the necessities of war. Because of this, we endeavoured to follow a policy of peace even when aggression took place on our territory in Ladakh five years ago. We explored avenues for an honourable settlement by peaceful methods. That was our policy all over the world, and we tried to apply it even in our own country. We know the horrors of war in this age today, and we have done our utmost to prevent war from engulfing the world.

But all our efforts have been in vain in so far as our own frontier is concerned, where a powerful and unscrupulous opponent, not caring for peace or peaceful methods, has continuously threatened us and even carried these threats into action. The time has, therefore, come for us to realise fully this menace that threatens the freedom of our people and the independence of our country. I say so even though I realise that no power can ultimately imperil the freedom we have won at so much sacrifice and cost to our people after long ages of foreign domination. But, to conserve that freedom and integrity of our territory, we must gird up our loins and face this greatest menace that has come to us since we became independent. I have no doubt in my mind that we shall succeed. Everything else is secondary to the freedom of our people and of our Motherland and if necessary everything else has to be sacrificed in this great crisis.

I am grieved at the setbacks to our troops that have occurred on this frontier and the reverses we have had. That were overwhelmed by vast numbers and by big artillery, mountain guns and heavy mortars which the Chinese forces have brought with them. I should like to pay a tribute to our officers and men who faced these overwhelming numbers with courage. There may be some more reverses in that area. But one thing is certain—that the final result of this conflict will be in our favour. It cannot be otherwise when a nation like India fights for her freedom and the integrity of the country. We have to meet a powerful and unscrupulous opponent. We have, therefore, to build up our strength and power to face this situation adequately and with confidence. The conflict may continue for long. We must prepare ourselves for it mentally and otherwise. We must have faith in ourselves, and I am certain that faith and our preparations will triumph. No other result is conceivable. Let there be this faith and fixed determination to free our country from the aggressor.

What then, are we to do about it? We must steel our wills and direct the nation's energy and resources to this one end. We must change our procedures from slow-moving methods of peace time to those that produce

results quickly. We must build up our military strength by all means at our disposal.

But, military strength is not by itself enough. It has to be supported fully by the industry of the nation, and by increasing our production in every way that is necessary for us. I would appeal to all our workers not to indulge in strikes or in any other way which comes in the way of increasing production. That production has to be not only in the factory, but in the field. No anti-national or anti-social activities can be tolerated when the nation is in peril. We shall have to carry a heavy burden, all of us, whatever our vocations may be. The price of freedom will have to be paid in full measure, and no price is too great for the freedom of our people and of our Motherland. I earnestly trust and I believe that all Parties and groups in the country will unite in this great enterprise and put aside their controversies and arguments which have no place today, and present a solid united front before all those who seek to endanger our freedom and integrity. The burden on us is going to be great. We must add greatly to our savings by the purchase of bonds to help to finance production and meet the increasing cost of national defence. We must prevent any rise in prices, and we must realise that those who seek to profit at a time of national difficulty are anti-national and injure the nation.

We must avoid any panic because that is bad at any time, and there is no reason for it. We have behind us the strength of a united nation. Let us rejoice because of this and apply it to the major task of today, that is preserving our complete freedom and integrity and the removal of all those who commit aggression on India's sacred territory. Let us face this crisis not light heartedly, but with seriousness and with a stout heart and with firm faith in the rightness of our struggle and confidence in its outcome. Do not believe in rumours. Do not listen to those who have faint hearts. This is a time of trial and testing for all of us, and we have to steel ourselves to the task. Perhaps, we were growing too soft and taking things for granted. But freedom can never be taken for granted. It requires always awareness, strength and austerity.

I invite all of you, to whatever religion or Party or group you may belong, to be comrades in this great struggle that has been forced upon us. I have full faith in our people and in the cause and in the future of our country. Perhaps, that future requires some such testing and stiffening for us.

We have followed a policy of non-alignment and sought friendship of all nations. I believe in that policy fully and we shall continue to follow it. We are not going to give up our basic principles because of the present difficulty. Even this difficulty will be more effectively met by our continuing that policy.

I wish you well, and whatever may befall us in the future, I want you to hold your heads high and have faith and full confidence in the great future that we envisage for our country.

II

For five years, we have been the victims of Chinese aggression across our frontiers, in the north. That aggression was, to begin with, rather furtive. Occasionally there were some incidents and conflicts. These conflicts might well be termed frontier incidents. Today, we have seen a regular and massive invasion of our territory by very large forces.

China, which claimed and still claims to be anti-imperialist, is pursuing a course today for which comparisons can only be sought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In those past days, the European Powers in the full flood of imperialist aggression and with strength and weapons given to them by the Industrial Revolution took possession of large parts of Asia and Africa by force. That imperialism has abated now, and many of the colonies of European countries have been freed and are independent countries. But, curiously, the very champions of anti-imperialism, that is, the People's Government of China; are now following the course of aggression and imperialist expansion.

It is sad to think that we in India, who have pleaded for peace all over the world, and who have sought the friendship of China and treated them with courtesy and consideration and pleaded their cause in the councils of the world should now ourselves be victims of new imperialism and expansionism by a country which says that it is against all imperialism. This strange twist of history has brought us face to face with something that we have not experienced in this way for over a hundred years or more. We had taken it almost for granted that despite some lapses in recent years, as in the Suez affairs we had taken it for granted that this type of aggression was almost a thing of the past. Even the Chinese aggression on our borders during the last five years, bad as it was, and indicative of an expansionist tendency, though it troubled us greatly, hardly led us to the conclusion that China would indulge in a massive invasion of India. Now, we have seen and experienced this very invasion and it has shocked us, as it has shocked a large number of countries.

History has taken a new turn in Asia and perhaps in the world, and we have to bear the brunt of it, to fight with all our might this menace to our freedom and integrity. Not only are we threatened by it, but all the standards of international behaviour have been upset and so all the world is affected by it, apart from the immediate consequences. No self-respecting country which loves its freedom and its integrity can possibly submit to this challenge. Certainly, India, this dear land of ours, will never submit to it whatever the consequences, whatever they may be. We accept the challenge in all its consequences.

It may be that this challenge is also an opportunity for us. Indeed, the people of India in their millions have demonstrated that they accept this challenge and have shown a unity and an enthusiasm such as has been very seldom in evidence. A crisis has come and we have stood up to face it and meet that crisis. We stand, I do believe, at a turning point not only in the history of India and of Asia and possibly even of the world, because what happens in this conflict will affect it obviously. It will affect Asia, of which two of the biggest countries are China and India. But it will affect the world also and therefore, this conflict has very wide-reaching consequences. We should try to look at it from this point of view. For the moment, we are shocked at this cruel and crude invasion of another country. The world has also witnessed the response of the people of the country invaded, that is, our country, and the world will yet witness the way the people of India act when their freedom is threatened and their dear liberty is imperilled. So, we are shocked and are in a state of high excitement. This is inevitable, and not surprising, but we have to remember that this turning point in history is not going to end soon. We may have to face this for a long period, for a number of years, I do not know how long, and we must train ourselves and the nation to be prepared to face it, however long the crisis may last. On the 22nd August, 1962 we sent a note to China.

A reply was sent to this on the 13th September last. But before the reply was sent or received by us, even on the 8th September, China's forces crossed the international boundary in the north-west corner of NEFA across the Thagla ridge and began to threaten the Indian post at Dhola. We had a number of posts near the northern frontier of NEFA adequate enough to meet any minor or normal incursion. We hoped that we would be able to meet this new aggression and immediately we took steps to strengthen our forces in that area. Five days after this new aggression, on the 13th September the Chinese Government sent us a threatening reply, asking for discussions on the boundary question. We have previously demonstrated by a mass of evidence that our boundary is what has been called the McMahon Line, but the boundary was not laid down even by Mr. McMahon, whoever is responsible for it. It was a recognition of the long-standing frontier on the high ridge of the Himalayas which divided the two countries at the watershed. To some extent, though indirectly, the Chinese accepted this. Certainly they accepted the continuation of this line in Burma. But, apart from the constitutional or legal aspects, it is undoubted and cannot be challenged that no Chinese has ever been in that part on this side of the line, excepting in a little border village called Longju.

Even the McMahon Line which the Chinese have called illegal was laid down 48 years ago, 1914, and that was a confirmation of what was believed then. Legal or not, it has been a part of India for a long number of years and certainly let us say for 50 years or so, apart from its previous history which is also in our favour. Here then is a boundary which for nearly 50 years has been shown to be our northern frontier. I am limiting what I say to 50 years for the sake of argument ; really it was even before that. Even if the Chinese did not accept it—and I would like to say that the objection they raised in 1913 to this treaty was not based on their objection to the McMahon Line ; it was based on their objection to another part of the treaty which divided Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet, the McMahon Line did not come in that ; however, it is a fact that they objected to the whole treaty because of that other objection—even if the Chinese did not accept it then, this has been in existence now in our maps, in our practice, in our Constitution, in our organisation, administration etc., for nearly 50 years. Even the non-acceptance of it, can it entitle them to undertake an armed invasion to upset it ? Even the Chinese know and say that independent India has been in possession of this territory right up to the Himalayan watershed. It is rather difficult for me to say what they say. Because, if any person takes the trouble to read through this vast correspondence, he will notice that their alleged frontier is a very mobile one ; it changes. It is wherever they have laid the frontier and in this matter too they have stated many contradictory things. They have laid stress sometimes on the fact that we have occupied this area of NEFA or a large part of it, since we became independent. That is a curious statement since, as I have said all along, it was fully recognised in 1913-14. Apart from that, when we became independent, we did one thing. We naturally wanted these tribal people in the frontier areas to share our independence. The British largely left them to their own resources and interfered only when there was some trouble. But there is no doubt that the British considered their frontier to be the McMahon Line. They did not have a full-fledged administrative apparatus there. On gaining independence, we were naturally anxious to develop these areas as we were trying to develop other areas of India. We tried, therefore, not only to introduce our administration there but schools, hospitals, roads, etc. It is this which the Chinese say represents our occupying that. Any person who sees these papers and the history behind them would easily say that we have occu-

pied it in every sense, legally, constitutionally, administratively, practically for a large number of years.

Now, the point is that whatever the legal and constitutional aspect of their claim might be—we think there is no force whatever—does that justify a sudden invasion of this kind? Repeatedly, in the course of talks—we were given to understand something not absolutely, not clearly—as has now been discovered, always their phrases had a double meaning attached to them which could be interpreted any way, to assure us of something and later to deny that they had not assured us. I remember the long talk I had with the Chinese Prime Minister, specially about the McMahon Line. I forget the exact date; it was five years ago or six years ago; I do not remember exactly. That was when he came to India. We had a long talk and immediately after the talk I put down in a note I prepared the contents of our talk so that I might not forget it. That note is here in our office. Much later I sent an extract of my note of that talk to the Chinese Government and they denied the truth of it. I was very much surprised and hurt because I was quite certain. When we were talking it was not once I asked ; I asked the same question two or three times and definitely the answer was given to me. He gave me to understand that although the Chinese Government considered the McMahon line an illegal line and a British imperialist line, nevertheless because of the large number of facts, because of their desire to be friendly with us, they would be prepared to do this. That was the clearest impression that I got. He denied it later on. So, it becomes a little difficult to say what they stood by at a particular time.

Anyhow, my point is that whether they acknowledge the McMahon line or not undoubtedly it has been, till a few weeks ago, completely in our possession ; the area on this side was completely in our possession ; for generations past it has been in our possession ; if you like it I can put a later date. 1913-14 and I may say that it was a recording of what had been happening previously. How does it justify the Chinese Government to carry on an invasion of it, by and law, international standards of behaviour or for any other reason ?

Chinese Government has made a very peculiar approach to what has happened recently in NEFA. They go on saying that India attack them and their frontier guards as they are called are merely defending themselves. I must confess that it is a complete perversion of facts and the attempt to make falsehood appear to be the truth, and the truth to be the falsehood has amazed me because nothing can be more utterly baseless than what they have been saying. Here is a single fact. We have been up to the McMahon line all these years ; we have not gone one inch beyond nor have we covered another's territory. They have come. Let us for the moment assume their case that there is some doubt where the McMahon line is. But the point is that they have invaded an area which has not been in their possession ever, ever in the history of the last 10,000 years. After all the present Chinese Government came into existence 12 years ago or thereabout Any claim that they may directly make to this territory can only be made either in these 12 years or possibly previously through Tibet. So, it becomes a question of what they can claim through Tibet or through their domination over Tibet. It is true that for a long time past there were some frontier questions between Tibet and India, even in British times. But all these questions were about little pockets or little frontier areas, small areas. Nobody has ever put forward, no Tibetan Government has ever put forward previously those large claims to what amounts to two thirds of NEFA, apart from the vast area in Ladakh,

So, we arrive at one firm conclusion which is not capable of argument or denial ; that is, the Chinese have come to this territory with a massive force, territory which for a long time at least has been included in India, and administered in a vague way and little fully administered by India. If they had any claim they could have discussed it and talked about it and adopted various means of peaceful settlement, appointed arbitrators or gone to the Hague Court or whatever it was.

Here, I may say, it has been unfortunate, as has been in so many other cases, that the present Government of China is not represented in the United Nations. We have supported the Chinese representation—representation of the People's Government of China—in the United Nations. We have supported it in spite of this present invasion, because we have to look at it this way : it is not a question of likes or dislikes. It is a question , which will facilitate Chinese aggression, it will facilitate its misbehaviour in the future. It will make disarmament impossible in the world. You might disarm the whole world and leave China, a great, powerful country, fully armed to the teeth. It is inconceivable. Therefore, in spite of our great resentment at what they have done, the great irritation and anger, still, I am glad to say that we kept some perspective about things and supported that even now. The difficulty is one cannot call them up before any tribunal or world court or anywhere. They are just wholly an irresponsible country believing, I believe, in war as the only way of settling anything, having no love of peace and stating almost that, and with great power at their disposal. That is the dangerous state of affairs not only for India but for the rest of the world. I am not going into the question, as some people do, of communism or anti-communism. I do not believe that that is a major issue in this matter or any other. Communism may help; but the major issue is, an expansionist, imperious-minded country deliberately invading into a country on this fact, because as some countries do, they explain everything in terms of communism and anti-communism. I think the result is that they are unable to see many of the basic facts of the question. Communism may help or communism may hinder. Communism may give them a certain strength or weakness, whatever it may be. But today we are facing a naked aggression, just the type of aggression which we saw in the 18th and 19th centuries ; there was then no communism any where.

So, we have to face this new type of imperialism on our borders. Asia is facing this new type, and the whole world is concerned with that. For the moment, we are most concerned with it, and we have to face it and bear the burden ourselves, although some of our friendly countries are certainly helping us and we are grateful to them for that help.

To say that we are committing all this aggression on Chinese territory is a kind of double talk which is very difficult for a man of my simple mind to understand. "We commit aggression on ourselves; we commit aggression on the soil of our own country and they defend it by coming over the mountains into our territory". It is really extraordinary to what length people can go to justify their misdeeds.

It is true that when we heard on the 8th September of their coming over the Thagla pass into our territory in some forces, we had quite adequate forces in our posts. We had no doubt some forces, to meet any incursion, but if large forces come over, an ordinary military post can hardly resist them. We took immediate steps to send further forces to reinforce our posts. We sent them immediately as we had to, in the circumstances; yet there was one unfortunate,

factor which normally should be remembered. That was, if we send our forces who are tough, young and strong, nevertheless, we send them from the plains of India suddenly to 14,000 ft. high. For any person, however strong he may be, it requires time to be acclimatised to these heights. But they went there. When they went there, then began a process; we sent some further forces and thought that they would be adequate to meet the Chinese menace in so far as it was feasible. The Chinese also started increasing their forces there. Now, for them, it was a relatively easy matter, because they have vast forces in Tibet. I do not know how much they have. They used to have 11 divisions, and I am told they now have 13 or 14 divisions in Tibet. Just imagine the very vast armies they are having in Tibet alone.

First of all, the Chinese armies were fully acclimatised, living for long on the high plateau of Tibet. It was just not in the line with the ridge but only a little below the ridge.

Secondly, the whole of Tibet has been covered in the last few years by roads, and the roads, there, in that extremely severe climate, means simply levelling the ground, removing boulders, etc., because you do not require cement or anything at that height. The ground itself is so very hard. So, this is covered by roads, and they can travel perhaps at quick notice from one part to another in Tibet.

So, they could bring large forces to the other side of the Thagla ridge. They would not be immediately visible to us, because, on the other side,—and that is what we believe happened : that although some forces were being added on by the Chinese crossing the Thagla ridge they could not be seen. They were adding large numbers of forces on the other side nearby and in the last few days of this battle that occurred there on the 20th, they poured in masses of the people. I do not know how much : six, seven and eight times the number of troops that we had. They have thus logistic advantage not only of bringing troops but supplying everything that could be brought immediately on the other side of the Thagla ridge and send them. We had a certain disadvantage. I am merely mentioning the facts—the logistic disadvantage of the people having been suddenly sent to these heights. Everything that they require has to be sent by air, and our Air Force has done a very fine piece of work there, intaking everything by air inspite, sometimes, of enemy fire and the difficulties that always occur in these high mountains. So, this went on.

I must pay my tribute to President Nasser in this matter because he did not make a vague proposal in the air. People advise us to be good and peaceful as if we are inclined to war. In fact, if we are anything, we do not possess the war-like mentality and that is why for the purpose of war there is weakness. We may have developed it, but that is a different matter, I am talking of the past. So, people talking to us to be good boys and make it up has no particular meaning, unless they come to grips with the particular issues involved. Now, President Nasser took the trouble to understand the facts and, thereafter, issued a presidential decree or communiqué issued by the President-in-Council of the UAR in which he made certain proposals. These proposals were not exactly on the lines we had suggested but were largely in conformity with our proposals. They laid special stress on troops withdrawing to their lines where they stood prior to the 8th of September. That was a major thing. That fitted in with our proposal. China has rejected this proposal made by President Nasser.

Now this crisis is none of our making or seeking. It is China which has sought to enforce its so-called territorial claims by military might. Indeed, she has advanced beyond the line of her territorial claims. As I said, their frontier is a mobile one ; anything they could grab becomes their frontier. In this task, in defending our frontiers and our motherland, we have sought help from all friendly countries. I wish to express my gratitude for the prompt response to our appeal for sympathy and support which have been given by various countries. This help that is given is unconditional and without any strings. It does not, therefore, affect directly our policy of non-alignment which we value. Those countries which have helped us have themselves recognised this and made it clear that they do not expect us to leave that policy. Help has been given to us swiftly by the United States, by the United Kingdom and by some other friendly countries. We are in touch with many others. We have also made approaches to other friendly countries like the Soviet Union and France for supplies and equipment.

We have often declared that we do not covet any territory of anyone also ; we are quite satisfied with our own territory such as it is. But there is another aspect of that. We do not submit to anyone else coveting our territory and although the aggressor in this instance has gained some initial successes—I do not know what they have in mind, whether they want to use it as a bargaining counter or they have some other evil designs—as I have said, we cannot submit to it, whatever the consequences.

This peril we have to face is a grave menace. This challenge may be converted into opportunity for us to grow and to change the dark cloud that envelops our frontiers into the bright sun not only of freedom but of welfare in this country. In effect we have to look at this matter as an effort of the whole nation. We may say—some people say—we want an armed people. That is true in a sense. But what we really want is the whole people mobilised for this effort doing their separate jobs whether it is in the field, the factory or the battlefield thus combining together and strengthening the nation and bringing success to us. We have to be armed, therefore, not only with weapons of warfare but by weapons of agriculture, industry and all those as well. We do not minimise our task. Let no man minimise it or have any illusions about it. It is not a thing which we can deal with by momentary enthusiasm, enthusiasm of the moment or lasting a month or two. It is a long effort that we require—a difficult effort—and we shall have to go out to do our utmost. It is not merely enough to pay something to the Defence Fund or to do something else. That is good in its own way. It is very welcome how people are paying them by straining every nerve to the utmost. We have to keep up our strength and our determination to the end. And that end may not be near. Therefore we have to prepare in every way to strengthen the nation not only for today and tomorrow but for the day after also to meet this menace. If we do that, I have no doubt that we shall be able to show the determination and fortitude that is required of our people. We have had a glimpse of it in their present enthusiasm which has been a most moving sight. To see our people come, not only the young but the old—old men and old women—and the young little children and their enthusiasm has been a sight to gladden any heart.

III

We are at the cross roads of history and we are facing great historical problems on which depends our future. Our present of course, but our future

So whether we are big men or small, we have to undertake the work of big men because only big people can face big problems, not big in size but big in mind, big in vision, big in determination. This is the first point I should like to stress upon you to realise the extraordinary character of what has happened which has in effect changed or will change our whole national outlook and our history as it is going to be. So if we have to face this adequately, as we have every intention of doing, then we have to think in a big way. We have to forget many of our problems which normally pursue us and see this big problem which governs us all.

It may be, I hope, it will and there are some indications that it will be, that in solving the big problem we shall almost automatically solve many of our smaller problems, conflicts, controversies, etc. At the same time it is clear that this big problem will require a tremendous effort on the Nation's part and those of us who have been placed by fate and circumstances in a position of Governmental authority, whether at the Centre or at the State, have a tremendous responsibility—a responsibility which a few persons by themselves can be big enough to shoulder but which, I am sure, all of us put together can and will shoulder. Therefore, it is necessary to view these problems in perspective and realise the full implications of what has happened and what might happen.

The Chinese invasion, I may use the word, came in its quantity and quality, as I said it is something different from the previous thing. It came almost like a thunder-bolt, and reactions, today in India, good reactions, have also come like a thunder-bolt. The response of the people all over the country has been truly magnificent and wonderful. Most of the problems that fill our newspapers, conflicts, this that and other are things of the past. Not for ever. They may raise their heads again but for the present they are not and we have to keep them there and there can be no doubt that the response of the people of all classes, of all areas in India, has been amazingly good and heartening. That itself shows the stuff that our people are made of. It is one thing to get entangled in small matters but when the big crisis comes, to rise above those matters and face it. While much had happened in the past to depress us, what has now happened has heartened me and I am sure heartened all of you.

We might say that this terrible shock has occasioned almost a new birth of the Indian spirit and the soul of India has awakened again after some stop. We who are privileged to serve the particular States, to serve India, it is a great privilege and a great responsibility. Well, all we can say is that we shall do our utmost to be worthy of this responsibility and not to allow any personal group or other matters to come in the way. We must put them aside. In this matter, constitutionally there might be Central Government and the State Governments, but actually we are all one and we have to face as one people.

It is clear to begin with that the first priority and the first necessity is to do everything that helps us to meet this crisis and ultimately to push out the invader and the aggressor from the country. That is the first priority and everything else must give way to it. But even considering that we have to see what strength we have in us in doing it and prepare the ground not only for that purpose but for the time that comes afterwards. After all we have an immediate task, immediate I use the word, because the task has come to us now, though it may last considerable time for us to give effect to it, is to free our country from the aggressor. But that itself is part of the task o₁

strengthening and raising our country to higher levels. It may be that some quick of destiny has put us to this test, to take our minds away from the petty things of life and to test us and to prepare us for bigger things in the future.

While we think of what might be called war effort, we have always to think of the building up of the country as well. War effort is not a question of enrolling soldiers and sending them to the front. That is a part of it, an important part. A soldier as everyone knows depends on the country, on the morale of the country, on the production of the country. Each soldier—I do not know how many he requires—requires hundreds of men behind to feed him and to send him supply. Even from the point of view of the war effort, we have to work all over the country in a variety of ways, in agriculture, in industry and so many other ways but also apart from the war effort that is necessary to produce the kind of India that we seek. The two are not contradictory. In fact they fit in. If we do not do that the war effort will be lacking and ultimate result would be very much lacking. For people to say that the Plan must be largely scrapped because we have got trouble and invasion to face has no meaning to me. It shows an utter misunderstanding of the situation. It is a war effort that requires the Plan.

The basis of the Plan is to strengthen the nation, the basis of the plan is to increase production. Nothing is required more than production when you have such a problem to face. I am leaving out the military aspect that is for our experts and soldiers to deal with. But the civil aspect is an essential part of any war effort of this kind. The civil aspect is important and production is important, training is important, technical personnel and all that. It becomes essential to look at the Plan as a part, as an essential part of our effort. Therefore, all idea of giving up the plan with some people who in their shortsightedness suggest is very wrong. It is true that we shall have to examine the Plan, stick to essential and those things that are not essential now or which might be essential tomorrow may be slowed down somewhat.

IV

We may not be able to always succeed in what we are trying now because of various factors and overwhelming numbers of the Chinese forces but I want to take the pledge here and now that we shall see this matter to the end, and the end will have to be victory for India. We are not going to tolerate this kind of invasion of India by any foreign country. This is the first war of Independent India to maintain her independence and India is not going to loose this war however long it lasts and whatever harm it may do us.

I want to send my greetings to the people of Assam, especially to the people of NEFA and to the rest of India, and to tell them that we must not get worried about this: sad we must be necessarily but we must train ourselves and steel ourselves to meet all these reverses and even to make our determination still firmer and to do all that we can to repel and throw out the invaders from India. We shall not be content till the invader goes out from India or is pushed out.

We shall not accept any terms that he may offer, because he may think that we are a little frightened by some setbacks. I want to make that clear to all of you and more especially to our countrymen in Assam to whom our

heart goes out at this moment. There has been a great deal of expression of determination in India—a great enthusiasm which has heartened us. People, even poor people, have been contributing to our Defence Fund and in many other ways people have shown their determination.

I hope that this will continue in an ever-increasing measure and any setbacks that may come in this war which has been thrust upon us, will not permit us to waver in our determination because we will not waver; we shall carry out this fight to the end and that end is going to be a victory for us whatever in between there might be.

So, with this pledge to you I want to end. I do not wish any person to doubt what the end will be. I do not want any Indian, man or woman or child to get dismayed because the Chinese forces have won some successes in the beginning. This is war and in war successes come and failures come also. What counts is the end and not the intermediate stages of the war. So at present I shall only say this to you. I shall not say much.

We see the grossest form of imperialism functioning here across our borders in India. China has said often enough that it is anti-imperialist. Now we see this so-called anti-imperialist country becoming itself an imperialist of the worst kind and committing aggression and invading a friendly country without rhyme or reason or excuse and justifying it by saying that they are being attacked.

I must confess that I have seldom come across such a travesty of truth and decency in international behaviour. We must stand up to it ; not only we, but all decent-minded persons and decent-minded countries who value their freedom anywhere in Asia or Africa, Europe or America.

I should like to say that we are grateful for the speedy help that came to us from our friendly countries abroad more especially from the United States and the United Kingdom. We shall require more help and we will ask them for it and we shall certainly use all the help they can give us because this is a matter of survival for us. It is not a game that we are playing : or if you like it is a game of life and death—life and death of a nation and life and death of millions in this country. We are going ahead whatever happens with the firm conviction in the righteousness of our cause and that success and victory will be ours. I want you to join in this conviction and not to be down-hearted at any time. And so let us all say today with the real meaning and repeat our old cry "Jai Hind".

PEACE NOT WITHOUT FREEDOM

Our policy of non-involvement in military blocs has helped us to foster fellowship among all nations, whatever their political and economic systems may be. In pursuance of this policy we did our best to establish cordial relations with our neighbour, China. Even as we were attempting to resolve our border differences through peaceful negotiations and proposing a conference for that purpose, China, in violation of the principles to which both our countries have subscribed, decided to change the boundary by resort to arms. The large-scale attack on our frontiers took us by surprise. On account of our traditional adherence to the methods of peace and the habits engendered by it, we were psychologically unprepared for meeting this sudden aggression. Owing to the difficult terrain and numerical superiority of the Chinese, we suffered military reverses. These have opened our eyes to the realities of the situation. We are now aware of our inadequacies and are alive to the needs of the present and the demands of the future. The country has developed a new purpose, a will. The difficulties and dangers we are passing through, will, I hope, cleanse us and purge us of our smallness.

We are now taking steps to strengthen our defences. This cannot be achieved by mere wishful thinking or pious resolutions. It has to be worked out by an orderly succession of well directed efforts and disciplined behaviour. We cannot afford to relax our efforts to build up defence forces adequate for the security of our country, with its size and population. The traditional valour and personal bravery of our troops are very high. When properly equipped and trained they would be one of the finest armies in the world.

The attack by China has demonstrated the remarkable unity of our people. The emotional upsurge can be stabilised at deeper levels, if we do not allow petty worries, selfish ambitions and incoherence to take hold of us. Private and personal interest should not be permitted to prevail over national welfare. Our government, our economy, our education, should keep pace with modern standards of economy, efficiency and rectitude. Within the context of this development and discipline we have to bring about a transformation of our country. From ancient times, a democratic attitude of tolerance and understanding of other faiths and ways of life has grown up in the country. An ancient text says that men and women of India belong to different communities, worship different gods and practise different rites.

*bharatesu striyah pumso nan varnah prakirtitah
nana-devarcane yukta nana karmani kurvate*

Among the devotees there is no distinction of caste, learning, beauty, wealth, profession and the like—

nasti teṣu jati-vidya-rupa-kula dhana-kriyadi bhedah

In spite of occasional deviations and setbacks, our people have held to this ideal.

Our policy is one of peaceful settlement of international disputes, though we are obliged to resist aggression when it occurs. Our resistance is to be carried out without illwill or hatred. Our faith in *ahimsa* does not mean cowardly submission to aggression. It is resistance to evil without violence in our minds or hatred in our hearts. While non-violence does not mean surrender to evil, it also requires that we should be ready to negotiate for an honourable settlement if and when an opportunity arises.

II

We have had aggression, military encroachments four years ago. Now and then they were being revived. But the latest was after the 8th of September 1962. All that we are asking for is to have a cease-fire and peace talks and vacation of the fruits of armed aggression after the 8th of September on our borders, Western, Middle and Eastern Sectors.

We are not asking for the complete vacation of all aggression before we start talks. We are asking for what they have by military force acquired after the 8th of September this year. If they do that, we are prepared, our Prime Minister has said a number of times, for peace talks to commence. If they do not accept that it only means that they employ strength, they respect strength and wish to achieve their aims by military force and there is no alternative left to us but to resist this attack, resist the challenge whatever may be the cost or the consequences for us. Freedom is something which is most precious. We cannot barter it away. It does not matter what losses we suffer but we should stand up for the precious gift of freedom which we acquired at so much cost and so much sacrifice. It should be understood by all friends and foes alike that our proposition is a very reasonable one. We are only asking for the vacation of the aggression after the 8th of September, the most recent military encroachments. These are the things in all the Sectors, Western, Middle and Eastern. If that is there, tomorrow there will be ceasefire and there will be peace talks but if that is not there the resistance of ours will continue and will go for a long time until the problem is settled in a just and a reasonable way. We want peace with honour, with justice, with freedom; that is what we ask for. I see in all sides people of all ranks, of all layers of society, of all persuasion, political and religious, united as one man. That shock has brought the country together and I find that sometimes this exuberance, this enthusiasm takes a wrong expression. It is for our leadership to mobilise the emotions, the enthusiasm, discipline the fervour which our boys and girls are showing and make them understand. It is a serious undertaking on which we are engaged and it is not the time for futile demonstrations or angry words. We must be determined, disciplined until we are able to achieve the right goal by peaceful means if possible, by any means if necessary. That is the alternative which is before us and we shall not falter in this task. We shall not be untrue to our predecessors and to our descendants by bartering away the freedom of our country selling away a part of its territory to satisfy our present convenience or anything like that. That is the spirit in which we have undertaken this task. Our cause is just and we will win. I have no doubt about it. Our people have no doubt about it and let it only be understood that we are not war mongers, we are not for expansionism, we are not chauvinistic, we are not getting into other people's territories. We are only anxious to preserve

our own territory and expel the intruder from it. That is our point and it is good to know that the free nations of the world have appreciated our point of view. All the peace loving nations of the world who don't believe in the law of military might, who believe in peace through justice, through freedom, they are supporting our cause.

III

This conflict with China does not in any way diminish our faith in the United Nations and the growth of a world community. We live in an age of the decline of the nation-state and the rise of a world society. All men are brothers though nation States sometimes seem to be hostile to one another. We have been striving, to the extent to which one nation can, to strengthen the United Nations and give to it authority and power to protect small and weak nation from attacks by larger and stronger powers. We will continue in our endeavours to transform the United Nations into a world authority. Till this goal is reached, so long as there are nations which esteem and respect only military strength, we owe it to ourselves to give our people security to lead their lives unfettered by interference from outside.

We are convinced of the irrationality of war. We know that it does not settle disputes but when our security is imperilled, when justice is violated, we are obliged to use force for defensive purposes. While individuals may adopt an attitude of complete abstention from the use of force in any circumstances, the State cannot adopt such a policy if it is to discharge its first duty to give protection to its citizens. Even States should ceaselessly strive with discipline and courage to narrow the escape for the use of force and enlarge that of persuasion.*

We do not wish to change our basic policies of democratic freedom, social justice and friendship among nations simply because military conflict is thrust upon us to our great sorrow. We will follow a policy of friendship to all nations and enmity towards none. We shall do everything in our power to clear up misunderstandings and suspicions with our neighbours without losing patience or hope. We shall not at any time or in any circumstance be tempted into a large country or great civilisation complex. We know that national self-confidence is essential for survival, but we also know that national conceit is a source of irritation to others. By our every word and action we create a climate of friendliness or annoyance and we should be vigilant about what we say or do in regard to international questions. Nationalism and internationalism do not involve us in an either or. Internationalism is an over-arching ideal which reconciles the national concepts we have developed. To this generation is given the responsibility and the opportunity to change the international situation and safeguard not only itself but the future generations, for whom we hold the world in trust. It is a race against time and we must win it.

FIGHT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES

The freedom we won 15 years ago, after a long and bitter struggle, is today being threatened. Our country which has consistently followed a policy of peace and friendship with the peoples the world over has been subjected to an unabashed and unprovoked aggression by a country with which we were especially friendly and whose case we espoused with fervour and zeal in the United Nations and outside. In flagrant violation of all recognised standards of international behaviour, China has chosen to launch a massive invasion of our country and has pressed into service hundreds of thousands of soldiers, armed with modern weapons, for this purpose.

What we are facing today is not merely a violation of the country's territorial integrity but a ruthless and unscrupulous attack on our freedom, our democratic values and our very way of life. Not only that, what we are facing is an onslaught on philosophy of international peace and progress which we have followed and upheld.

A supreme effort on our part is called for to meet this challenge. The response which people all over the country have shown has been most magnificent. The entire nation has been roused and stirred into a new awakening. Men, women and children have come forward to give all they have for the defence of the country. Old differences and controversies, feuds and squabbles have suddenly been forgotten and a new consciousness—a national consciousness—has come to the fore and a mighty upsurge of national determination to face the danger and overcome it has become the dominant feature of our national life. What we are witnessing is not some thing momentary but the real spirit of a nation determined to live—live in freedom and with dignity. As the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, has rightly put, “it may be that some trick of destiny has put us to this test, to take our minds away from the petty things of life and to test us and to prepare us for bigger things in the future”.

Our valiant men of the Army and Air Force have shown epic heroism in facing the aggressor. In spite of difficult terrain and superior number of the invader they have fought for every inch of our sacred land and not given in before a brute show of armed might. We all have to back those valiant sons of our country by every possible means—by doing our duty efficiently and, unflinchingly, wherever we are, by producing more in fields and factories and by standing like a colossus behind our Government and its leader. We have to redouble our efforts for achieving the targets which we have set ourselves under the Plan and achieve them speedily and with the least possible waste of resources and energy.

What is more, we have got to be vigilant about the enemy within—I mean those who might seek to derive profit from the present situation by rais-

ing prices, cornering stocks of essential commodities or by weakening the will of the people by indulging in destructive and demoralising criticism of national policies and raising issues which have no relevance to the present situation. It should be made clear to them that they shall not receive any quarter anywhere in our country. The people of border States like Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Bengal, U.P. and Himachal Pradesh have a special responsibility in the present situation. We have got to be particularly vigilant and watchful and mobilise all our resources for the all--important task of organising national defence.

So far as Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, our entire resources are at the disposal of the nation. Our men of the Militia are fighting the Chinese aggressor on the Ladakh front alongside the Jawans of the Army and a number of them have been honoured for the exemplary courage and heroism shown by them. I take this opportunity to salute the memory of those of our men who have fallen while fighting and, on behalf of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, I pledge that their martyrdom will not go in vain. For every drop of blood that they have shed in the cause of country's freedom and honour hundreds and thousands of men and women will rise to continue the battle and fight till our objective is achieved.

We are fighting for our freedom and our honour, for the preservation of democratic values and our way of life. With faith in the justness of our cause and confidence in our future let us dedicate ourselves to live and die for our motherland. Victory shall be ours.

TO TEACH PEACE TO CHINESE INDIA WOULD SEND NOW NOT BUDDHA BUT JAWANS

The present Sino-Indian conflict seems to be the biggest riddle of the twentieth century. The opening of the fronts on the NEFA and Ladakh by the marauding Chinese is, in fact, an armed entanglement of India, unaware and against her desire. India has been keen to avoid any clash with China. Prime Minister has been saying from the beginning that India-China amity is '*sine quia non*' for ending colonialism in Asia and for its economic development. He went on to say friendship between China and India was essential for world peace. This is the reason behind our whole-hearted support for getting an honoured place for Communist China amongst the comity of nations at the UNO. Even after her perfidious invasion of our sacred soil, we have not weakened in our resolve to get her a seat in the United Nations General Assembly. Our countrymen, it is useful to remember, tried to cement the relations between the two nations by forging the slogan of 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai'; and rediscovering for the world polity the noble message of Panch-sheel

We have been rewarded by China with trickery, chicanery and faithlessness in return for our steadfastness; goodwill and peaceability. Behind the facade of friendship, China has been preparing for war on a grand scale against us. She has mistook our love for peace for weakness and has timed her move to stab us in our Himalayan shoulder-blade.

Thus today we are face to face with such an unscrupulous and barbarous adversary. Chinese aims have now become clear and there should remain no ambiguity left in our minds. They have focussed their slant-eyes on the rich mineral and oil-bearing valley of the Brahmaputra. They are initially trying to stage an outflanking movement against Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal, cutting them off from the umbrella of India's guidance and protection. Their ultimate goal is to disembowel their gigantic man-power on the fertile Yamuna-Ganga Valley. In other words, Red China itself having passed through the blood-bath of a regimented medieval oligarchy is bent upon letting loose the same hell on the peaceful democratic India.

It is clear that the leaders of Red China are pinning their faith blindly in the doctrine of exporting Communism. The home of Communism, Russia seems to understand the change in the world reality and is coming more and more towards the technique of peaceful settlement of international problems. But China wants to outdo her mentor in spreading Communism by force. The Chinese intellectuals think world peace cannot be established except through a perennial class struggle and bloody revolution. China's Vice-President of Cultural and Literary Affairs, Chou Yang, expressed the opinion in 1960 that those who talk of humanity and humanism were first class reactionaries. War was not always inhuman and did not dehumanize human nature. On the other hand, he said, large-scale deaths of soldiers on the battlefield were

ennobling sacrifices that inspired and re-moulded mankind. To abhor and shun war was to betray trust with the progressive forces, he philosophized.

Mesmerized and blinded by this theory of war, the Communist rulers of China have launched a full-scale war on India to ostensibly settle the border dispute. They are under the delusion that it is the right moment to help Indian Communists exploit internal discontent and create chaos. Probably this is the reason that though the Communist Party of India has declared China as an aggressor in its resolutions, many of the Communist leaders do not consider it to be so. They believe that China is a socialist state and whatever she is doing is for the spread of socialism and for strengthening socialist forces. They say such a nation can never be called an aggressor.

We will discuss later how and to what extent Chinese aims are being executed. Let us cast a glance at the political, economic and social condition of Communist China. Scores of experiments have been tried during the last thirteen years for the reconstruction of their land according to their new fangled theories. At one time, the entire attention of the nation was concentrated on massive industrialisation. Farmers were mobilized to become factory labour. There was the inevitable failure on the agricultural front. Crores of tons of food had to be imported. Then there was a swing back to agriculture sought to be regimented through the brutal system of communes. Food, however, refused to come along the assembly line and China today faces the worst recurring famines of its history. The Communists thus destroyed their social and cultural heritage but did not attain economic prosperity. In fact, China could not find any break and could not discover any path along which she could make an ordered progress. Communications and transport have remained undeveloped. Only one-third of the area has the facility of railways. Despite being an agricultural country, farm produce has not shown any increase during the communist regime. The general public lacks elementary necessities of food, clothing and shelter. Hunger marches are common and people asking for food and employment are beaten and given shock treatment. Recently when Chinese hordes were shelling our frontiers, 10,000 Chinese were staging hunger marches in Manchuria. They were all sent to jail for this offence.

The above explains how and at what cost the Communist Revolution has been stabilised in China. There is mounting discontent at the abysmal failure of the economic policies of the Communist war lords.

The present war on India is the child of this discontent. People's anger and hunger are sought to be diverted by this Himalayan adventure. It is heartlessly believed that this war would also help in balanceing their population explosion. To their heartless theorists, decimation of man-power to offset increase in population is quite a humanitarian ethics. To them, killings of their people in a war of their own making is perfectly justified as a panacea for over-population. They believe in the theory of war by throwing waves and waves of 'human sea' against enemy positions.

Their strategy is to pulverise the enemy under the physical weight of their legions. This was their policy in their own civil war, in the Korean war. This policy envisages the cutting of human beings like carrots. Man ceases to be a creature in the image of God and is reduced to being merely a sacrificial goat. To the Communist masters of China, there is nothing wrong in this policy as it is the antidote to their population problem,

Such is India's enemy today on her northern frontiers. His atrocities in Tibet are not hidden from anyone. Tibetan women have been captured en masse and turned over to the Chinese soldiers, the brave Khampa tribe being ruthlessly exterminated. In fact, Tibet is a victim of genocide and being rapidly populated by the Chinese.

We should have no illusions about the aims and objects of the Chinese invaders. They are out to conquer us and make slaves of us, if they can. They are banking upon the achievement of their objective by the sheer strength of their 65 crores man power. Their policy of the 'human sea' has paid short-term dividends in the initial fighting on the border. They were able to over-power our forward posts but had to pay dearly for their successes.

Chinese killed are said to be five times more than ours. Thus, if the number of our killed is estimated at 2,500, their number should be about 15,000.

The question that arises is whether the Chinese 'human sea' warfare will prove successful against us and whether we will go down before them, losing our freedom. The answer to the first part of the question is that India's man power is no less than China's, and is qualitatively superior. If the Chinese Communists want the Indians to reduce their population, then India has man power enough for the job. The answer to the second part of the question can be obvious from the upsurge of patriotism that has swept the country from end to end. The Red rulers of China should know they have prodded the Himalayas, the perennial source of all our strength, physical and moral. The mighty giant is awake and has taken the sword.

The Indian people would again teach the Chinese the lesson of peace, no non-violently like the 'Buddha' of old, but, at the ends of the jawan's guns. This is because the Chinese Communists do not understand the language of love but only of force.

V

Aggression And India

- I Unprincipled Sino-Pak Pact RANA SATYA PAUL
- II The Army And Economics H. V. R. JENGAR
- III Danger To Non-Communist Asia TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN
- IV Clouds Over India HEINZ PENTZLIN
- V Aggression And India HAMAYUN KABIR

UNPRINCIPLED SINO-PAK PACT

The former princely State of Jammu & Kashmir acceded to India in October 1947 when the ruler of the State executed an Instrument of Accession under the Government of India Act of 1935 as adapted under the Indian Independence Act of 1947. This Instrument of Accession was accepted on behalf of the Government of India by Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor-General of India. A similar document was signed by more than 500 princely States who acceded to India after her Independence.

The State's accession to India was legal, completely constitutional and totally unconditional.

The act of the State's accession to India was performed by the ruler with the concurrence and support of the largest political party in the State, the National Conference, (the then only opposition party Praja Parishad, of the Jammu & Kashmir State also openly favoured the complete and unconditional accession of the State to India). This act of accession was further reinforced by a freely elected Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu & Kashmir which held its first meeting in October 1951. It was reaffirmed in the State's Constitution adopted on November 17, 1956. The relevant portion of this Constitution is as follows:

“We, the people of the State of Kashmir, having solemnly resolved, in pursuance of the accession of the State to India which took place on the twenty-sixth day of October 1947, to further defend the existing relationship of the State with the Union of India as an integral part thereof, and to secure to ourselves justice, social, economic and political; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; equality of status and of opportunity, and to promote among us all sovereignty assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the Nation :

“In our Constituent Assembly this seventeenth day of November, 1956, do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution.

“The State of Jammu & Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.”

The Instrument of Accession has been superseded by the Constitution of India and the relations between the State of Jammu & Kashmir with India are now regulated by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution.

Hence, Kashmir became, as expressly desired by its people, a constituent State of the Indian Union and, therefore, part of Indian territory. India's sovereignty in Kashmir stems from the act of accession which was complete,

total and unconditionel—an act of accession fully ratified by the freely expressed will of its people.

Almost all the States acceded to India or Pakistan on various dates after 15th August 1947 when India won her Independence and Pakistan was created a new independent State in Asia. In each case the Instrument of Accession was signed by the ruler, as required by the Government of India Act. The State of Jammu & Kashmir delayed its decision in regard to accession. Pending his decision, the ruler of Jammu & Kashmir sought to enter into a Standstill Agreement with each of the Dominions. But, before long, the Pakistani raiders and other hostiles crossed the frontiers into the State.

October 22, 1947. The intruders now turned invaders, launched a massive attack and threatened to overthrow the ruler and occupy the whole of the State in an illegal fashion. The raiders were aided and, as proved later, organised by Pakistan, who used tribesmen and Pakistan irregulars as the invading force. Led by officers of the Pakistan Army, they were supplied with automatic weapons and transport and reinforcement. The raiders used Pakistan Army signals and military hospitals. The Armed Forces of the State and the people offered stout resistance but, by October 25, the invaders had advanced deep into Kashmir and were within few miles of Srinagar, the summer capital of the State, after burning and sacking the town of Baramula. They indulged in indiscriminate killing, plunder, arson and rape, and whole villages and towns were laid waste.

On October 26, 1947, the ruler executed an Instrument of Accession to India in strict accordance with the constitutional forms and procedure. On October 27, 1947, the Indian Armed Forces landed in Kashmir and with great heroism and sacrifices checked at once the tide. The invaders began to retreat. On January 1, 1948 the Government of India referred the matter to the Security Council of the United Nations requesting the Council to force Pakistan not to give any help to the invaders in order to establish law and order in the State effectively and speedily. Sir Zafrullah Khan, Pakistani Foreign Minister, emphatically denied any Pakistani collusion with the tribal invaders. When the United Nations Commission arrived in Karachi on July 7, 1948, it was surprised to know from the same Pakistani Foreign Minister that regular units of the Pakistan Army had been fighting against India in the State of Jammu & Kashmir—according to him since early May, but infact much earlier.

Later both Pakistan and India accepted the Resolution of August 13, 1948 by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The first part of that Resolution imposed a ceasefire. The second part of the Resolution directed Pakistan to withdraw all its regular and irregular forces from the territory of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The third part (*which was to be implemented when the conditions laid down in parts one and two were fulfilled*) envisioned a method whereby the free will of the people of the State could be ascertained in a peaceful manner.

Pakistan never honoured the Resolution. Since the day the ceasefire was imposed Pakistan had repeatedly violated and continues to violate even today in the form of organizing raids and sabotage in Kashmir. She did not withdraw a single soldier from the occupied Kashmir but, on the contrary has established new contonements and military establishments and allowed the American forces to maintain permanent basis in this area. This constitutes a

clear violation of the letter and the spirit of the Resolution of the UNCIP. Pakistan had already earlier violated the Indian Independence Act of 1947, the Government of India Act of 1935, the Instrument of Accession which bound the State of Jammu & Kashmir with India, and, the Standstill Agreement which the ruler had entered into with Pakistan when Pakistan aided armed tribesmen and later the regular Pakistan Army intruded into the Kashmir valley. The precedent having set, Pakistan continued to violate the ceasefire, the United Nations and the Security Council's resolutions and, torn into shreds all the rules of conduct of civilised international community.

It is true that India accepted the ceasefire in Kashmir in 1948 and has not even once violated it but, it is true also that India has never forgone her sovereign and legal rights in that area of the State which fell into the Pakistani hands after ceasefire. Though this area has remained, and still is under the illegal occupation of Pakistan, this does not establish her sovereign rights in that area of the State which by all international norms is basically an Indian territory. And, how far is Pakistan legally justified to surrender a portion of this illegally occupied territory to a third State? Any agreement concluded which contravenes the spirit or the letter of the law of the land or international community has no binding effect according to the international practices. India cannot allow a country to barter away the Indian territory for some diplomatic benefits to that country. Ceasefire in Kashmir is not a ceasefire between the two countries on the common international borders. The present ceasefire is well within the Indian territory of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The area under Pakistani occupation is India's territory and India alone can decide about the future of this area and, not Pakistan at all.

II

According to details released officially in Karachi, the Government of Pakistan first, informally sounded China and then sent a diplomatic note on March 28, 1961, expressing the desire to negotiate demarcation of the boundary. The Chinese Government reacted formally to this, about a year later, that is, in February, 1962. On May 3, 1962 by a communique the Government of China announced that the Governments of Pakistan and China had entered into an agreement 'to locate and align their common borders'. This communique pushed India into a new relationship both with Pakistan and China. India who had in her foreign policy tried hard to preserve peace and on her fronts both with Pakistan and China endeavoured to reach to a peaceful settlement of her dispute with China and Pakistan, was now a victim of the vicious designs of these two countries. The two countries were now entering into an unholy alliance against India. China who had earlier by all diplomatic behaviour recognised India's sovereignty over the whole of the State of Jammu & Kashmir including the area now under unlawful occupation of Pakistan, went away from her earlier commitments about India's sovereignty over the Pakistan occupied Indian territory. Pakistan, who had earlier regarded Communist China as a danger to her security and sought India's help to stem the Communist tide and entered with the Western countries into various military alliances against China, found in China a new friend in opposition toward India. A strange collusion. An unprincipled pact. India's reaction to the Chinese communique was quick and sharp.

On May 10, 1962, drawing reference to her previous protest notes dated May 4, 1961 and June 12, 1961, the Government of India lodged a strong

protest against the reported attempt of Pakistan to sign a boundary agreement with China for the area of the State of Jammu & Kashmir under unlawful occupation of Pakistan. The Note pointed out : "Despite numerous reports in the press and the Pakistan Government's refusal to provide the clarification sought from them, the Government of India had all this time been disinclined to believe that the Government of Pakistan would in fact enter into negotiations with China in respect of the territory of the State of Jammu & Kashmir (*Pakistan has no common boundary of its own with China*) which forms an integral part of the Indian Union. The Government of Pakistan are obviously not entitled to negotiate with China or any other country about territory that is not their own." The Note continued : "As the Government of Pakistan are aware the international boundary alignment in the sector west of the Karakoram Pass of Jammu & Kashmir State of India follows well-known natural features, has been recognised in history for all these years, and does not require fresh delimitation.....The Government of India will never agree to any arrangements, provisional or otherwise, between the Governments of China and Pakistan regarding territory which constitutes an inalienable part of the Indian Union."

On the same day the Government of India lodged a strong protest with the Government of Communist China. It reads :

"As the Government of China are aware there is no common border between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China. It is the India-China boundary which starts from the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan at approximately Long. $74^{\circ} 34'$ E and Lat. $37^{\circ} 3'$ N and runs eastward upto the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, Burma and China.

"There has never been any doubt that the sovereignty over the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir, including that part which is under Pakistan's unlawful occupation, vests solely in the Indian Union. The Government of India had so far believed that the Government of the People's Republic of China had accepted this basic position without any reservation. This was confirmed by Premier Chou En-lai when he stated to the Indian Ambassador in Peking on March 16, 1956 "that the people of Kashmir had already expressed their will" on the issue of Kashmir's accession to India. The same impression was gained at the meeting between the Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Chinese Prime Minister in July 1961. At that time it seemed that the Government of China still acknowledged the final accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union. The Government of India in view of this background, are, surprised that the Government of the People's Republic of China should have suddenly decided to enter into an international agreement to negotiate the boundary of that part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which is under the unlawful occupation of Pakistan with the Government of Pakistan. This is a reversal of the attitude of the Government of the People's Republic of China in regard to India's sovereignty over the entire State of Jammu & Kashmir and is obviously a step in furtherance of the aggressive aims that China has been pursuing towards India in recent years.

"In lodging an emphatic protest with the Government of the People's Republic of China for this interference with the sovereignty of India over the State of Jammu & Kashmir, Government of India solemnly warns the Government of China that any change provisional or otherwise in the status of the State of Jammu & Kashmir brought about by third parties which seeks

to submit certain parts of Indian territory to foreign jurisdiction will not be binding on the Government of India and that the Government of India firmly repudiate any agreements provisional or otherwise regarding her own territories arrived at between third parties who have no legal or constitutional *locus standi* of any kind.

"It is clear that the Government of China are in this matter acting in furtherance of their aggressive designs and are seeking to exploit the troubled situation in Kashmir and India's differences with Pakistan for their advantage. The Government of India will hold the Government of China responsible for the consequences of their action."

In the course of their reply dated May 31, 1962, the Chinese Government said : "When did the Chinese Government accept without any reservation the position that Kashmir is under Indian sovereignty ? The Indian Government could not cite any official Chinese document to prove this arbitrary contention but, basing itself solely on the guesswork and impression of Indian diplomatic officials who have been to China, insisted that Chinese Government authorities had made statements to that effect."

The Chinese Note went on : "There is a boundary of several hundred kilometres between China's Sinkiang and the areas, the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan, and it has never been formally delimited and demarcated. Since both China and Pakistan are sovereign States, why cannot China conduct negotiations with Pakistan to settle the question of the actually existing common boundary so as to maintain tranquillity on the border and amity between the two countries ?"

The Chinese Note took up the position that the boundary negotiations between China and Pakistan did not at all involve the question of ownership of Kashmir, and said that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, "the sovereign authority concerned shall reopen negotiations with the Chinese Government on the question of Kashmir boundary so as to conclude a formal boundary treaty..."

In its reply to the Chinese Note of May 31, 1962, the Indian Note of June 30, 1962, reasserted : "To justify their untenable move, the Government of China have emphasised a particular necessity which in fact does not exist. There is no boundary dispute in this sector of the Sino-Indian boundary and no urgency for a fresh settlement over it. Even in 1847, the Government of China had informed the British Government that as the boundary in this sector was sufficiently and distinctly fixed, there was no need for any additional measures for refixing it. The initiative in this matter was for political reasons taken by the Government of Pakistan who had committed aggression in Kashmir. Though the Chinese Government had not responded to this initiative earlier, it is clear that they decided to do so now for possible political advantage to be obtained by exploiting the Indo-Pakistan differences in this matter."

The Indian Note added : "It is patent that the Government of China have now taken a new stand on the legal status of Kashmir." The note pointed out that, while not formally declaring their official stand on the status of Kashmir, the Chinese Government had, "perhaps with mental reservation of their own, given the impression on a number of occasions that they had, by and large, accepted India's basic position in Kashmir. At other times, they

had declared themselves against any third party interference in the situation created by Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir."

The Indian Note went on to recall that on March 16, 1956, Premier Chou En-lai told the Indian Ambassador in Peking that "the people of Kashmir have already expressed their will." Again on July 16, 1961, at the talks between Premier Chou En-lai and the Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Premier Chou En-lai stated that "Pakistan had formally proposed border talks" but emphasised that the Chinese Government "have not discussed with them anything so far." In the same discussions, Premier Chou En-lai went on to ask the Secretary-General: "Can you site any document to show that we have ever said that Kashmir is not a part of India ?" Now this position has been reversed. The Chinese note (of May 31, 1962) under reply asks : "Can you site any document to show that we have ever said that Kashmir is a part of India ?"

The Indian Note stressed : "The entire evidence cited above supports the view that, until recently, the Chinese Government had declared themselves in favour of the question of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir being settled peacefully, and against any third party taking advantage of it. However, this stand of the Government of China has changed and a new situation now created by the Sino-Pakistan agreement to demarcate their non-existent common border. In departing from their earlier policy of non-interference in the Kashmir situation, the Government of China are giving legal and moral encouragement to an aggressor State and prejudicing the prospects of a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan."

Concluding, the Indian Note said : "The Government of India, while rejecting the Government of China's note under reference, would again reiterate that any change, provisional or otherwise, in the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir brought about by third parties which seeks to submit certain parts of Indian territory to foreign jurisdiction will not be binding on the Government of India."

On the eve of the Indo-Pakistan talks on Kashmir and other related matters, December 23, 1962, the Government of China and Pakistan announced "complete agreement in principle" in regard to the alignment of the common border between China (Sinkiang) and the Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir. The announcement made simultaneously in Rawalpindi and Peking referred to the Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir as "contiguous areas the defence of which is the responsibility of Pakistan". Pakistan's then External Minister, Late Mohammed Ali, said that he was gratified that the legitimate interests of Pakistan had been safeguarded under the agreement. Mohammad Ali also pointed out that the legitimate interests of China had been also similarly safeguarded.

This would be interesting to note that the Chinese had always excused themselves from discussing the question of India's frontiers west of the Karakoram (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir) on the plea (to quote the Chinese officials at the Officials' Conference of 1960 between the two countries) that "it was necessary for both sides to adopt a matter-of-fact attitude and avoid serious political questions unrelated to our work." Commenting on the 26th December Sino-Pak announcement the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, pointed out on December 27, 1962 that the present discussions between China and Pakistan are "quite obviously in contradiction

to these provisions and this explicit undertaking. China herself in the past had respected this position. It is all the more surprising, therefore, that on the eve of discussions between India and Pakistan, in which Kashmir will form a subject, both Pakistan and China should have thought fit to announce this undertaking. This can only confirm a close collaboration between Peking and Rawalpindi."

When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had earlier succeeded to Late Mohammad Ali as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, was already in Peking and an agreement between the two countries were expected at any time, the Government of India lodged another protest on March 2, 1963 regarding boundary negotiations between the Governments of Pakistan and China. Referring to the Chinese assertion dated February 21, 1963 that the Government of China "has never involved itself in the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir", the Indian Note emphasised that "this assertion is directly contradicted by the actions of the Chinese Government in entering into negotiations with Pakistan though there is no common border between Pakistan and China". The Indian Note continued : "Equally groundless and misleading is the further assertion that the Sino-Pakistan boundary negotiations and related agreement have not at all touched upon the ownership of Kashmir". If Pakistan has no common border with China, and China and Pakistan, nevertheless, agree to locate to and align a boundary in Kashmir, no further proof is needed to show that the Chinese objective is to come to terms with Pakistan on the question of the ownership of Kashmir, and to involve itself in its neighbours' dispute in the interests of its expansionist and chauvinistic policies. The absurd claim made in the Chinese note that the boundary negotiation between Pakistan and China has "promoted the friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani people and is in the interests of Asia and the world peace" is, therefore, nothing but an excuse—and a false excuse at that—for the pursuit of exactly the opposite objective, namely, China's insidious policy of poisoning the mutual relations between the countries of Asia and creating tensions and conflict in this region."

On the same day, March 2, 1962, when the Government of India handed over to the Chinese Embassy in India her above mentioned protest Note, the Government of China and the Government of Pakistan signed in Peking a border agreement delimiting the 300 miles frontier between Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the text of the agreement was simultaneously released in Karachi and Peking.

The 'Boundary Agreement' between Pakistan and China reads as follows :

The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Pakistan ;

Having agreed, with a view to ensuring the prevailing peace and tranquillity on the border, to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan, in a spirit of fairness, reasonableness, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation, and on the basis of the ten principles as enunciated in the Bandung conference ;

Being convinced that this would not only give full expression to the desire of the peoples of China and Pakistan for the development of good-neighbourly and friendly relations, but also help safeguard Asian and world peace;

Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present agreement and have appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries the following :

For the Government of the People's Republic of China : Chen Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs ;

For the Government of Pakistan : Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of External Affairs;

Who, having mutually examined their full powers and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following :

ARTICLE I

In view of the fact that the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan has never been formally delimited, the two parties agree to delimit it on the basis of the traditional customary boundary line including natural features and in a spirit of equality, mutual benefit and friendly co-operation.

ARTICLE II

In accordance with the principle expounded in Article I of the present agreement, the two parties have fixed, as follows the alignment of the entire boundary line between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan :

(1) Commencing from its north-western extremity at height 5,630 metres (a peak, the reference co-ordinates of which are approximately longitude 74 degrees 34 minutes east and latitude 37 degrees 03 minutes north), the boundary line runs generally eastward and then southeastward strictly along the main watershed between the tributaries of the Tashkurgan river of the Tarim river system on the one hand and the tributaries of the Hunza river of the Indus river system on the other hand, passing through the Kilik Daban (Dawan), the Mintaka Daban (pass), the Kharchanai Daban (named on the Chinese map only), the Mutsjilga Daban (named on the Chinese map only), and the Parpik pass (named on the Pakistan map only), and reaches the Khunjerb (Yutr) Daban (pass).

(2) After passing through the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (pass), the boundary line runs generally southward along the above-mentioned main watershed upto a mountain-top south of this Daban (pass), where it leaves the main watershed to follow the crest of a spur lying generally in a southeasterly direction, which is the watershed between the Akjilga river (a nameless corresponding river on the Pakistan map) on the one hand, and the Taghumbash (Oprang) river and the Keliman Su (Oprang Jilga) on the other hand.

According to the map of the Chinese side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur, runs along a small section of the middle line of the bed of the Keliman Su to reach its confluence with the Kelechin river. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern extremity of this spur, reaches the sharp bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh river.

(3) From the aforesaid point, the boundary line runs up the Kelechin river (Shaksgam or Muztagh river) along the middle line of its bed confluence (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 76 degrees 02 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 26 mintues north) with the Shorbukh Daria (Shimshal river or Braldu river).

(4) From the confluence of the aforesaid two rivers, the boundary line, according to the map of the Chinese side, ascends the crest of a spur and runs along it to join the Karakoram range main watershed at a mountain-top (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 75 degrees 54 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 15 minutes north) which on this map is shown as belonging to the Shorgulak mountain. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line from the confluence of the above mentioned two rivers ascends the crest of a corresponding spur and runs along it, passing through height 6,520 metres (21,390 feet) till it joins the Karakoram range main watershed at a peak (reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 75 degrees 57 minutes east and latitude 36 degrees 03 minutes north).

(5) Thence, the boundary line running generally southward and then eastward, strictly follows the Karakoram range main watershed which separates the Tarim river drainage system from the Indus river drainage system, passing through the east Mustagh pass (Muztagh pass), the top of the Chogri peak (K-2), the top of the broad peak, the top of the Gasherbrum mountain (8,068), the Indirakoli pass (names on the Chinese maps only) and the top of the Teram Kankri peak, and reaches its southeastern extremity at the Karakoram pass.

(Two) The alignment of the entire boundary line as described in section one of this article, has been drawn on the one/million scale map of the Chinese side in Chinese and the one/million scale map of the Pakistan side in English, which are signed and attached to the present agreement.

(Three) In view of the fact that the maps of the two sides are not fully identical in their representation of topographical features the two parties have agreed that the actual features on the ground shall prevail so far as the location and alignment of the boundary described in Section one is concerned ; and that they will be determined as far as possible by joint survey on the ground.

ARTICLE III

The two parties have agreed that :

(1) Wherever the boundary follows a river, the middle line of the river bed shall be the boundary line ; and that

(2) Wherever the boundary passes through a daban (pass), the water-parting line thereof shall be the boundary line.

ARTICLE IV

One : The two parties have agreed to set up, as soon as possible, a joint boundary demarcation commission. Each side will appoint a chairman, one or more members and a certain number of advisers and technical staff. The

joint boundary demarcation commission is charged with the responsibility, in accordance with the provision of the present agreement, to hold concrete discussions on and carry out the following tasks jointly :

(1) To conduct necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground, as stated in Article II of the present agreement, so as to set up boundary markers at places considered to be appropriate by the two parties and to delineate the boundary line of the jointly prepared accurate maps.

(2) To draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and the location of all the boundary markers and prepare and get printed detailed maps, to be attached to the protocol, with the boundary line and the location of the boundary markers shown on them.

Two : The aforesaid protocol, upon being signed by the representatives of the Governments of the two countries, shall become an annex to the present agreement, and the detailed maps shall replace the maps attached to the present agreement.

Three : Upon the conclusion of the above-mentioned protocol, the tasks of the joint boundary demarcation commission shall be terminated.

ARTICLE V

The two parties have agreed that any dispute concerning the boundary which may arise after the delimitation of the boundary line actually existing between the two countries shall be settled peacefully by the two parties through friendly consultations.

ARTICLE VI

The two parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations with the Government of the People's Republic of China on the boundary, as described in Article II of the present agreement, so as to sign a formal boundary treaty to replace the present agreement, provided that in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement and of the aforesaid protocol shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed between the People's Republic of China and Pakistan.

ARTICLE VII

The present agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature. Done in duplicate in Peking on the second day of March, 1963, in the Chinese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Now, it has been stated in Karachi that the difference between the Chinese claim line and the Pakistan claim line was 3,400 square miles. In the final agreement, Pakistan claims to have received 1,350 square miles, including 700 square miles of area which was in China's possession. The Chinese have

been given 2,000 square miles under the agreement. But, according to the Survey of Pakistan maps, even those published in 1962, about 11,000 square miles of Sinkiang territory formed part of Kashmir. If one goes by these maps, Pakistan has obviously surrendered over 13,000 square miles of territory.

Reacting sharply to this agreement the Prime Minister of India in a statement in the Lok Sabha on March 5, 1963 pointed out that "although, according to the agreement, the parties have agreed to delimit the boundary on the basis of the traditional customary boundary line, including natural features, the boundary, as agreed to, does not do so. The Pakistan line of actual control, according to the map, which the Government of Pakistan had supplied to our High Commission, lay, across the Kilik, Mintaka, Khunjerab Passes; but, thereafter, the line left the watershed and followed neither the Aghil Range, which is the traditional boundary, nor the Karakoram Range along which the alignment claimed by the Government of China lay. In fact, the Pakistan line of actual control ran along no definite natural features, but cut across the tributaries of the Shaksgam river and sometimes lay half way up the slopes. It then reached the Karakoram Pass. Running south of the traditional alignment, the Pakistan line of actual control surrendered about 1,600 square miles to China. The difference between the Pakistan and Chinese alignment was about 2,100 square miles."

The Prime Minister continued : I have already stated in this House, that we are, naturally anxious to have a settlement with Pakistan ; but I cannot help feeling that the joint announcement on December 26, the Pakistan Government's announcement on February 22, to sign the border agreement in Peking, and finally the signing of this agreement have been timed to prejudice the outcome of the joint talks on Kashmir and other related matters. However, as an earnest of our desire for an honourable and equitable settlement with Pakistan, we propose to continue with the talks in Calcutta.

Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, further added that the other party to the agreement, namely China, in spite of its professions that it has never involved itself in the dispute over Kashmir or its absurd claim that the boundary negotiations have promoted friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani peoples and are in the interests of Asia and world peace, is directly interfering in Indo-Pakistan relations. By doing this, China is seeking to exploit differences between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question to further its own expansionist policy."

This is how Pakistan has joined hands with the Communist China in an open hostility towards the bastion of democracy in Asia—India. This unholy arrangement, which Pakistan has succeeded to reach with a great ease while giving away to China a few thousand square miles of Indian territory, and, China has mischievously concluded with an haste in her attempt to isolate India along her entire borders and outwit the Anglo-American diplomacy to bring Pakistan and India together to find out a solution to the Kashmir problems, is nothing but an alliance of hatred and jealousy against India and as such against the Free Asia.

THE ARMY AND ECONOMICS

It is impossible to discuss matters of economic significance without making some attempt to understand the nature and magnitude of the present crisis, for these affect not merely the political background against which economic decisions have to be taken, but also the whole strategy of economic development and the re-thinking of its basic structure over the next few years.

It is possible to begin an analysis from a variety of angles, but it would perhaps be best to build it round one single and easily understood concept, namely, the role of the Army. After the British establishment their hegemony in this country, they evolved a system of political balances which made it easy for them to define, with precision and great simplicity, the role that the Army had to play. The Himalayan region was, as our geography books used to say when we were at school, a real barrier against invasion from the North. This was partly because it was felt that armies could not manoeuvre and fight over the Himalayan mountains, but largely because the States in the Himalayan regions constituted a series of buffers between India and China. The British had established the friendliest possible relations with Nepal. Bhutan was independent in so far as all its internal affairs were concerned, but its international relations to the extent they existed, were conducted by the British Government. Sikkim enjoyed internal autonomy but was not independent in the international sense. Tibet was also autonomous although it was subject to formal suzerainty by the Chinese, and the Government of India had a mission in Lhasa which dealt directly with the Tibetan authorities. It has, of course, to be recognised that the British were militarily very powerful; in fact, they were the most powerful country in the world, and China was weak, but, even so, the British attached value, from the point of view of the strategy of defence, to the existence of the Himalayan buffer states. The Army could, therefore, forget the whole range of the Himalayan mountains, and its role was confined to the single task of protecting the country against invasion from the North-west frontier. For generations, the threat was supposed to come from Russia, and the Russian threat could only operate through the passes in the North-west frontier. Consequently, the Indian army was trained and conditioned to operate in the North-west frontier. The strategic roads and railways were designed on this basis. The training was adapted for this purpose and history over the years was built round the camps that were set up on the frontier.

It is only necessary to compare the situation which faced the Indian Army a couple of months ago with the situation of the British-Indian Army before 1947, to see what a colossal change has taken place in the role of the Army since Independence. Because of deep-seated political anomalies, it has been necessary to keep a good-sized force on the Pakistan frontier in both wings.

A substantial portion of the Indian Army has had to be kept along-side the cease-fire line in Kashmir. In addition to these responsibilities which are

onerous enough, the Indian Army over the last three or four years has had to take on the responsibility of guarding the Himalayan frontier running from Ladakh in the West right up to the extreme Eastern section of the McMahon line. No assessment of the performance of the Indian Army in the recent operations can fail to take account of the fact that the task set before it, in comparison with that of the British-Indian army before independence, was enormous and required, for effective performance, numbers, equipment, and logistical arrangements which it did not possess.

The role that the Army has been asked to play has evolved directly from the political situation in our frontiers. Our relations with Pakistan have been extremely bad; with Nepal our relations seem to have been bedevilled by mutual suspicion; the Kashmir problem has been a running sore; and our relations with China have steadily deteriorated to the point that the Chinese mounted a violent and massive attack against us. We have been caught in a military situation which classical writers have always regarded as untenable, namely, of keeping our armies split between several fronts. Added to the difficulties created by an extremely political situation on our frontiers, the Indian Army has had to face other difficulties.

The Army has never had the resources anywhere near what is adequate for the role it has been called upon to play. The whole emphasis since Independence has been on economic development. This has involved the utilization of the bulk of our resources for the long-term plans of economic development; in consequence, the resources allocated to the Army and the Air Force, having regard to the role they have been called upon to play, can only be called exiguous. This is particularly the case if regard is had to the fact that on both the frontiers we have had armies which have been well equipped. The Pakistan Army has been equipped by the Americans with modern weapons that could enable it to hold fast against Communist attacks, and the Chinese Communist Army, as was proved during the Korean war, is very large in number, well equipped, and extremely tough, being trained to stand exceptional rigours and hardship, particularly in mountainous terrain.

To say that we must patch up our differences with Pakistan is easier said than done. And although public opinion in the West may be ignorant, the Governments of the U. S. A. and the U. K. cannot be unaware of the difficulties in the way.

The very genesis of Pakistan which has declared itself an Islamic State, was the poisonous teaching that it is impossible for Hindus and Muslims to live together. On the other hand, India is a secular democracy and we have 50 million Muslims who have to live a life of security, honour and self-respect. If alone for this reason and leaving aside all other arguments, we cannot attempt short cuts over the Kashmir problem which might have dangerous internal repercussions in both India and East Pakistan. Moreover the U. S. A. and the U. K. cannot possibly be unaware that Pakistan appears to be indulging in political blackmail by proclaiming that she will do a deal with Communist China.

The situation is an extremely complicated maze of dilemmas all round. For the Americans it is a dilemma between an anxiety to assist India against China and anxiety to keep within bounds a bitter and malevolent public opinion in Pakistan. For the British the dilemma is between a very

genuine anxiety to assist us against the Chinese and a desire to maintain friendly relations with another Commonwealth country—a country moreover which by harping on Islamic ideology has been attempting to make a political impact in Arab countries where the U.K. has large stakes. For us the dilemma is even greater. On the one hand a sense of realism and a perspective of long term strategy point to the need for accommodation with Pakistan. On the other hand, we cannot disengage ourselves from the Kashmir problem in a manner which Pakistan is looking for without creating serious complications which could turn out to be quite dangerous.

Where does all this lead to so far as our immediate problem is concerned, viz., what should be the size of our Army? I fear that the conclusion is inescapable that the Army would have to be substantially strengthened and re-equipped. And when we talk of the Army, we must obviously include the Air Force.

The position of the United States has changed enormously since the beginning of World War II, in the sense that she is now the undoubted leader in the Western world and the dominant force against international Communism. One need not, therefore, expect that the problem of military aid to India to contain Chinese Communism will be bitter or prolonged as in the case of Lend-Lease during World War II. On their global view of the situation, the Americans may be expected to give us massive aid, but in the absence of a sudden emergency such as we went through recently, the pace of assistance and its volume may be determined by the development of our relations with Pakistan. But one thing is clear: Lend-Lease cannot possibly take care of the entire expenditure of reinforcing and re-equipping the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force. However generous might be American assistance, a great deal of Rupee expenditure would have to be incurred in India in the purchase of locally made goods and for local services. How much this will involve in terms of additional Rupee expenditure over the next few years is a matter on which it is impossible to hazard a guess at the moment. This is one of the imponderables of the situation at the present time. But, as a working hypothesis, we cannot do better than accept what is reported in the Press to be the view of the Finance Minister, viz., that we may have to double the current expenditure. In other words, the additional burden on the Indian budget may be of the order of some Rs. 5,400 crores per year. Would additional expenditure of this magnitude impose on us the cruel dilemma of halting our plan of economic development or could we, as other nations have done, emerge stronger out of the fire?

Although the position is at the moment rather nebulous, we have to proceed, as a working hypothesis, on the assumption that the increase in defence expenditure may have to be of the order perhaps of Rs. 400 crores per year, excluding the cost of equipment to be supplied by the U.S.A. and U.K. on lend-lease or similar arrangements. This expenditure will be wholly unproductive in the sense that it will not produce additional goods for consumption by the community; on the contrary, it may well result in shortages and varying cuts in consumption standards. What will be the effect of all this on the Third Five Year Plan and succeeding Plans?

We may first examine whether expenditure of the magnitude now assumed is, *per se*, excessive, having regard to experience in other countries. The national income of India is at present running at the rate of something over Rs. 15,000 crores per year. The total defence budget, before the recent supple-

mentary demand approved by Parliament, was of the order of Rs. 340 crores ; as a percentage of national income, it was therefore a little over 2½%. With the supplementary grant recently approved, it would be still less than 3%, and if we assumed that the total budget was of the order of Rs. 750 crores, it would be 5% of the national income. To set the percentage against similar expenditure in other countries, we may note that in the United States, against a national income of approximately 428 billion dollars, the defence expenditure in 1961 was of the order of 45 billion dollars; that is, about 10½% of the national income. The corresponding percentage in the United Kingdom was about 8%. The Indian figure appears relatively modest. But it has to be recognised that a comparison with the U.K. and the U.S.A. is inappropriate because it is far easier for countries with a high standard of living to appropriate a fair part of the national income to defence than it is for an underdeveloped country with a vast majority of its population living on the bare subsistence level. Perhaps a better method of assessing the dimensions of the problem in India would be to relate additional defence expenditure to the total Plan expenditure each year. The total Third Five Year Plan expenditure is a little over Rs. 10,000 crores, so that the average per year would be Rs. 2,000 crores. An additional Rs. 400 crores per year really means, therefore, some 20% of the total plan expenditure each year. This is a very large amount indeed.

Taking both factors into account, namely, the unfavourable start of the Third Five Year Plan together with the change in public psychology which is now evident, one has to assess to what extent the Third Five Year Plan can stand the pressure of additional defence expenditure of the magnitude we have been discussing, without giving rise to serious inflationary pressures. This matter is not susceptible of any precise quantitative analysis at this stage. All that can be said is that it would be foolish to imagine that we can carry on with the Third Five Year Plan as originally programmed, in the new circumstances, without an intensification of inflationary pressures already existing in the economy. If this is to be avoided substantial cuts would undoubtedly have to be made. I am, of course, assuming that it is the policy of Government to avoid an intensification of inflationary pressures. In a broadcast which he delivered on November 28, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Shri Gulzarilal Nanda stated : "If inflationary pressures consequent upon a full scale effort for national defence are to be contained, it will be necessary to take a series of measures for mopping up the surplus purchasing power." The obvious implication is that such measures will be undertaken. I think it is necessary that Government should reiterate in unequivocal terms that it is their policy to contain inflationary pressures. This means in effect that the price level of the necessities of life will not be allowed to go up and that the general price level will be maintained within reasonable limits. I have, from time to time, stated it as my view that in a developing economy such as ours, it will be impossible to maintain absolute stability of the price level; a 2 or 3 percent rise per year may be unavoidable, but it should not be continuous. The public must be made to feel that the Government have the capacity to keep the level from rising when they want to and even perhaps to bring it down for a time. A clear understanding of this issue is necessary to preserve the health of the economy, to preserve public confidence in Government and also to ensure that our ability to export is not further hampered by an imbalance in prices.

In considering in what directions the cut can be applied, one has to take account of the fact that a good part of the expenditure particularly in the industrial field, is probably already committed expenditure in the sense that

orders for plant and equipment have been placed, particularly overseas. But quite apart from the fact that our hands may already have been tied, we have got to consider what should be the main strategy on which we must base any action intended to reduce the total expenditure on the Third Five Year Plan.

In the first place, it seems perfectly obvious that, whatever else we do, we must not take any steps which would come in the way of our increasing our agricultural production to the extent contemplated in the Plan. There are two reasons for this. One is, of course, that when the whole economy is under a strain and cuts have to be made in developmental expenditure, it is of special importance that at any rate the consumption standards in regard to food and clothing are not further reduced. The other reason is that increased agricultural production has a decisive anti-inflationary effect. Experience in our country during the last ten years has shown that where money supply is expanding, its effect is mitigated more by an increase in agricultural production than by any other factor. All this means that the fertiliser projects would have to go ahead; that agricultural research and development schemes would have to go ahead; and also that all measures intended to conserve water, provide good seed and distribute insecticides and the like should be maintained at full tempo. Whether administrative economies can be made in the planned expenditure in the agricultural sector is another matter. That is a problem which traverses the entire field of administration. But clearly there can be no reduction in the activities that have been planned for increasing agricultural production.

I suggest that, in the second place, there can be no scope, as a broad matter of strategy, for a reduction in the industrial bias given to the Third Five Year Plan. It was a basic point in the Second and Third Five Year Plans that, if we are ever to get out of our foreign exchange difficulties, it is absolutely essential that we must make in India the bulk of the machinery which is required for industrial projects in the country. This proposition is as true today as it ever was, and it continues to be of the highest importance that we should cease, as quickly as possible, to be dependent on imports for what may be called normal types of machinery and equipment. In other words, those parts of the Plan which deal with the manufacture of steel and the setting up of foundries, forges, heavy machinery, machine tools and chemicals, must go ahead. As a necessary corollary, plans for raising more coal, generating more power, and increasing transport facilities would also have to go ahead. There may be some scope for readjustment where final steps have not already been taken, but the magnitude of this is likely to be small.

It would not be altogether easy to carry out even an attenuated Plan confined, in the main, to the agricultural and industrial sections, together with the ancillary section dealing with transport. The lack of adequate foreign exchange is only one of the difficulties, although a major one: it seems essential that steps are taken to get untied credit or free foreign exchange which could be utilised for the import of essential raw material. I have little doubt the Government are doing their best to bring this point home to the Aid India group of countries, and one can only express the hope that those countries will take a more sympathetic view than they have hitherto. In this context, it would also seem necessary that steps are taken to facilitate the inflow of foreign private capital. There are indications that, in spite of the crisis we are going through—possibly even as a result of the crisis—there are prospects of foreign private capital coming into India in larger volume than either to, provided

certain irritations and difficulties caused by our policies and procedures are eliminated or reduced. I do not propose at this stage to elaborate on this point beyond mentioning the possibility and merely adding that it is not necessary for this purpose that we give up basic principles. Some flexibility and understanding of the apprehensions of a foreign investor, however unjustified in our opinion, seem to be called for. Internal finance could also be a difficulty, particularly in the field of private enterprise. The behaviour of our Stock Exchanges has been such that the capital market has lost much of the vitality and enterprise it showed in recent years, and the immediate prospects of raising large-scale funds for industrial enterprise seem dubious. There seems also need for a more forth-right and positive promise of bank credit to productive enterprise. This seems necessary because the psychology created by some of the recent announcements of the Reserve Bank is one of an all round curtailment of credit which I am sure, was not intended.

The attempt to carry out the agricultural and the industrial parts of the Plan will itself involve a major draft on our financial resources, administrative ability and technical expertise. On the arguments about priority which I have put forward a cut in the plan must inevitably fall on what may be called the social side, that is to say, education, possibly even public health except the prevention of epidemics, community development and welfare services. It is unfortunate that this should have to be the case, but I do not see how this can be helped. A revision in our order of priorities consequent on intensified defence expenditure together with a concentration on agriculture and heavy industries is bound to lead to a postponement of some of the more socially desirable consequences of the Plan. It might even well be that on balance, it may not be possible to achieve any substantial increase in the standard of living of the mass of people, during the period of the emergency.

This does not mean, however, that inequalities which exist, and which it was part of the Plan effort to reduce, should be intensified because of increased defence effort. On the contrary; if popular enthusiasm has to be maintained for the defence effort, it is more than ever necessary that conspicuous consumption should diminish and that the people should be made to feel that sacrifices are being willingly borne in appropriate measure by all sections and not merely by the poor. In the book published by John Maynard Keynes when the Second World War broke out, entitled "How to pay for the War", the following passage occurs :

"Courage will be forthcoming if the leaders of opinion in all parties will summon out of the fatigue and confusion of war enough lucidity of mind to understand for themselves and to explain to the public what is required ; and then propose a plan conceived in a spirit of social justice, a plan which uses a time of general sacrifice, not as an excuse for postponing desirable reforms, but as an opportunity for moving further than we have moved hitherto towards reducing inequalities."

What Keynes said about the need for reducing social inequalities in the U. K. is even more true of India, and it would have to become the policy of Government to take steps which will ensure that, as a result of the defence effort, the rich do not become richer, and the poor, poorer. This requires the most active co-operation from the sections of the community which are comparatively better off. Each element of consumption would have to be subjected to a fresh test from the point of view as to whether it is appropriate

in the new context. The responsibility for thinking of ways and means by which, what may broadly be called conspicuous consumption lies primarily on the wealthier sections of the community and in many cases voluntary action may be adequate to give effect to the reawakened social conscience. In some cases, however, it would be necessary to supplement this by Government decree. To the extent that fiscal measures are called for with a view to reducing the demand for scarce goods of a non-essential type, Government action would of course be essential. The point of principle that requires emphasis is that if, as a result of increased defence expenditure and the consequent revision of Plan priorities, the mass of our people are subjected to additional burdens or deprived of social benefits which they have previously expected, it would be the height of folly for the better off sections of the Community not to take steps and for Government not to enforce them wherever necessary, for equality of sacrifice. If everybody concerned, namely, Government, the well-to-do sections of the Community and the mass of the people all play their due part, we might emerge out of the crisis better off than before. We would, at the end of it, have a sound agricultural and industrial base on which we can proceed rapidly to build ; and what is more important, a reawakened social attitude without which no plan can really be a success.

DANGER TO NON-COMMUNIST ASIA

Ever since the Communist regime called the People's Republic of China was proclaimed, India was amongst the first countries to recognise the Government and she did so on 30th December, 1949 with the declared objective that the recognition would further strengthen what the Indians remarked as the immortal friendship, and would assist in bringing stability in Asia and the peace of the world. Very consistently India supported Communist China's entry into the United Nations.

It was evident that the Indian Government led by Mr. Nehru faithful to his principles of *PANCHASHILA* which advocate peaceful co-existence was extremely eager to embrace China as a friend. Even when Chinese troops entered Tibet in October 1950, India very mildly remarked that such an action would have adverse effects on China's prospect of entry into the United Nations.

In June 1954 Chou En-lai came to India on a State visit. The streets of Delhi were packed by millions chanting a welcome to Chou "China-India Bhai ! Bhai !" In Hindi, China and India are brothers. Soon after, signs began to appear that Communist China was interested in claiming certain Indian territories. Mr. Nehru visited Communist China in October the same year and raised the matter of maps being published in Communist China showing Chinese boundary which included approximately 50,000 square miles of Indian territory. Mr. Chou En-lai dismissed the matter as trivial and attributed it to Kuomintang's old maps being reproduced without revision.

After that a systematic intrusion into Indian territories took place, The Indian Government made the usual demarche but of no avail. Sporadic incursions took place to the extent that roads were actually constructed on the Indian soil. In January 1959 the Communist Chinese Government officially laid claim to 50,000 square miles as shown in the map which was supposed to have been drawn up by the Kuomintang. Size of Malaya.

The Chinese duplicity in the matter became more pronounced. The Dalai Lama was driven out of Tibet and was given political asylum in India. The Chinese raised serious objections. Chinese military action against India began to be intensified and members of the Indian armed forces in the frontiers were taken prisoners by the Chinese. At this stage in November 1959 the Indian Government offered to withdraw their troops in Western Sector to the line which Communist China claimed, provided Communist China would withdraw to the line of their traditional boundary and that a peaceful solution should be sought to settle the problem. This was objected to by Communist China which even moved still further and built roads and army posts in the Indian territory.

In April 1960 Chou En-lai visited New Delhi. Mr. Nehru was unable to

thaw Chou's obduracy on the border claims. But the Indian people were still hopeful that the so-called traditional friendship could be preserved. Indian newspapers commenting after the Nehru-Chou meeting almost in one voice said, "China and India have every reason to remain friendly for tens of thousands of years" and "it is not impossible to find common point or points of proximity over the border question". Chou En-lai in following his policy of dissimulation had the audacity to say at that time that, "Friendly countries should negotiate for a final delineation of their boundaries and revise their maps accordingly." India was not conditioned to the kind of double dealing and sincerely believed that she had no quarrel with China, Chou's departure from India had drawn Indian cheers—"India-China Bhai ! Bhai !"

We too in Malaya thought that Communist China was India's friend. You can well imagine the surprise and shock which we share with the Indians when the Chinese Communists launched their attacks against India on October 20th.

I was in India when this shameful aggression took place. There was a sense of bewilderment in India. The general public was at first confused but later gathered themselves and took stock of the whole situation. The line began to veer from that of friendly disposition towards a feeling of bitter frustration. There was much soul-searching and I could feel the sense of hopeless indecision at that time. The newspapers' reaction was one of caution in the hope that matters might yet be patched up. The Government was still hopeful that in spite of such gross attack India was still prepared to retain friendly relations and that this border clash might be localised and that it would end in a round-table talk. The border clash had developed into a war but diplomatic relations had not ruptured and there was still hope that it might be settled.

But I saw India unprepared. She was not ready militarily and psychologically for a large scale invasion. Her best army was concentrated in the Indo-Pakistan border. She never expected that she was going to be the victim of aggression from China. She was watching out for Pakistan. Least of all she never thought that *PANCHASHILA* which Communist China had acclaimed and adhered to in Bandung would be debauched. Peaceful co-existence was a principle to be respected by Communist China only according to Communist conception of it.

Let us now ask ourselves as to why Communist China should behave the way she did. I think the main reason is that Communist China, an ardent follower of Stalinism, cannot afford to see India succeed in her effort to advance politically in the path of democracy and establishing herself as leader of Asia. According to Communist China, India could be tolerated so long as she does not usurp the position of being top Asian country. That must belong to Communist China with her vast fighting resources. But India was showing progress. Democracy was after all becoming more than a successful experiment in India. Admittedly, progress has been slow but in the light of her gigantic problems India had made large strides since her Independence in 1947. If the Indian experiment succeeded other countries in Asia would adopt the India model of democracy instead of the Communist China's totalitarian regime. India must therefore be cut down to size and humiliated. In this way wavering countries can be brought into the fold of Communism. Anti-Communist countries can be brought to their senses and subdued and beaten. Communist forces in these latter countries can take courage for fresh

rebellion, for ardent followers of Marxism believe only in revolution. It is a well-known fact that relations between China and Russia are none too well at this stage. Khrushchev having debunked Stalin, accepted the principles of co-existence. Mao Tse Tung, on the other hand, only paid lip service but did not consider it a good policy. Like Stalin, Mao would prefer a show of strength rather than the method of quiet infiltration through the myopia of peaceful co-existence. Furthermore, Russia must be proved wrong that India was neutral. With this attack and the quick response made by the Western Powers to come to the aid of India, Communist China according to them have ample proof that India was not so neutral after all and that there was no such thing as neutrality in the bigger conflict between communism and democracy. In this case India became the guinea pig in the search for truth between Russia and China. We in Malaya at least agree with Communist China in this respect. We do not believe that Communism and Democracy can co-exist peacefully, because it is contrary to the tenets of Communism. It is the avowed aim of Communism. It is the avowed aim of Communism to expand and control not only nations but lives and souls of man in an imperialism more terrible and sinister than any which history has ever recorded.

Having been able to gauge the feelings of the people of India, I told them in one of my speeches that the Communist attack was a glaring red signal of danger to non-Communist Asia. I told the Indians and I shall repeat here, and others may differ with me, that to my mind the Chinese Communists are out to capture the hearts and minds and imagination of the whole of Asia with the hope that in a show of strength all Asia will look up to Communist China through fear. As I said China can no longer tolerate the existence of a great rival. They intend to topple democratic governments wherever they are found and to replace them with Communist regimes completely subservient to Peking. There is no need to mince words about the seriousness of their thought. This attack on India is not just a border clash. The picture is ghastly serious. Countries big or small must sit up and take notice. They must prepare for worst things to come.

I was tremendously impressed with what I saw in India during her hour of trials and tribulations. The ardent patriotism of the people in every walk of life rallying to the call of their President and Prime Minister convinced me that India will face this grim struggle with determination. If she knuckles under, the fate of other non-communist countries in Asia is doomed.

At that early stage of my visit all that I could give India was Malaya's warmest and strongest sympathy for India. But half an hour before my speech in the State Banquet given in my honour in Delhi, I received a message from Kuala Lumpur to the effect that the Government of the Federation was in full sympathy with the Indian cause but, our Government reiterated its hope that the present trouble might be resolved by negotiations and peaceful means on terms acceptable to India. It was accepted that India was the victim. Indeed Tun Abdul Razak in Kuala Lumpur on behalf of the Government said that "we will certainly offer to India something much more than sympathy in this her gravest hour". I assured them at the banquet that Malaya is a small country but in whatever way we can help India in her most trying moment, the moment she was faced with defence of her national honour we will be only too happy to give.

Our forthright stand and our unhesitating support for India received very wide publicity and favourable reaction in India. When referring to my various

speeches, newspapers commented that no words of encouragement could be timelier. One leading newspaper said, "India owes him a lasting debt of gratitude for his forcefully expressed sympathy." Another commented that there was a profound truth in my warning as our Malayan Government had to deal with a violent Communist movement for many years before it could be suppressed. They remarked that I did not suffer from an imaginary Communist phobia and that according to them our analysis is the more relevant because we as a small nation of Asia can see better what a Communist Chinese success would mean in a conflict with democratic India. I was particularly struck by the comment made by one Indian newspaper which said that if I had made a similar speech some years ago about the Chinese motives it would have been sceptically received in India. "Much has happened since then. Much experience has been packed in the last few weeks" says the same paper. One Indian newspaper, welcoming the support given by Malaya to India, commented that the forthright stand taken by us on Chinese aggression was so heart-warming. It further stated that coming from a country where the second most populous community was Chinese, it was of great significance. To this my reply was that our decision to uphold the Indian cause has no reference whatsoever to any of the communal groups in Malaya. I have regarded the people of Malaya as Malayans. Therefore the only significance of our action is not because there is a large community of Chinese or Indians in Malaya but that the Malayans are quick to receive the Communist challenge to democracy and our way of life and our duty was to respond to India's call for help.

I left India with a very heavy heart because I had just witnessed a country being stabbed in the back by a so-called friend and neighbour whose cause she had espoused everywhere for the sake of peace and amity. India as I left was being over-run by hordes of people who have no respect for or belief in God or man. It is her curious fate that India must suffer this unjustified and naked aggression from one whom she regards as friend.

In retrospect, I felt grateful that I was in India at a momentous time when she was faced with a grave and serious situation. I need not have to imagine the effect of the Communist action which had stirred the whole nation to its depths. I am convinced that India is determined to redeem her honour and prestige.

We in Malaya might feel that the Sino-Indian affair is remote and that it has nothing to do with us. To those who subscribe to that idea, they are not aware of the true nature of the Communist menace. Any success of the Communists in the Indian border would only tempt the Communists in our country to start trouble afresh. We must therefore be vigilant. Any outbreak of communist trouble here would throw us back many years. All the progress we have made since Independence would suffer a serious set-back. A war in India would bring about a serious repercussion in all the Asian countries which, since Independence, have been trying to set their houses in order. The crisis in India is also a challenge to the entire free world.

So when I returned to Kuala Lumpur, I at once consulted my colleagues on the initial help which we might be able to give India at this stage, remembering that this is a battle between Democracy and Communist totalitarianism. If India, the biggest democratic country in Asia, were humiliated and at the same time given the cold shoulder by her friends in her hour of need, democracy in Asia would suffer a heavy, and perhaps mortal blow. We will see the

end of democracy. The smaller Asian countries, by not supporting democracy, would not save themselves; on the contrary, their efforts to appease the Communist dragon would only seal their fate more certainly. Like Hitlerite Germany in the 1930s, Communist China would swallow up the smaller countries, one by one. As I see it, therefore, it is Malaya's duty to stand by democratic India since this would not only be morally correct but a sound practical measure and one in keeping with avowed policy.

On the 21st November (1962), Peking issued a statement announcing a cease fire which would be carried out by Chinese Communist forces with effect 00.00 hours on the 22nd November, "along the entire Sino-Indian border." The statement also announced that beginning from the 1st December 1962, the Chinese Communists would "withdraw to positions 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on the 7th November 1959." The unilateral Chinese Communist decision to effect a ceasefire and a 'withdrawal' does not appear to be a clean bill since it enables the Communists to retain large chunks of Indian territory particularly in the Ladakh area in the Western Sector.

The Communist Chinese claim that they are prepared to withdraw 20 kilometres north of the "illegal" McMahon Line, which means 20 kilometres north of the North East Frontier Agency. They will set up "check posts on its side of the line of actual control with a certain number of civil police assigned to each checkpost," i.e. within the 20 kilometres wide zone between the McMahon Line and the main Chinese forces. If India agrees to take parallel action, Indian troops will find themselves 20 kilometres south of the McMahon Line which has always been the Sino-Indian boundary. Moreover, in the Middle and Western Sectors, a 20 kilometre withdrawal by the Chinese from the November 7, 1959 line of actual control will mean that the Chinese will still be within the Indian frontier, particularly in Ladakh where the Communist Chinese have occupied a vast area and where they have built a long military road.

This recent action by the Communist Government is a political offensive aimed at isolating India from Afro-Asian sympathy and support, since Communist China must have realised that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for India to fall in with this typical Communist tactic, commonly referred to as a "peace offensive." In this respect Peking can be expected to seize upon any sympathy for the Chinese plan and interpret it as support for Communist China against India. Such sympathy, even if motivated by a genuine desire for peace, is likely to play into the hands of Communist imperialism.

By launching a peace offensive immediately after a succession of Communist Chinese military victories, China has forced India to a Hobson's choice. If India falls in line with the peace offensive she would have to surrender a large part of India, her humiliation will be complete; if she rejects it, she will be faced with the charges that she wants to make a pact with Imperialist West for a war against another great Asian nation. She will be branded "tool of Western imperialism".

It is therefore with a deep sense of gloom that I see the immediate future of the situation. I must confess that I am not at all optimistic with the prospect of India accepting the Chinese offer although we cannot deny that in this matter it is for India alone to decide. Small sacrifice for the sake of peace is perhaps a good thing.

Malaya's policy is that there should be peace, and we have all along taken this line in the United Nations and elsewhere. Therefore our first desire is that there must be peace on terms favourable to India, who must be considered the victim of aggression. So many things are happening between two countries. Events are moving so swiftly that it is difficult to keep pace with them. Any message from our High Commissioner becomes stale news when it gets here. India is still considering the peace move by China. American and British missions are in India. India has received the sympathy of the free world and Malaya is no exception because to us it is not just India that has been attacked but Democracy is endangered.

In this conflict between two great nations of the world, our only hope and prayer is that it should be settled by peaceful means. If the conflict were to develop into war, that will be the end of Asian civilisation. It would then not be just a question of a war between China and India. Call this trouble a dispute if you will, but to the best of my knowledge some thousands of lives have already been sacrificed on both sides. Many millions of dollars of property have been destroyed. Schools in the troubled spot have been closed and thousands of children have been driven out, and now trudging their way across the mountainous ridges for safety. Not only that, in some cases they have had to be separated from their families,

The reason for Malaya's involvement is our love for Democracy and our sympathies for those thousands of human beings who are suffering as a result of the aggression. It is my hope that the Malayan people should not consider themselves involved in this affair on any other ground than humane and our love for democratic way of life. Some irresponsible politicians have already started to make wild accusations against me with no other objective than to put me up to hatred and contempt. I pin my faith on the people whom it is my privilege to lead these number of years to believe in me and to know that what I am doing is the right thing. Malaya shares with me our deepest sympathies for India and her determination to uphold the democratic way of life which India and ourselves have so much in common. At the same time let us pray for peace.

CLOUDS OVER INDIA

The Communist Chinese aggression has not only affected India's military and political position, but also her economy, and the uncertainty, following the ceasefire, is not limited to the military and political field either, but likewise encroaches upon the whole fabrics of India's economic life. Because of the part, which India plays in the world, current events at the same time take on world-wide significance.

Additionally, a weakening or strengthening of India's economic situation, invariably affects all nations, which in the course of past years, have highly contributed to economic aid. They have now to expect India experiencing greater difficulties in meeting her current obligations with regard to credits received or in paying them off altogether. Furthermore, the increased efforts required from India towards strengthening her armament, will in all probability necessitate additional aid.

As to her economic development, India has for some time past been continuously compared with China. The whole world, notably the Afro-Asian countries, have watched with close attention, which of the two systems would eventually turn out more successful : the extreme Communist system of the People's Republic of China, or the democratic-socialist system adopted by India for the reconstruction of her economy.

Both countries have had a similar starting position : a vast population in a huge area of land where, despite a number of rather highly-developed industrial centres—in Manchuria in China and also in the south of the country, in India mainly in Calcutta and Bombay—the majority of the population lived in rural areas and, more often than not, cultivated the fields in a primitive way. These two countries served as test cases, from which it could be learnt, which was the best and quickest way towards a modern, sound economic development based on a system of rationalised industry and mechanised agriculture.

For a long time it had looked, as if the brute force, by which the Red rulers in China drove the masses to work and the utilisation of large parts of the production for investment—i.e. for further extension of physical industrial assets, was producing much better results than the Indian system. The Indians had renounced violence and showed consideration to traditional customs, notably to the religious feelings of the population. Although India received more substantial aid from foreign countries, China appeared to be much more successful in building up her industry and in modernizing her agriculture.

But during the past years, since 1960 or 1961, to be precise, the picture has changed. While China suffered severe set-backs, which can only partly be explained away by bad weather or natural catastrophies, while there were

famines in the country and miscalculation in industrial planning became evident, success began to take concrete shape in India, indicating slow but steady progress.

Speculations on the kind of motive of the Chinese rulers, that may have prompted them to mount their sudden aggression against India's northern frontier and to their just as surprising sudden halt, *inter alia* contained the theory, that hitting out at India's economy had been the basic objective of their military operations : by forcing India to concentrate parts of her economic resources on rearmament, the modern industrial progress was to be hampered. This, however, seems to be a rather devious kind of conception, because China can hardly wish for a strengthening of Indian armament, even if this was to impede and delay India's economic reconstruction.

Whatever the course the political and military development between India and China may take in the weeks and months to come—whether the Indian Government will agree to the proposals made by China or whether it will reject them, whether the lull will continue, or whether fighting will be resumed—it is to be expected with some certainty, that the Government in Delhi, with the full consent of the majority of Parliament and with the approval of widest circles of the population will change its military policy and will considerably strengthen armament, which will have far-reaching consequences in the field of India's financial and economic policy.

The military budget has hitherto been kept comparatively low, whereas the national outlay for economic development was higher. The Third Five Year Plan, which commenced on April 1, 1961, envisages 21,84 million dollars as investment for the plan period. This amount may appear comparatively small for a country with a population of 430 or 435 million. But as compared with the Second Plan the amount represents an increase of investment of about 50 per cent. Of this the public sector is to raise 1575 million, which under the plan amounts to 45 per cent of the total public outlay.

Of the 15,75 million the share of revenues will be 30 per cent, while 29 per cent. will be financed by foreign credits, the remainder by loans, surpluses of public enterprises and several other minor resources. If substantial means are now being branched off for armament purposes, the Government will have to have to either raise taxation or reduce other expenditure. This would be at the expense of economic investment, of social welfare or education, which are at least as important for general development as economic progress.

The consequences of a military build-up on the economic life of a country are equally strong, because modern armament cannot be achieved over-night. Still, a beginning has already been made. There are the Aircraft Works in Bangalore, where, under British licence, a Mach 1-fighter is built, and Professor Tank has completed development work for a Mach 2-fighter.

But what is primarily required for armament is a well-developed heavy industry on broad basis. In the First and Second Plan the building of steel plants has played an important part and the Third Plan envisages the extension of the latter. But India—contrary to countries of the Eastern bloc—has so far endeavoured, not to force the issue of heavy industry unduly. A certain balance was to be maintained between the development of basic materials and processing industries, and also an adequate proportion between investment industry and consumer goods industries.

Under the pressure of military-political necessities, the reconstruction of heavy industry is now being accelerated. Steel capacity, above all, is being speedily raised. Subsequently, development in other fields, such as in social welfare will slow down. All this requires a higher measure of readiness for sacrifice and stronger efforts on the part of the population.

That the Chinese threat has been a challenge to such readiness for sacrifice and has evoked the firm resolution for stronger efforts is beyond doubt. This, in the long run, will be an advantage, because India thus receives an impetus which is bound to prove extremely valuable for her economic development.

AGGRESSION AND INDIA

Sixteen years of freedom have seen steady progress in our effort to rebuild social, economic and industrial life on principles of justice, equity and equal opportunity for all. The recent reverses suffered by Indian arms have led to many doubts and questions about the adequacy of our efforts in those directions. Such doubts are welcome and healthy if they inspire us to greater efforts and make the whole nation work harder for bridging the gap between expectation and achievement in the shortest possible time. We must not however forget that the tasks which faced us immediately after independence were so colossal that diversion of greater efforts to military purposes would have slowed down the pace of economic and social progress. We have also to remember that even military power depends on the economic and industrial potential of the country and the contentment and satisfaction of the people. If the base of heavy industries had not been laid in the last ten years and efforts made to provide the essential social services, our position today would have been far weaker in every respect. While admitting that we may not have always lived up to our ideals and many of our expectations still remain unfulfilled, we can confidently claim that Indian achievement in the last ten years in the social, the industrial and the economic fields have been impressive.

This process of steady internal growth and constant expansion of the circle of friendship and cooperation outside has now been rudely disturbed. There are few records in history where one nation has shown such friendship and cooperation for another as India did for China. There is perhaps no single instance where such friendliness has been repaid by unprovoked and treacherous attack. Border disputes are nothing new in human history and have often led to bitterness and conflict, but rarely have such disputes led to unprovoked and massive aggression of the type launched by China in October this year. The Chinese invasion has not only endangered the territorial integrity of the country, but what is even more serious, it threatens our economic growth and seeks to undermine the friendly, cooperative and democratic way of life which India has been seeking to evolve ever since the attainment of independence.

The picture at the moment is so sombre and we would be failing in our duty if we did not recognise the seriousness of the situation. Caught unprepared, we have lost some of our strongholds. We have suffered the loss of some of the finest of our fighting men. Our plans to improve the standard of life of the common man are being recast and resources diverted from constructive to warlike areas. They are needed for national survival and will be carried out till we have achieved victory, but they will slow down to some extent the provision of goods and services needed by the common man. The Chinese attack on India is an attack on our democratic way of life and must be met with the strength which only free man of a democratic society can show.

Even in this dark picture, there are however some silver linings. The first is the unprecedented upsurge of national feeling which has united all sections of the people in a common resolve to resist the aggressor. Even those who have lived through the heroic days of 1920, 1930 or 1942 must admit that the depth and solidarity of Indian feeling today is unprecedented in our history. Even more significant is the alertness and interest in public affairs displayed by the common man. In the past, the average Indian tended to be indifferent to public affairs and was often content to leave the conduct of state business to kings and ministers. Today, mainly as a result of the adoption of the democratic way of life, every citizen feels a sense of responsibility and is anxious to participate in the service of the nation. The entire nation is thus on the march and nothing can prevent its attainment of the goal however long, arduous or dangerous the journey may be.

This awakening of the nation is bound to have far reaching effects on every aspect of our life. One reason for China's treacherous attack may have been her jealousy at the steady progress of India in developing her agriculture and her industries. In spite of claims of great leaps forward, China's masses still lack the minimum requirements of life. China's agriculture is lagging and famine stalks the land. China's industry has also not progressed according to plan in spite of draconian measures that have turned citizens into slaves. Perhaps the Chinese thought that aggression would force India to give up her plans of economic development and devote all her resources to defensive use. They did not realise that a free people have reserves of strength of which slaves are not capable. There were in any case unutilised resources which are now being brought into use and we must see to it that the Chinese attack leads not to a slow-down but to an acceleration of agricultural and industrial progress in India.

Some sections of our people have been dissatisfied with India's continuance in the Commonwealth. To them, it is a reminder of the old political relation when India lived under British domination. They did not realise that the Commonwealth itself has changed its character. After the emergence of independent India and Pakistan, and later other States in Asia and Africa, the Commonwealth has become a truly multi-national union of free and independent peoples. This transformation of the Commonwealth has helped in the growth of other associations of free nations of which the French Community and the recent efforts to unify Europe are two shining examples. It is doubtful if the concept of a Union of Europe would have made such progress but for the success which the Commonwealth has achieved in holding together peoples with different traditions and cultures and divergent economic and political interests. In this moment of crisis, the immediate and unconditional assistance which many Commonwealth countries have offered to India has proved how the silken ties of friendship can be more powerful than treaties and organisations based on military pacts.

Ever since she became free, India has offered her friendship and co-operation to all countries without regard to their political beliefs or economic systems. There have been critics of this policy in India and outside because she followed a policy of non-alignment and refused to identify herself with either of the power blocs into which the world has been divided. Such criticism has become more insistent and shrill in the last few months, but these critics have failed to see that both in the past and today this is the only policy that India could have followed. On many critical occasions, India's voice of moderation has had an influence on world affairs far greater than

could be expected from her economic, political or industrial might. Today also in this hour of crisis, this policy has been able to secure her support and assistance from the major powers of the world without regard to political ideology or affiliation.

A great deal of the criticism against the policy of non-alignment is ill-informed and unjustified. There may have been occasions where in the actual implementation there is room for difference of opinion if the policy of non-alignment was correctly pursued. The basic soundness of India's approach is however seen in the spontaneous and generous response of the great democracies in this hour of danger. The United States of America has offered massive assistance even though we have often differed from her policies. The Federal Republic of Germany and many other friendly States of Europe and America have offered similar help. Among Afro-Asian nations, there has been wide support of India in the moment of her trial. Countries so widely separated geographically and politically so different as Japan and U.A.R. have condemned Chinese aggression as a threat to world peace. To all of them we are grateful both for the moral and material support they have given and for their recognition that India is today fighting for the cause of liberty, democracy and justice.

It is significant that countries which are governed by a communist ideology have also expressed their disapproval of the Chinese aggression against India. Yugoslavia has never been a slave to communist slogans and has for long pursued her own independent way. With her understanding for and sympathy with India, she was naturally the first among communist nations to condemn China's act of treachery. Nor must we forget that the Soviet Union is continuing her assistance to India in spite of our conflict with China. This marks a new phase in the relation of communist countries with those who follow other economic and political creeds and must be regarded as evidence of Soviet faith in the peaceful co-existence of different systems. This overwhelming support for India by nations who are widely divided in their political beliefs and economic ways is evidence of the growing recognition that freedom and peace are indivisible in the modern world. Today, an attack on any nation or country is aggression against all.

The Chinese attack on India may thus well prove to be a turning point in contemporary history. For more than a decade, mankind has lived under the constant threat of total destruction because of the conflict between the great nuclear powers. In this moment of crisis, these great powers are showing increasing sign of recognising the need of understanding and peace. Men of goodwill throughout the world hope that they will succeed in their attempt to find a settlement which will lift the threat of destruction from the world. If this happy consummation is achieved, there will be a release of almost unlimited resources for dealing with the problems of hunger, disease and ignorance throughout the world. There is no country which suffers more from these maladies than China and yet with a perversity that is difficult to understand, Chinese leaders are almost alone in resisting a peaceful solution of nuclear menace.

The foremost need of today is national unity and solidarity. In her long history, India has suffered most when she has been divided by internal dissensions. When Indians have united against a common enemy, they have triumphed. Divisions have been followed by defeat and decay. Today, it is a matter for gratification that the country has united to a man against a common enemy. The Chinese may have been encouraged to attack because

they thought Indians were divided among themselves. They now know that they were suffering from a great delusion which will cost them dear. Through-out our history, people have risen to great heights in moments of intense emotion, but very often this has been followed by a period of quiescence and lethargy. There is too often a tendency to dissipate our energies in excitement without realising that what we need in moments of crisis is sustained and controlled action spread over long periods.

The danger posed by the Chinese threat cannot be resolved in one day. It will require the strengthening of our economic organisation and the development of our industries so that the country can face future tasks with confidence and strength. It will also demand the eradication of social inequalities so that Indians can face all threats as a solid, compact and unified body. Ours is not and will, I hope, never be a regimented society. The suppression of the individuality of groups or sections has no place in a free society like ours. Social cohesion in India must therefore depend upon willing cooperation of divergent elements which can each make its contribution to the national life. The successful implementation of free, rational and liberal polices in social, economic and political matters can along give the nation the strength and resilience which can meet the challenge of totalitarianism and triumph over it.

There are many who think that the diversity of India has been a source of weakness. They point to the many languages, the many religions the many beliefs and the many castes and communities found in this sub-continent. To superficial view such differences may appear a source of weakness, but the evidence of history points to a different conclusion. It is an incontrovertible fact that India has survived many vicissitudes of fortune while more monolithic societies have gone down under their pressure. One can perhaps explain this paradox by referring to the field of biology. Where an organism is single-celled or all the cells are of the same type, the slightest change in the environment may lead to decay and death. Multi-cellular organisms with large internal diversities have a greater survival value. Because of their diversity, a change in the circumstances need not be fatal to them, for one or other of the different elements may be able to adapt itself to the new situation. India with her great diversity has a flexibility which a more monolithic society cannot exhibit. In a clash between monolithic and totalitarian China and diversified and flexible India, the Indian values are bound to triumph.

There is another reason why we can confidently look to a successful outcome of our present struggle. India is a democracy and the long history of man has proved again and again that in any conflict; the more democratic society has triumphed over the more totalitarian. Democracy involves differences while totalitarianism leads to regimentation and uniformity. Life is full of novelty, for experience is a continual march into the unknown. Uniformity is therefore against the principle of life and makes the organism incapable of accepting the challenge of the new.

VI

Chinese Expansionism

- I Chinese Militarism** SARDAR K. M. PANIKKAR
- II A Dragon Towards Bhutan** G. F. HUDSON
- III Dragon With Memories** *Economist*
- IV Cloak And Dagger** S. L. POPLAJ

CHINESE MILITARISM

There is an idea widely prevalent in the West that the Chinese as a race, unlike the Japanese, are non-militarist in their outlook and are, broadly speaking, wedded to pursuits of peace.

This idea was based on many facile arguments. The first and most popular view was that as the Chinese civilisation was based on the ethical teachings of Confucius, it was held together by principles of morality and the Five Doctrines of Obedience. It was further alleged that in the Confucian society it is the scholar and the mandarin who enjoyed power and directed policy and not, as in other civilisations, men who were at the head of armies or whose claim to national respect was based on victories against enemies. It was further claimed that soldiering as a profession was always held in contempt in confucian China.

All these together were held to show conclusively that civil society as the Chinese had evolved was one in which military activity was not held in high honour.

This is the picture of China which was projected into Europe by the Jesuit fathers in the 16th and 17th centuries and was the origin of what was known as "Reve Chinois", or, the Chinese Dream, under the effects of which scholars from Voltaire downwards held forth on the virtues of Chinese social and political system as a model for Europe.

While it is, no doubt, true that the Chinese as a people were not, in the early days, wedded to the idea that warfare was the most honoured of professions and the Confucian doctrine held up the scholar official as the ideal, State policy at all times in China was based on a ruthless militarism.

Ever since the first unification of China by the Chin emperor, Chinese history has varied between periods of civil war, foreign conquests and settled imperial administrations. During all these periods one major activity was war.

During the period of civil war, clearly the whole country was ravaged by generals and war-lords and the Confucian scholar retreated to contemplate in monasteries or himself took to arms for the sake of the re-establishment of peace.

During the time of foreign conquests, the imperialism of the dynasties carried Chinese militarism far into every corner of Eastern Asia and only the then impenetrable Himalayan wall and the Japanese seas stood in the way of Chinese military expansion. But it would be a mistake to think that because the Mongols and the Manchus were the more recent exponents of Chinese

imperialist expansion through military power that indigenous Chinese empires were free from it.

The great Han empire carried its victorious arms on to the Caspian and conquered the upper regions of the Pamirs. All the neighbouring states of China, again outside India and Japan, came to feel the strength of Chinese militarism during the Tang period. The last great indigenous dynasty of the Chinese, the Hings, not only pursued an actively militarist policy, but even sent out navies as far as the coast of Africa.

It will thus be seen that the idea originally put forward by the Jesuit priests of the 16th and the 17th centuries and sedulously propagated by the mandarines in the days of their weakness that the Chinese were a nation who never believed in militarism is altogether untrue, and is a false image of a nation whose central policy was always one of expansion against her neighbouring states.

Nor is it merely an accident of history that during the times of their settled governments the Chinese should have followed a policy of militarism. Though there was never in China any class wedded to the profession of arms, as the Samuraies in Japan or the feudal nobility in Europe, there was always in China a military theory which preached the ruthless pursuit of objectives by military action.

Sun Chuan in the 3rd century B.C. enunciated theories of warfare which have retained their popularity even today and which as refurbished by Mao Tse-tung, provide the basis for the new Communist militarism. There was always in China a theory of military action which, even in Europe, developed only with Clausewitz.

It may, however, be accepted that till quite recent times it is only the State policy that was militarist and not the nation. But during the last fifty years, that is from 1912, the national character itself has undergone a change by which not only the State policy but the people of China themselves have become militarists. This has been the result of three separate courses of development.

First, after the rebellion against the Manchus, the whole country came under the leadership of war-lords so that every province went through a period of militarisation and the army became the major career for large numbers. The war-lords regime in China from 1916 has had an influence which most people have been led to underestimate, but no one who studies carefully this period of Chinese history will deny that it led to a gradual transformation of Chinese character as every part of the country became a recruiting ground for the maintenance of soldiers. Also, in the absence of what may be called counter-vailing factors, the war-lords from such dominant figures as Chan Tsh Lie and Wu-fai Pu to the local bandit, who assumed the title of general, became a major feature in Chinese history.

The second movement which led to the transformation of the Chinese people into a military minded nation was the Kuomintang itself. Though the Kuomintang started as a democratic national party, it achieved power only through military action which became possible only after its leadership had undergone training at the Whampao Academy whose military director was General Chiang Kai-shek. It is significant also to remember that the political

adviser to the Academy was Mr. Chou En-lai who thus became associated early in life with the growth of military movement in China.

It is the Whampao Cadets that formed the spearhead of Chiang Kai-shek's army and brought China under the Kuomintang Government. But after a short period of civil administration, it should be remembered that the Kuomintang itself became a war-lord regime with practically everyone of the governors of the provinces, except T. V. Soong, a regular general in the Army. Also it should not be forgotten even during the period of Kuomintang Government, which was recognised as the National Government, large areas continued to be under old time war-lords.

As time went on, the central administration of the Kuomintang itself became militarised with the Generalissimo as President, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander of the Army. The Kuomintang tradition in effect became a military tradition, might over-riding whatever civil and political origins it might have had under Sun Yat-sen.

The third and the most important is the tradition of the Communists themselves. It should be remembered that though the Communists started as a political party, their tradition, at least from the time that Mao Tse-tung took refuge in the mountainous areas of Chekiang and made his alliance with the two bandits who were honoured by the title of General, the Chinese Communist Party had taken on a military aspect.

When Mao Tse-Tung was joined by Chu Teh, with a rebellious army group which came to be known as the People's Liberation Army, a new militarism was born, which in 20 years' time, was to take over the whole of China. It should also be remembered that even in these days, it was by military action against Kuomintang forces that Mao Tse-tung tried to establish himself.

It was when he found that owing to the superior strategy of the German general in charge of the Kuomintang forces the area which he had brought under control could no longer be held, that he organised the Great March which, through devious routes across mountains, rivers, deserts and grassy lands, reached the safety of Yenan. Again, it is significant that it is an army group which reached Yenan, and this army group might have remained but a major factor in Chinese politics, but for the opportunity for military training that it received through the Japanese invasions.

The period from 1938 to 1948 was one of incessant warfare with militarism entering the very marrow of Chinese politics. Every Communist leader at that time was a general and it was through the association with People's Liberation Army that communist leadership grew to maturity.

The idea that the Chinese are non-militarist people wedded to the arts of peace is thus utterly fallacious. They have always been militarist as a matter of State policy. They have been militarised as a people by the last 50 years of continuous warfare, and it is no wonder that whatever peaceful traditions existed in ancient China have been over-ridden not merely by the expansionist policy inherited from the past, but by the militarist tradition of last half a century.

DRAGON TOWARDS BHUTAN

The sudden withdrawal of the Chinese forces from the territory of the Indian North-East Frontier Agency after their remarkable military victory there last November left the world puzzled as to the political objectives of the operations. No body has taken seriously the Chinese contention that their frontier forces "had no choice but to strike back in self-defence"; in any case the Chinese offensive was obviously on too big a scale to have been a mere local counter-attack. It could hardly, however, have been meant to enforce China's claim to the territory of the Frontier Agency, since the part of the disputed area which had been overrun was evacuated.

Nor did it make sense to maintain that the Chinese were attacking on the North-East Frontier in order to compel India to legalise Chinese possession of the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh through which the Sinkiang-Tibet highway—according to some commentators the only real interest of China in the boundary dispute—has been constructed: if this had been the intention, the captured territory in the North East would have been held for bargaining purposes. There was indeed an adequate military explanation of the withdrawal—the approach of winter conditions in the high Himalayan passes, which would have made it difficult to supply a large Chinese force down on the edge of the Assam lowlands. But the Chinese must have known that winter was coming when they launched their offensive well on in the autumn. Moreover, according to what seems to be a reliable report, a senior Communist official in Peking stated to a foreign journalist in October that however far the Chinese troops might go they would later be recalled behind the 1959 "line of control", which meant going back to the McMahon frontier.

There is indeed no evidence to set against the contention that the Chinese withdrawal was both voluntary and predetermined by the Chinese Government. Mr. Nehru's assertion that it was due to Soviet pressure on China was purely imaginary. Why, then, did the Chinese make such a considerable military effort only to relinquish the territory they had gained? This question raises another: What actually did the Chinese achieve by their victory? The answer is that they achieved a clear demonstration of military superiority. But who was most likely to be impressed and intimidated by such a demonstration? The answer points to the State close to whose borders the fighting took place; in other words, Bhutan. The briefest glance at the map—and we may assume that Mao Tse-tung, who has been fighting wars for most of his adult life, has studied maps of China's Himalayan frontier very thoroughly—should be sufficient to show the vital strategic importance of Bhutan for the defence of the Indian sub-continent. Bhutan extends from the crest of the Himalayas down to India lowlands on the borders of Bengal, and Assam is joined to the main body of India only by a narrow corridor, which runs between Bhutan to the north and East Pakistan to the south. If Bhutan were to be taken over and occupied by China, and if Pakistan were to remain strictly neutral so that Indian troops could neither

pass through, nor be supplied through, its territory, Assam would be in extreme danger of being cut off from the rest of India together with any part of the Indian army that might be defending it. Moreover, if Nepal were also neutral, Indian forces holding Sikkim and covering Darjeeling and Kalimpong could be outflanked by a Chinese move through Bhutan and would risk being pinned against the eastern frontier of Nepal.

India's prospects of a successful defence of its territory therefore depend to a very great extent on the attitudes of Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan. As by far the weakest of the three and the nearest to China's recent exhibition of military might, Bhutan is the most liable to be intimidated, and it can be expected that, if there were a further crisis in the area, Bhutan would have no confidence in India's protective capacity and would not dare to resist a Chinese demand for preventive occupation, which would enable Peking to claim that its troops had entered Bhutan at Bhutan's own request.

Bhutan has not so far admitted any Indian troops within its borders. It is theoretically an independent state, but has not, like Nepal, been internationally recognised as sovereign; it has agreement with India for conduct of its foreign relations, but the Bhutanese claim that this only amounts to giving advice which they are not bound to take. In the discussion of frontier questions between India and China at official level in 1960 the Chinese delegates refused to discuss the borders of either Sikkim or Bhutan with Tibet on the ground that neither state was part of India. This implied a challenge to the Indian position that both are in some sense within the Indian political system. Sikkim is in fact effectively within the system because it is garrisoned by Indian troops, but any Indian military move now into Bhutan to forestall the Chinese would almost certainly be a *casus belli* for China.

For some months past Chinese agents along the whole Himalayan tract from Kumaon to the Burma border have been trying out locally the idea of a Confederation of Himalayan States to include Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, an Eastern Hills State in the North East Frontier Agency, and Nagaland. This Confederation would be independent of India and guaranteed by China. It would in effect deprive India of any Himalayan frontier at all east of Kumaon, and as long as Pakistan remained neutral, would render it almost impossible strategically for India to hold Assam, which could at a suitable opportunity be detached and transformed in a separate People's Republic. If these possibilities are taken into account, it is easier to explain the course of recent events and the apparent disproportion between the relative triviality of the ostensible border issues and the magnitude of the Chinese concentration of political hostility military effort against India. If, of course, India and Pakistan were to be genuinely reconciled and combine for the joint defence of the sub-continent, the whole present situation would be transformed. There are so far no grounds for expecting that India will be ready to make concessions on the question of Kashmir sufficient to draw Pakistan out of its present posture of sullen neutrality. That Mao has been counting on Pakistani neutrality in his designs against India is highly probable; he must have anticipated that any build-up of Indian strength with British and American aid could only aggravate Indo-Pakistan tensions unless there were to be a settlement on Kashmir.

The British and American aid can, nevertheless, in time greatly increase India's defence potential, whether Pakistan co-operates with India or not. But the operative words are "in time." Will China give India the time to grow strong? The next few months will provide the answer to this question.

A DRAGON WITH MEMORIES

China's view of its position in the world, now being appraised in Peking with a flock of ambassadors recalled for consultation, could threaten others besides India—but not yet.

The dragon breathing fire across the Himalayan passes is potentially a hydra-headed, many-limbed beast with claws and nostrils in reserve for use elsewhere. It is not necessarily, however, as indiscriminate a danger as might be thought on reading the chronology of communist China's 'thirteen years of aggressive activity' lately issued by the United States Information Service. Nor is the fact that China happens to be under communist rule as relevant as many suppose (though communism does indeed add an extra dimension to the Chinese problem); Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's government in Formosa has reminded the world that though he disapproves of the methods used by the Chinese communists, he no more accepts the McMahon Line, or any other frontier disputed by China's present rulers, than they do.

Plenty of evidence suggests that, when it comes to drawing China's frontiers on the map, Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues are Chinese first and communists second. What is obscure is just what, in the minds of the men in Peking, China's frontiers are. Any number of definitions could find support in China's long history. Imperial China at its greatest included not only Tibet but also most of what is now Vietnam; Korea was a Chinese possession before it was a Japanese colony; the Mongols, like the Manchus, were outer "barbarians", to be subdued and civilised by the Han Chinese. Some authorities, such as Professor C.P. Fitzgerald, hold that deep in his heart every Chinese believes that any territory that was once ruled by China remains for ever Chinese. A more extreme theory argues that any country or people that once absorbed Chinese culture is residually Chinese—a concept that would embrace Japan but exclude Tibet.

Probably all these competitive ideas co-exist in the minds of Chinese leaders, whether they sit in Peking or in Taipeh. But it does not follow that all will be acted upon in the foreseeable future, or at all. In certain important senses, China is still feeling its way in foreign affairs. Traditionally, the mere idea of relations with foreign powers has been alien to Chinese thought. The Chinese have had a foreign ministry only since 1901, when they set one up under British pressure. China's relations with non-Chinese peoples used to be handled by an unimportant branch of the ministry of court duties, charged with determining whether gifts offered by vassal states were worthy of the Emperor's attention. China was the Middle Kingdom, whose natural tendency was to expand outward as the troublesome barbarians on its fringes were subdued; should the barbarians turn the tables and advance into China, as the Manchus did, then nothing was lost, for China would inevitably absorb them.

The imperialist pressures of the nineteenth century, especially Britain's, dented China's ethnocentric image without entirely shattering it. The Chinese, as practical people, were forced to acknowledge the existence of other centres of power; as superior people, they resented—not without reason—the humiliations that were inflicted on them. The expansion of Tsarist power into Siberia and the rise of Japan provided other lessons, such as the view that China ought never to quarrel simultaneously with the land power to the north and west, and with the sea power to the east.

These ideas and events are highly relevant to the present conduct of foreign affairs in Peking. When the Chinese communists came to power in 1949, they faced the problem of reserving their unredeemed territories : Outer Mongolia and Tibet, Hongkong and Formosa. All including Outer Mongolia, which had been a republic under Soviet protection since 1924, were regarded as integral parts of China. On grounds of realism, Tibet was the only one that could be taken back with impunity, and it was. The time had not come to get the British out of Hongkong; Formosa was saved, first by the inadequacy of communist China's sea and air power, and later by President Truman's decision to protect the Chinese Nationalist government. Outer Mongolia was saved by Mao's decision to "lean" to the Soviet side in the world power struggle and by China's reluctance to take on a continental power (Russia) and a sea power (America) at the same time.

It would be delusive, however, for the Russians—or the Mongolians—to imagine that the Chinese communists have abandoned their claim to what is now the People's Republic of Mongolia. They did recognise the republic's "independent status" in an exchange of notes accompanying the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, but the frontier between Outer Mongolia and China's own Inner Mongolia has never been demarcated to Peking's satisfaction. (The boundaries between China and Outer Mongolia have now been recently settled. The basis of the Settlement and the Contents of the Treaty are not disclosed to the public —Editor). Indeed, Peking's maps have shown varying areas of the Mongolian Republic—according to the date and degree of pressure exerted by Moscow—as Chinese. Nor do the Soviet maps of the region where China meets Afghanistan, Soviet Tadzhikistan and Kirghizia coincide with China's, even now.

The Sino-Soviet quarrel about tactics and ideology has brought Peking dangerously close to the prospect all Chinese must want to avoid—that of having a continental enemy as well as a maritime one. In one way the military attack on India would have made sense if it had forced Mr. Khruschev to come off on Peking's side of his precarious neutral perch between Peking and Delhi. There is no sign of this happening, and the Chinese are showing anger that it has not. All the same, it would be wrong to suppose that the Chinese leaders press their latent claims on border regions under Soviet rule or protection, at least in the near future, India is fair game; Russia is not, as yet.

Perhaps the most reasonable assumption to make about China's foreign policy in the present phase is that those who make it want to use communism as a weapon to restore China to its historic place as the centre of the world. This is far from saying that their communism is insincere; indeed, their doctrinal challenge to Moscow is consistent both with sincerity and with the view that Peking is, or ought to be, the natural leader of the block. It is also a fair assumption that the Chinese leadership will continue, whenever it seems expedient, to "take back" territory that was once China's. So long as countries like Vietnam and Korea remain at least partly in amenable hands, they are

unlikely to be attacked, though this situation could change if the anti-communist side in either country gained the upper hand.

China's population problem may also, in the further future present a danger to its neighbours. For the present, however, there are plenty of empty spaces within China's present boundaries, to be pioneered and made productive. In the light of China's economic problems, the notion that the Chinese would like to take over all India—whose problems are painfully similar—seems grotesque. If and when Lebensraum does become an issue, the choice will lie rather between the underpopulated Soviet Far East and the fertile rice bowls of south-east Asia. Chinese expansion would then take on a different pattern; but that time still looks remote.

CLOAK AND DAGGER

In an earlier age China's adventurist foreign policy would have been hailed as a classic example of masterly Machiavellian statecraft. But in the middle of the twentieth century it is only an anachronism, reminiscent of the age of the buccaneers and conquistadors of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries or even of an earlier age of the Celestial Empire of China.

Today, China's attempts to re-impose her will upon her neighbours and upon the so-called former "dependent territories" can only be described as crude attempts at neo-imperialism, seeking cheap glory at the expense of her supporters and friends in, what she thinks, are the "safe" areas in her vicinity. The Chinese Government has progressively revealed itself as an expansionist power seeking to put back the clock of history, betraying the cause of its people, the trust of its friends and jeopardising the prospects of the Asian peoples to abolish misery and hunger from their midst. This is the significance of the perfidy of the Chinese Government.

The story of this great betrayal began a little more than 12 years ago. Within a year of the setting up of the People's Republic, the government of Mao Tse-tung struck at two of her small and weak neighbours—Korea and Tibet—without the slightest provocation from these countries.

In the dust of international controversy raised by these actions, the Chinese Government successfully covered up its failure to implement its promises of national reconstruction on the strength of which the people of China torn by 30 years of war had switched their loyalties from the Kuomintang regime to the Chinese Communists.

Instead of bringing them peace, the new regime pushed the Chinese people with characteristic callousness into another war which lasted for 3 years in Korea—the advance in Tibet having been halted when the Chinese Government realised that its hands were quite full in Korea and that it could not fight on two fronts.

Despite fighting hard for three years, the Chinese made little territorial gains in Korea as South Korea still eluded their grasp ; in Tibet their gains were even smaller.

Why did the Chinese Government undertake the Korean adventure ? It is no longer doubted that they were chagrined at their 'loss of face' at their inability to take over Formosa and that they were misled by the announcement of the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in January 1950, defining the US defence perimeter in the Far East. In this announcement there was no mention of Korea, the place from which the American troops had been evacuated a couple of months earlier.

They had further reasoned that in its own interest the Soviet Union would not permit too great a military pressure to be put upon them by the Western Powers. Korea was therefore a "safe" place to seek military glory.

As regards Tibet, a land-locked state, India deeply involved against Pakistan, would be in no position to put any effective obstacle in their way. The third consideration which impelled them on this perilous course was, first, the need to create distraction at the home front from the failure of the Communist 'miracle' to materialise, and, secondly, the urgency for schooling the Chinese peoples to accept shortage of food and other amenities of life. For this they built up the scare of the continuing threat from the imperialists and the reactionaries in Korea and Tibet.

Although the Chinese made little territorial gain, their Government drew comfort that they had gained from India a recognition of their claims to sovereignty over Tibet; and had successfully resisted the UN forces in Korea. They also noted that their aggression had gone unpunished. This encouraged them in the belief that because the democracies of the world were anxious to avoid involvement in a war, they could go ahead with their policy of re-establishing their rule over, according to them, the 'dependent peoples, in Assam, Burma, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet.

At the same time they had noted the nervousness that their adventure in Korea had produced among their smaller neighbours and decided to do something about it.

The next time that the Chinese showed their hand they were careful to select an area where a Western Power was still installed as an imperial power. The place was Indo-China where the Indo-Chinese people had been fighting the French since 1945 for their national freedom.

Shortly after the Korean truce, the Chinese Government turned its attention to Vietnam. Chinese arms and trucks were made available to Viet Minh and in 1954 their tempo of fighting in Vietnam suddenly flared up. The Chinese were, however, careful to keep appearances and did not send their troops. In their anxiety not to get involved in a war at the wrong place and the wrong time, the Western Powers stood aloof from the military conflict.

As a result, a communist regime was established in North Vietnam and French Indo-China was broken up into Cambodia, Laos and the States of North and South Vietnam. Although the Chinese had strenuously denied their help, they were present at the Geneva Conference to receive their share of the credit for 'liberating' the Indo-Chinese from the French.

Although the Chinese troops had not appeared in Vietnam, Chinese influence in North Vietnam was openly discussed in the World Press and created uneasiness in Burma, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

The Chinese Government now sought to assuage this nervousness among its small neighbours in the South. In the Tibetan Trade Treaty with India, they agreed to the enunciation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, the principles known as *Panch Sheel*. These principles were ostentatiously reiterated in the joint communiques issued at the conclusion of the various visits of the Chinese Prime Minister to foreign capitals.

At the famous Bandung Conference, the Chinese Prime Minister appeared in the role of a staunch supporter of Peaceful Co-existence and for the time being stilled the doubts and suspicions which had risen in the minds of some southern neighbours of China, including India.

The Chinese Government, however, did not remain inactive for any length of time, and their foreign adventures continued.

Soon they turned their attention to Formosa, or rather to the two insignificant rocky islands of Quemoy and Matsuo, controlled by the Government of Taiwan. For a couple of weeks the islands were shelled from the Chinese coast to create the impression that the Chinese Government was not afraid of the United States Seventh Fleet operating in the Formosan Straits. Then in the name of world peace the Chinese stopped this senseless shelling.

The only rational purpose behind this shelling could have been to get rid of a lot of ammunition which by the passage of time had deteriorated and had become too dangerous for further storage.

Soon the Chinese Government produced another rabbit from its bag of tricks. It had so far used two devices to extend the political frontiers of China—massive military intervention in the case of North Korea; exploitation of national freedom movement in Vietnam.

The new trick was cartographical encroachment, a device which was to be used against India.

Chinese maps have been the subject of many exchanges between the governments of India and China. On several occasions reference was made in the Indian Parliament to the misrepresentation of India-China boundary. The Government of China at first disclaimed all responsibility for the maps which had been prepared under the earlier regime and said that they had no time to look into this.

The issue was raised by the Indian Government during the negotiations of the Tibetan Trade Treaty of 1954, and, later at the meeting of the two Prime Ministers in 1956.

It has been repeatedly said by the Indian Prime Minister that three times during that meeting the Chinese Prime Minister had stated that, for the sake of friendship between their two peoples, the Chinese Government would respect the McMahon Line in the Eastern Sector and the traditional boundary in the Western Sector of Indian frontier.

As the border between India and Tibet was clearly indicated on the various Indian maps, repeatedly brought to the notice of the Chinese Government since 1950, Prime Minister Chou was fully aware of India's traditional frontier both in the Eastern and the Western Sectors, when he gave the undertaking to Prime Minister Nehru in 1956.

Still, an official map, published in Peking later in the year, showed nearly 50,000 sq. miles of Indian territory as Chinese territory. What was worse, as was discovered by Indian Government only two years later, that through 1954—57, Chinese had quietly constructed a road in Indian territory in Ladakh.

This is how the cloak-and-dagger type of diplomacy was practised against a steadfast friend of the Chinese people; how it was used for traditional aggrandisement. At first, the Chinese Government denied any responsibility for the map but in 1959 brazenly claimed the areas as Chinese territory.

Another example of broken promises was the military build up in Tibet in 1959 despite the solemn promises given by the Chinese Government to the Indian Prime Minister in 1956 and repeated to the Tibetan people several times thereafter.

The full blast of Chinese propaganda against India began soon after, the Tibetan revolt. The persistent theme was that the so-called reactionary circles in India had sparked the Tibetan ; the recurrent accusation against the Indian Government was that they had given asylum to the Dalai Lama; the Chinese counter-action, again quiet and furtive, was occupation of more than 12,000 sq. miles of Indian territory in Ladakh, and of Long-Ju in the NEFA.

Henceforth, the Chinese Government has persisted in its claim to territories which have been under our exclusive administrative control for many decades. Last year the Ladakh frontier shown in the 1956 maps, was shifted further westward, advancing the Chinese claim to another 2,000 sq. miles of Indian territory.

Recently, without making any commitment, the Chinese Government has invoked the accuracy—please note not its legality—of the McMahon line in its favour.

And finally, while professing its desire to negotiate, it launched a large-scale assault on the Thag-la ridge against Indian posts and forcibly seized several posts in the NEFA.

There can be little doubt in the mind of any person that the Government of China has been expansionist in its policy; there can be no doubt that it was not sincere in its protestations for peaceful settlement of disputes, and has used its armed forces for territorial aggrandisement; that it has broken its solemn undertakings to the peoples of Tibet and India while it was professing its everlasting friendship for them.

Ever since our independence, the people and the Government of India have supported the Chinese Government; in doing so they have even earned the displeasure of many countries.

We were the first non-communist country to recognise the Communist Government of China and have persistently worked for their recognition by the United Nations. We mediated on their behalf in Korea and in Indo-China.

When the Tibetan complaint was being discussed in the Security Council in 1950, it was dropped when we stated that the Chinese Government had told us that it would not use force in making a settlement with the Tibetan people.

It was India which had sponsored the Chinese participation in the Bandung Conference.

Indeed, we have gone considerably out of our way for the sake of our friendship with them.

Our reward has been that the Chinese Government has not only bitterly attacked us in its propaganda since 1959, has not only occupied our territory all the time that it seemingly 'offered' to negotiate without actually doing so except to enlarge its claim, but has also accused us of military aggression. Such fantastic accusations were not hurled against its opponents even by Hitlerite Germany !

Naturally, one must ask why the Chinese Government has done all this, what are their objectives and what do they expect to get out of militarism ? It is sometimes said that the Chinese Government is seeking the leadership of Asia; sometimes it is argued that it is seeking the leadership of the Communist bloc. It is also hinted that they are in great difficulties at the home front, that the great 'Leap Forward' has failed, that their agricultural plans are in shambles. It is neither possible nor necessary here to say anything with certainty on this point.

But it may be in order to assess the international repercussions of Chinese expansionism and of her attempts to revive the glories of the Celestial Empire in the age of democracy.

The Chinese attack on Indian democracy is going to have far-reaching results.

It has dealt a heavy blow to the policy of peaceful co-existence and put the world on the alert. In many parts of Asia and Africa it had been assumed, after the Bandung Conference, that China had decided to co-exist peacefully with other countries in Asia and Africa. When the largest, though not the most powerful, democracy has been attacked by China, many of the smaller non-aligned countries will be forced to take a second look at their non-alignment. It is unlikely that they will omit to notice, that in its professed desire to fight the so-called imperialists, China has chosen to attack unaligned India.

Again, if this wave of nervousness and fear gathers momentum it will involve and swamp the sincere efforts of the new States in Africa and Asia to raise their pitiable standards of life by their own efforts and with the assistance from their friends abroad.

Chinese bellicosity will undoubtedly also affect adversely the prospects of nuclear disarmament. It will also have a profound effect on the working of the United Nations.

In short, it will endanger all the constructive developments that the world has seen since the end of World War II.

It is these dangers that we are fighting in our stand against Chinese militarism. This is the real significance of our fight with the Chinese Government.

VII

The Naked Aggression

A CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS OF THE
India-China Border Dispute
Since 29th April, 1954 to 27th February, ~~1963~~ 1963

THE NAKED AGGRESSION

1954

APRIL 29TH : The Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India was signed at Peking between India and China. A note was exchanged along with, by which the Government of India agreed to forego all her extra-territorial rights in Tibet. Partly it read : "The Government of India will be pleased to withdraw completely within six months from date of exchange of the present note the military escorts now stationed at Yatung and Gyantse in Tibet region of China ... The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment operated by the Government of India in Tibet region of China ... The Government of India will be pleased to hand over to the Government of China at a reasonable price the twelve rest houses of the Government of India in Tibet region of China ... The Government of India will be pleased to return to the Government of China all land used or occupied by the Government of India other than the lands within its Trade Agency compound walls at Yatung.

The Preamble of the Agreement contained the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence—*Panchsheel*.

JUNE 28TH : Premier Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru re-affirmed their faith in *Panchsheel* in a Joint Statement released in Delhi.

JULY 17TH : Government of China lodged a protest against the presence of 30 Indian Army personnels who had crossed the Niti pass on June 29, 1954 in Wu-Je area of Tibet.

AUGUST 27TH : India rejected as entirely incorrect the Chinese allegation of intrusion in Wu-Je area of Tibet. India pointed out that a party of our Border Security Force is encamped in the Hoti Plain which is south-east of Niti Pass and is in Indian territory. *None of our troops or personnel have crossed north of Niti Pass.*" India protested against the crossing of the Tibetan officials in the Hoti Plain which belongs to India.

1955

JUNE 28TH : Chinese were reported camping at Hoti with 5 tents and 20 horses and India protested to China against the illegal entry and stay of Chinese officials at Hoti.

JULY 11TH : China protested that "Indian soldiers crossed into Wu-Je on June 25, 1955 and engaged in constructing fortification at places very close to our garrison forces stationing there".

JULY 18TH : Government of India rejected the Chinese protest of 11th July 1955 ; "The troops mentioned were not in the Tibet region (Wu-Je) of China

but at Bara Hoti, on the Hoti Plain in India which is south of Tunjun La. We are not aware of the exact location of Wu-Je, though the Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy mentioned that it was 12 kilometers north of the Tunjun La". India complained against the continued presence of the Chinese troops in the Bara Hoti area of Indian territory.

AUGUST 18TH : The Sarji, a Tibetan official, with the Chinese troops at Barahoti on the Hoti Plain in India realised by force grazing tax from Indian herdsmen grazing goats in the area. India protested against this new development on the border question.

NOVEMBER 5TH : A Chinese detachment of 20 troops intruded 10 miles south in Damzan in India on September 15, 1955. India made a strong protest : We must point out that Damzan is clearly within Indian territory It is situated at longitude 79°51'—latitude 30°49' and is 10 miles south of the *Niti Pass which has been recognised by the Sino Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954 as the border pass between the two countries in this region."*

1956

APRIL 28TH : Twelve Chinese armed with tommy and sten guns intruded in Nilang area of Indian territory.

JUNE 8TH : Chinese claimed Tunjun La pass as the Chinese territory and not a border pass.

JULY 26TH : Chinese Note claimed Barahoti as Chinese territory : Wu-Je being its Chinese name. For the first time Chinese asserted to the existence of Wu-Je to the south of Tunjun La and not to 12 kilometres northeast of the pass, admitting this as only an official mistake.

SEPTEMBER 1ST : About ten Chinese Army personnel crossed the Shipki La Pass into Indian territory.

SEPTEMBER 8TH : Chinese Army personnel stoned at the Indian officials and threatened to use fire in the Shipki La Pass in the Indian territory. The Chinese officials told the Indian officials that the Chinese border extended up to Hupsang Khad (South to Shipki La Pass).

SEPTEMBER 20TH : Twenty Chinese Army personnel crossed the Shipki La Pass and came up to Hupsang Khad in the Indian territory and threatened to open fire on Indian officials.

SEPTEMBER 24TH : India lodged a strong protest against the Chinese intrusion in the Shipki La Pass area of Indian territory : The Indian protest Note said : "In view of the fact that Shipki La Pass is clearly the border and is acknowledged as such in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954 the Government of India consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist.

OCTOBER 3RD : India raised objection to the changed Chinese position (see 26th July 1956) about the location of Barahoti/Wu-Je.

NOVEMBER 28TH : Premier Chou En-lai visited India. Chinese Premier agreed with Prime Minister Nehru that there was no border problem between India & China but, "only a few petty issues to be amicably decided by the officials of two Governments on the basis of *established practice and custom as well as the watershed principle*". Immediately after his meeting with Premier

Chou, Prime Minister Nehru noted in his diary about his discussion on McMahon Line, "Premier Chou referred to the McMahon Line and again said that he had never heard of this before though of course the then Chinese Government had dealt with this matter and not accepted this line. He had gone into this matter in this connection with the border dispute with Burma. Although he thought that this line, established by British imperialism, was not fair, nevertheless because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that *they should give recognition to this McMahon Line.*"

1958

APRIL 19TH : Talks between China and India began at New Delhi over Barahoti.

JULY 2ND : India lodged a protest against the Chinese occupation of the Khurnak Fort. The Note pointed out that even at a conference of the representatives of the Kashmir State of India and the Tibet region of China held in 1924 regarding the boundary in this area, the jurisdiction of India over the Khurnak Fort was never disputed.

AUGUST 21ST : India lodged a strong protest against the publication of a wrong map in an official magazine 'China Pictorial' of July 1958 showing as Chinese territory (i) four of the five divisions of India's North East Frontier Agency; (ii) some areas in the north of the State of Uttar Pradesh; (iii) large areas in Ladakh which form part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, and the entire Tashigang area of Eastern Bhutan and a considerable slice of territory in north-west Bhutan.

SEPTEMBER : Chinese soldiers arrested an Indian patrol party on a normal routine duty in the northern part of Akasi Chin and detained and ill-treated the Indians for nearly five weeks. A large Chinese party entered Barahoti with building materials, clearly in order to construct permanent or semi-permanent structures.

SEPTEMBER 27TH : A detachment of Chinese troops crossed into the Lohit Frontier Division and later moved into Burma.

OCTOBER : Chinese Armed personnel entered Lapthal and Sangeha Malla in Uttar Pradesh State of India and established military out-posts at both the places.

OCTOBER 18TH : The Government of India protested against the construction of the road by the Government of China across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jammu and Kashmir State, which is part of India. This road seems to form part of the Chinese road known as Yehcheng-Gartok road or Sinkiang-Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September 1957. The road enters Indian territory just east of Sarigh Jilgnang, runs north-west to Amtogar and striking the western bank of the Amtogar Lake runs north-west through Yangpa, Khitai Dawan and Haji Langar which are all indisputable Indian territory.

OCTOBER 29TH : Unauthorised flights of Chinese Aircraft over Spiti Valley in the Punjab and Himachal Pradesh States of India were reported.

OCTOBER 29TH—NOVEMBER 1ST : Unauthorised flight of Chinese Aircraft over Chini area of Himachal State of India.

NOVEMBER 3RD : The Government of China replied : "In the maps currently published in China the boundary line between China and its neighbouring countries, including India, is drawn on the basis of maps published in China before the liberation. This was made clear to His Excellency Prime Minister Nehru by Prime Minister Chou En-lai when the former visited China in October 1954. Premier Chou En-lai explained then to His Excellency Prime Minister Nehru that the reason why the boundary in Chinese maps is drawn according to old maps is that the Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a survey of China's boundary, nor consulted with the countries concerned, *and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own.* The Chinese Government believe that with the lapse of time, and after consultations with the various neighbouring countries and a survey of the border regions, a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided on in accordance with the results of the consultation and the survey."

NOVEMBER 8TH : Government of India protested against the Chinese claim over the Akasi Chin area of Ladakh and the ill-treatment of the members of the Indian patrol captured by the Chinese.

DECEMBER 14TH : India read danger in the Chinese Note of November 3, 1958. India, which had ever till now believed the non-existence of any major border dispute and who had seen in the 1954 Agreement on Trade between China and India the settlement of all the boundary questions between the two countries if there were any, was now taken aback by the Chinese assertion that the 'Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a survey of the Chinese boundary nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own'. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Premier Chou : "I was puzzled by this reply because I thought there was no major boundary dispute between China and India". *Chinese Puzzle* was never to leave India from this day onward.

1959

JANUARY 17TH : India lodged a protest against the Chinese entry in Walong in October 1957 and into Lohit Frontier Division in September 1958.

JANUARY 23RD : In reply to Prime Minister Nehru's letter of December 14, 1958 Premier Chou wrote : "The Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited. Historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary has ever been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and the Indian Government." Premier Chou categorically rejected the McMahon Line as the boundary between the two countries and pointed out that 'it has never been recognised by the Chinese Central Government'. The Government of China made an about-turn on the map issue and claimed that all the Chinese maps published after the establishment of the People's Republic in China show the correct traditional and customary Chinese alignment with India and other border States. With one stroke of pen Chinese laid claim to over 50,000 square miles of Indian territory.

MARCH 10TH : The Tibetan people stood in revolt against the Chinese masters.

MARCH 22ND : Prime Minister Nehru categorically rejected in his letter to Premier Chou the Chinese territorial claims as shrewly baseless. India agreed with China that though no formal border treaty governs the entire length of the border but India pointed out that this traditional and customary Indian align-

ment is so clear and well defined and was so for centuries together that the correctness of the Indian alignment is beyond any possible dispute of any kind.

Government of China in a statement to the Government of India pointed out that : 'The local Government in Tibet under instigation and support of the imperialists and foreign reactionary elements have torn up the agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet and begun armed revolt by attacking Government offices of the Central Government troops.....This is entirely an internal affair of China and we shall never permit interference from outside. Tibet is an integral part of China and any intrigue aimed at splitting Tibet away from China is doomed to total failure.'

MARCH 31ST : The Dalai Lama, who earlier had escaped from Lhasa, on the failure of the Tibetan revolt against the Chinese, entered into the Indian territory and immediately, in accordance with the international usage, was given the political asylum on his request. The Dalai Lama came in India on his own free will and was not abducted from Tibet as the Government of China alleged.

APRIL 26TH : India confirmed that she had no desire to interfere in the internal happenings in Tibet, but took a very strong objection to the unbecoming and unjustified attacks made by the responsible persons in China on the Government of India for granting political asylum to The Dalai Lama.

MAY 23RD : India once again declared its unreserved adherence to the *Panch-sheel*. Referring to the Statement of the Chinese Ambassador of 16th May 1959, the Indian Foreign Secretary in his Note to the Chinese Ambassador pointed out that ".....it appears that, according to them (China), the *Panch-sheel* or the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence may or may not be applied according to convenience or circumstances. This is an approach with which the Government of India are not in agreement. They have proclaimed and adhered to these Principles as a matter of basic policy and not of opportunism. They will continue to hold to these principles and endeavour to apply them according to their thinking."

JULY 8TH : India protested against the violation of 1954 Agreement by China by creating innumerable difficulties for the Indian officials at the Indian Trade Missions in Tibet to discharge their functions.

JULY 28TH : A Chinese armed detachment intruded into the region of Pangong Lake in Ladakh, arrested six persons of Indian Police and established a camp at Spanggur in Indian area.

India protested (30th July) against the Chinese intrusion of 28th July.

AUGUST 7TH : A two hundred strong Chinese armed patrol intruded into Khinzemane and pushed back the Indian Patrol to the bridge at Drokung Samba.

AUGUST 11TH : India protested against the Chinese intrusion of 7th August and made clear to the Chinese authorities that "these places are admittedly within Indian territory and we have been in continuous possession of it."

AUGUST 19TH : On a request from Bhutan Government, with whom India enjoys special treaty relations, Indian Government protested against the violation of the Bhutanese extra-territorial rights in the eight villages of Tibet which Bhutan had been enjoying without any break for the last 300 years.

AUGUST 25TH : A strong Chinese detachment crossed into Indian territory south of Migyitun on the NEFA border and fired without notice on an Indian forward picket. Later, the Chinese detachment outflanked the Indian outpost

at Longju (two miles south of international boundary) and opened fire on it from a distance of 800 yards.

AUGUST 26TH : The Chinese detachment encircled the Longju post and opened heavy fire. The small Indian garrison abandoned the outpost, which was captured later by the Chinese.

AUGUST 28TH : India protested in a very strong term the incidents of 25th and 26th August : "A case of deliberate aggression on Indian territory". India urged the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the area at Longju which the Chinese had occupied forcibly.

SEPTEMBER 1ST : China claimed Longju as part of Migyitun area of the Chinese territory. China reiterated that no section of the Sino-Indian boundary had ever been formally delineated and the whole of the boundary had to be settled through surveys and discussions between the two sides.

SEPTEMBER 10TH : India strongly protested against the "standing threat to India's integrity" by publication of maps giving wrongly a large part of India's territory as Chinese. India denounced the Chinese view that Longju is a part of Migyitun.

SEPTEMBER 13TH : India rejected Chinese plea not to send Indian civil administrative personnel in Barahoti pending settlement. India regretted the non-resumption of the discussion of April-May 1958 in New Delhi on the Barahoti disputes.

SEPTEMBER 17TH : India protested against economic hardship Indian traders and Indian pilgrim were facing due to devaluation of Tibetan currency and the attitude of the Chinese officials.

SEPTEMBER 24TH : The Government of India made clear to the Chinese Government in their Note that "they cannot permit a diplomatic mission accredited to the Government of India to publish or circulate any material critical of the Government of India's policies or Ministers of the Government in India.

About the nationality of the Ladakhi Lamas, Muslims of Kashmir and the Indian nationals in Tibet, the Indian Government requested the Chinese Government to permit the Indian citizens and persons of Indian origin entitled to Indian citizenship to return to India, should they so wish.

OCTOBER 20ST : Two members of an Indian Police Party who went on patrol duty in Kong Ka Pass area in Ladakh, 40 to 50 miles south of the traditional Sino-Indian boundary were found missing.

OCTOBER 21TH : Another party headed by a senior officer which went in search of the missing Indian persons was surprised by a sudden fire from a Chinese armed force entrenched on a hill-top which used automatic weapons and hand grenades. Seventeen Indian personnel including the senior officer lost their lives.

OCTOBER 23RD : The Indian Government lodged a serious protest against the 'unjustified attack' of October 21, 1959, and demanded the immediate release of the Indian persons arrested on 20th October, 1959.

NOVEMBER 7TH : Premier Chou En-lai forwarded the notorious 'line of actual control' policy and suggested a 20 kilometres withdrawal by the two sides.

NOVEMBER 16TH : Prime Minister Nehru rejected to agree with the myth of the 'line of actual control' and 20 kilometres withdrawal from this line as

suggested by the Chinese Premier in his letter of 7th November 1959. Prime Minister stated : "Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter of surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent and different lines are sometimes indicated in them. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you have been in occupation of the area upto the frontier line shown in your map. On the contrary, the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the frontier line specified by them.....we exercised jurisdiction over this area by sending regular patrols up to the international boundary. Certain police check posts were established at some distance from the boundary to control the trade routes, etc. Since this statement is controverted by you, it is obvious that there is complete disagreement between two Governments even about the facts of possession. An agreement about the observance of the *status quo* would, therefore, be meaningless as the facts concerning the *status quo* are themselves disputed. I suggest, therefore, that in the Ladakh area, both our Governments should agree on the following as an interim measure. Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware, are their latest maps. Similarly, the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India in their earlier notes and correspondence and shown in their official maps. Since the two lines are separated by long distances, there should not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side. The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.

DECEMBER 5TH : Indian Government lodged a protest against the violation of Indian air space in the last two months along the entire India-China boundary. While replying to the various Chinese protest Notes to prohibit the demonstration in India, the Government of India made clear that under the Constitution and laws of India it is not possible to put a check on them so long these demonstrations were of peaceful character.

DECEMBER 13TH : India protested against the harsh and inhuman treatment given to the Indian personnels taken as prisoners after the attack on the Indian patrol party in Kongka Pass area on 21st October 1959. Karam Singh, second-in-command of the ill-fated Indian police patrol party who was taken prisoner along with other six Indian persons, issued a statement completely vindicating the Indian stand on the Kongka Pass incident and refuted all the previous statements which he and his companion gave in Chinese custody because of the Chinese inhuman pressure.

DECEMBER 17TH : The Government of China rejected the proposals of the Government of India of 16th November 1959 but, instead, made territorial claims amounting to about 33,000 kilometres of the Indian territory in Ladakh.

DECEMBER 26TH : China laid claim on 90,000 kilometres Indian territory in NEFA.

1960

FEBRUARY 5TH : India rejected the Chinese claim on the Indian territory detailed in Premier Chou En-lai's letter to Prime Minister Nehru of 26th December 1959. Prime Minister Nehru invited Chou En-lai to discuss means to a peaceful Settlement.

FEBRUARY 12TH : Government of India sent a Note to the Chinese Government making clear its stand on the border issue.

APRIL : Chinese military personnel patrolled the Suriah area.

APRIL 4TH : Indian Government lodged a protest against the violation of Indian air space in the previous three months by the Chinese planes.

APRIL 13TH : India again stressed that the 'persons of Indian origin who have been residing in the Tibet region of China, are entitled to the privileges of Indian citizenship.'

APRIL 19TH : The Prime Ministers of India and China met in New Delhi (19th April—25th April) to discuss differences between the two countries. The talks were not fruitful.

APRIL 25TH : The two Prime Ministers agreed in the Joint Communiqué issued after their meeting at New Delhi : "The two Prime Ministers, therefore, have agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet and examine, check and study all historical documents, records, accounts, maps and other material relevant to the boundary question, on which each side relied in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two Governments."

In an informal Note to the Government of China, Indian Government made clear to China that : "Under India's Treaties with Bhutan and Sikkim, Government of India is clearly responsible for the external relations of these two States. This has been pointed out to the Government of the People's Republic of China, as also the fact that the question relating to the northern boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan have to be considered at the same time as the boundary between India and China. Our concern is all the greater because persistent reports have reached us over a period of months that propaganda organs as well as senior Chinese officials in the Tibet region have been saying that China intends incorporating Sikkim and Bhutan like Ladakh into the Chinese People's Republic. On some occasions it was even stated that China might take military steps to occupy these territories. It is hoped that in the interest of restoring Sino-Indian relations and assuaging apprehensions, India's responsibility in respect of the external relations of Sikkim and Bhutan would be fully understood and respected and such propaganda would be stopped."

JUNE 3RD : A large Chinese party moved into Taktsang Gompa which is about five miles within Indian territory in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA. India lodged a protest on 29th July.

JUNE 25TH : A Chinese survey party visited Suriah.

AUGUST 22ND : India protested against the violation of her space by the Chinese planes flying from Tibet for fifty two times since March 1960.

SEPTEMBER 22ND : A Chinese armed patrol intruded several hundred yards into the Sikkimese territory near Jelepla Pass. India protested on 27th September.

OCTOBER 13TH : An armed Chinese party intruded approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of Hot Springs of Kongka Pass area in Ladakh.

DECEMBER 30TH : India protested against the Burmese-Chinese Boundary Treaty of 1st October 1960 for describing Diphu L'ka Pass as the tri-junction which is in fact a few miles north to the Diphu L'ka Pass.

1961

FEBRUARY 13TH : India protested against the violation of the Indian air space by the Chinese aircrafts.

FEBRUARY 14TH : The Government of India published the Report of the Officials of the Two Countries which established clearly the correctness of the Indian alignment and the absurdity of the Chinese claim to about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory.

MARCH 30TH : Rejecting the Chinese protest of December 10, 1960 for breaking the *status quo* by sending the civil administrative personnel in the Barahoti area, the Government of India Note emphatically made clear that "Barahoti is part of India and this fact was indisputably substantiated with a mass of details during the discussions between Indian and Chinese officials in 1958 and more recently in the officials' discussions which took place last year. On the other hand, the Chinese Government produced no clear topographical detail of the area, much less any material evidence to prove their contention. Nevertheless, in order to safeguard against any armed clash, the Government of India, in a reciprocal understanding with the Government of China, have refrained from sending any armed personnel to Bara Hoti plain for a number of years now. The despatch of civil administrative personnel is a different matter altogether. In the absence of any agreement not to send civilian officials to the area the the Government of India cannot agree that there has been any change in the *status quo* prevalent in the area. The Government of India must reserve their right to exercise their sovereignty in Bara Hoti in the traditional manner."

APRIL 13TH : India rejected the Chinese assertion that the Tibetans from the Indian territory had ever gone to the Tibetan territory to instigate the local people to flee from the Chinese territory.

APRIL 20TH : Chinese personnels crossed into Sikkim near the Jelepla Pass.

APRIL 29TH : India protested against the violation of the Indian air space by the Chinese over Askote, Joshimath and Badrinath from about 10.15 hours to 11.00 hours on March 17, 1961.

MAY : Chinese personnels intruded into the Indian territory near Chushul in the Ladakh area of India.

JULY : A Chinese patrol crossed the Eastern Sector of the Indian alignment about one mile west of Chemokarpola in the Rameng Frontier Division.

JULY 13TH : R.K. Nehru, Secretary General in the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, passed through Peking on his way back to Delhi from Mongolia and leaders of the Chinese Government to ascertain whether any progress could be made on the basis of the report of the officers.

JULY 15TH : India lodged a protest against the continued bad attitude of the Chinese authorities towards the Indian pilgrims and traders.

AUGUST : Chinese forces established three new check-posts in Ladakh at Point 78° 12' E, 35° 19' N, at Nyagzu and near Dambugura. Road linking these posts with rear bases were constructed.

SEPTEMBER 12TH : Armed Chinese personnels came into Sikkim across the Jelepla Pass.

NOVEMBER 2ND : China accused India for 'intrusion' in the Demchok area which belongs to India.

NOVEMBER 30TH : The Chinese Note rejected the 'so-called McMahon Line' as boundary alignment between China and India in this Sector and asserted that China had even regarded the boundary line along the southern foot of the Himalayas. The Note continued, "If the Indian Government's logic should be followed, the Chinese Government would have every reason to send troops to cross the so-called McMahon Line and enter the vast area between the crest of the Himalayas and their Southern foot." China agreed that China-Sikkim border 'has long been formally delimited and its location is very clear'.

DECEMBER 3RD : China made a formal request for the conclusion of another trade agreement on the expiry of 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region of China and India.

DECEMBER 15TH : In its Note the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, rejected the Chinese offer of 3rd December 1961 for signing a new trade treaty between Tibet and India on the expiry of the 1954 Agreement on June 3, 1962.

1962

JANUARY : Some Chinese civil and military officials crossed the border in the Eastern Sector near Longju and proceeded to Roi village half a mile within India.

JANUARY 5TH : India rejected the Chinese Memorandum of December 4, 1962 about the deportation and the persecution of the Chinese residents in India. The Indian Note pointed out that "no Government can ignore the security and well being of its people, and permit aliens to work from within to subvert the State. From time to time the Government of India has had to expel aliens from the territories of the Indian Union for engaging themselves in anti-social activities (e.g., smuggling, trafficking in narcotics and other cognizable offences), for infringement of visa regulations and indulgence in activities, covert or overt, intended to subvert the security of the state."

FEBRUARY 22ND : Government of India protested against the advance patrolling further inside Indian territory in Ladakh where earlier the Chinese Government assured to maintain the *status quo*.

FEBRUARY 26TH : India rejected the baseless charges of the Indian intrusion in the Chinese territory contained in Chinese Note of 30th November 1961. The Indian Note claimed : "That the territory west of Spanggur, the Demchok area, Nilang and Barahoti have always been parts of India and been administrated by Indian authorities". The Indian Note continued : That it is the Government of China who have in recent years sought to change unilaterally by means of force the long existing *status quo*. This has violated what had throughout history been a frontier of peace and jeopardized relations between the two countries. Peace on the border and friendly relations between the two countries can never be restored until the Government of China withdraw from Indian territory which they have unlawfully occupied."

MARCH 10TH : India protested against the violation of Indian air space over Chini area of India on 12th January 1962.

MARCH 18TH : This is a legitimate right of a sovereign country to do everything within its territorial bounds, which it feels necessary to safeguard its territorial integrity. The Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, pointed this

to Peking in their Note and added, "The Government of India regret 'that the Government of China have, in contravention of international law, and, in total disregard of the principle of respect for territorial integrity, taken steps which have violated the tranquility and peace in the Indian border area and compelled the Government of India to adopt protective measures to stop further inroads into Indian territory.'" India reiterated that "to achieve the peaceful settlement of the India-China border dispute it would be better if there was 'peaceful withdrawal of Chinese forces from territories which have traditionally been a part of India. Such action by China would re-establish faith in international law and respect for the traditional boundary between the two countries, and go a long way in resorting the traditional friendship between the peoples of India and China, and so assist in the maintenance of peace in Asia and the world."

MARCH 22ND : China rejected the Indian proposal of Chinese withdrawal from the traditional Indian territory. China claimed that it was between 1954—57 that she surveyed and constructed the Akasi-Chin road.

MARCH 24TH : India protested against the violation of the Bhutanese air space by the Chinese aircrafts on 24th, 25th and 27th November 1961.

APRIL 11TH : The Government of India reiterated that "the Agreement of 1954 was obviously intended to settle all outstanding issues which had been inherited from the past. It laid down regulations for trade and intercourse with the Tibet region across the common border. It also, for the first time in history, laid down the Five Principles as a code, governing relations between two friendly Governments. Each side gave a solemn undertaking that it would respect the other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese side had full knowledge at the time of the negotiations of what constituted the territorial boundaries of India. If it had any doubt, what was the purpose of the undertaking which it gave to respect India's territorial integrity ? Surely, it is not open to a Government which enters into solemn agreement on the basis of the Five Principles, first to give such an undertaking and then to claim part of the other's territory as its own ?

"It cannot be said that the Chinese Government was in any doubt at the time of the 1954 Agreement about what India regarded to correct traditional boundary between two countries. What Indian official maps clearly showed conformed to the territorial *status quo* of 1954 and earlier. The Government of India had published these Indian official maps which were precise and the Chinese Government knew about them. The Government of India had also repeatedly drawn the attention of the Government of China to the precise Indian official maps and to bewildering variety of erroneous alignments shown in the Chinese maps. The Government of China in reply always assured the Government of India that the old Chinese maps were products of the incorrect cartography of the Kuomintang regime and that they had no time to revise them. There was no ambiguity in so far as the Government of India was concerned about the traditional boundary alignment precisely shown in Indian official maps ; nor did the Government of India have any reason to believe that there was any uncertainty on the part of the Government of China regarding the correctness of this alignment. There can be no doubt at all that the 1954 Agreement confirmed the territorial *status quo* as it existed at that time. Surely, no agreement like that of 1954 negotiated over a period of some months could have been arrived at with substantial doubts and mental reservations on the question of the border in the minds of one of the parties to the Agreement.

"The entire frontier was a peaceful one at the time of the 1954 Agreement and continued to be so for a few years thereafter. There was no conflict or trouble along the frontier. It is only during the last few years that conflicts and troubles have arisen along the frontier. These have not arisen because of any action taken by India. The cause of the recent troubles and conflicts along this frontier is the action taken by the Chinese authorities along this frontier."

APRIL 18TH : The Government of India protested against the Chinese incursion in January 1962 into Roi village in the Eastern Sector.

APRIL 30TH : India rejected the Chinese claim that the entire boundary between India and China is the direct outcome of British imperialism and their policy of colonialism. Government of India pointed out "The records of British rule in India, which are now accessible and open to examination, show that the British only extended their authority over those territories which were historically and traditionally parts of India. These records also show that the British, far from expanding into Tibet or Sinkiang region, actually helped the Chinese to consolidate their authority in these regions."

The Chinese Government threatened to resume border patrolling along the entire Sino-Indian border.

MAY 3RD : The Government of Pakistan and China announced their agreement to enter into negotiations to locate and align the portion of the India-China boundary west of the Krakoram Pass presently under the illegal occupation of Pakistan.

MAY 10TH : India lodged with China and Pakistan an emphatic protest against their 3rd May 1962 announcement 'for this interference with the sovereignty of India over the State of Jammu & Kashmir.' See : Unprincipled Sino-Pak Pact page 84 for details)

MAY 14TH : India protested against the aggressive patrolling by the Chinese troops in the Chip Chap area of Ladakh and the Chinese threat of active patrolling on the entire India-China border. India again asked for the withdrawal of the armed and civilian personnel of the two countries from the area in dispute in Ladakh pending to the peaceful settlement. Were this to be agreed, India was to allow the Chinese Government the use the Aksai-Chin Road in Ladakh for non-military purposes.

MAY 21ST : India protested against the establishment of a new Chinese post approximately 8/10 miles south-east of Spanggur in Indian territory.

MAY 31ST : China went back upon her previous stand about the State of Jammu & Kashmir as the integral part of India.

JUNE 2ND : China rejected the Indian proposal for peaceful settlement of 14th May 1962 and warned India 'for the bloody conflicts' if India did not accede to the Chinese territorial demands.

JUNE 6TH : India protested against China's increasing intrusion into the Indian territory and the growing threat to peace on the border by "pushing forward trucks and jeeps, blasting the mountainside with heavy explosives, constructing new military bases and extending bases already set up."

JUNE 16TH : India protested against the clearing of a new road through Indian territory running south east from $78^{\circ} 35' E$, $35^{\circ} 0' N$. to the west of $79^{\circ} 10' E$. $34^{\circ} 43' N$. and thence southward to $79^{\circ} 8' E$., $34^{\circ} 33' N$. and setting up of a new post at $79^{\circ} 8' E$., $34^{\circ} 33' N$.

JUNE 28TH : India protested against military post near the Chip Chap river at $78^{\circ} 12' E.$, $35^{\circ} 19' N$, set up illegally by China.

JUNE 30TH : India rejected the Chinese contention contained in their 'Note dated 31st May 1962 that the settlement of the 'boundary between Pakistan and China' was a matter of urgency and that 'they cannot indefinitely leave unsettled their boundary of several hundred kilometres with the areas the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan.'" India emphatically pointed out that there was no such urgency and 'there is no boundary dispute in this sector of the Sino-Indian border."

JULY 8TH : China laid claim over the Galwan Valley in Ladakh.

JULY 10TH : India protested against the Chinese assertion of 8th July 1962 about the Indian territory of Galwan Valley and the encirclement of an Indian post at $78^{\circ} 38' E.$, $34^{\circ} 39' 45'' N$. on the Galwan river.

JULY 12TH : India protested against the establishment of nine new check-posts (seven in Chip Chap River Region, one in Chang Chenmo Valley Region and one in Spanggur Region.

JULY 22ND : India lodged a protest against Chinese firing on an Indian patrol in the region of Chip Chap River on July 21, 1962.

JULY 25TH : India protested against the violation of Indian air space over Chushul on 7th July 1962.

JULY 29TH : A group of about 20 Chinese soldiers opened fire on an Indian party in the vicinity of Yula in the Pangong Lake area. Indian troops did not return the fire.

AUGUST 4TH : China claimed the villages of Longju and Roi villages as the part of Migyitun area.

AUGUST 14TH : At about 19.30 hours a party of Chinese troops took up position opposite an Indian post at Yula in the Pangong Lake region and commenced firing. The Indian post was compelled to return fire in self defence. The Chinese party withdrew shortly thereafter.

AUGUST 22ND : The Indian Government re-emphasised that 'if the Government of China are genuinely desirous of resolving the differences between the two Governments on the boundary question by further discussions and negotiations, they must realise that these discussions cannot start unless the *status quo* of the boundary in this region which has been altered by force since 1957 is restored and the current tensions are removed'.

AUGUST 26TH : At about midday, a party of Chinese troops attempted to ambush an Indian patrol approximately 33 miles south east of Daulat Beg Oldhi.

AUGUST 28TH : China established as many as twenty-three new military posts in the past few weeks.

SEPTEMBER 2ND : At 0800 hours a large Chinese military force attacked an Indian patrol in Chip Chap River region.

SEPTEMBER 7TH : Establishment of two more new military posts by the Chinese in the Indian territory was reported.

SEPTEMBER 8TH : THE CHINESE FORCES CROSSED THE FRONTIER

IN THE EASTERN SECTOR AND THREATENED THE DHOLA FRONTIER.

SEPTEMBER 15TH : The intruding Chinese troops opened fire on an Indian defence post at approximately $78^{\circ} 80' 15''$ E., $35^{\circ} 07' 45''$ N—over a hundred miles west of the International boundary in this region.

SEPTEMBER 19TH : India in her Note rebuked China for her aggressive activities and for her determined desire to alter by force the *status quo* of the boundary unilaterally, using talks and discussions between the two Governments only as a cloak to further her aggressive and expansionist claims.

SEPTEMBER 20TH : India protested against China for her dangerously deploying the troops against the Indian defensive forces.

SEPTEMBER 20/21ST : China opened fire one mile east of the Dhola Indian post in NEFA

SEPTEMBER 21ST : India protested against the establishment of six more military posts in the Indian territory.

China served another threat to cross McMahon Line.

OCTOBER : Communist Party of India in their resolution supported the stand of the Government of India and blamed China for her aggression.

OCTOBER 9TH : Chinese armed forces attacked Indian troops in Southern Tibet near Chihtung.

OCTOBER 10TH : Heavy firing by Chinese forces began in NEFA front.

OCTOBER 16TH : Exchange of firing between Indian and Chinese troops broke out at Dhola area in the NEFA front.

India proposed to the Government of China for the restoration of the *status quo* of the boundary as it prevailed before the Chinese aggression in the Eastern Sector on 8th September 1962, prior to talks and discussions for easing of tension and for creating the appropriate climate for purposeful talks to resolve the differences between the two countries.

OCTOBER 21ST : After overrunning the Indian post of Dhola, the Chinese advanced further south of Namkha Chu River in NEFA. In Ladakh the Chinese opened a second front in Pangong Lake area.

India's Defence Minister, Krishna Menon declared in a press briefing that the Chinese 'have very considerable superiority in numbers and fire powers' but 'whatever the difficulties are, if we have to fall back we will fall back, but still we will continue to fight. The turn of the battle will decide the future'.

OCTOBER 22ND : The Chinese opened up two more fronts in Kibitoo in Lohit Division and Longju, both in NEFA. Tanks were used in action by the Chinese in the Ladakh and were supported by a large fleet of trucks in addition to machine-guns and heavy mortars.

In a special broadcast to the Indian nation the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called upon the people "to face with courage and confidence the great crisis created by 'the continuing and unabashed aggression by the Chinese forces.'" About the Chinese perfidy and treachery Pandit Nehru said: "Perhaps, there are not many instances in history where one country, that is India, has gone out of her way to be friendly and co-operative with the Chinese Government and people and to plead their cause in the councils of the world and then for the Chinese Government to return evil for good and even go to the extent of committing aggression and invade our sacred land. No self-

respecting country, especially not India with her love of freedom, can submit to this, whatever the consequences may be."

OCTOBER 23RD : Continuing their thrust southward in NEFA the Chinese reached Brokenthang and Zamithang, about seven or eight miles from Khinzemane which the Chinese captured on 20th October 1962.

OCTOBER 24TH : The monastery of Tawang town in NEFA and Galwan Valley post in Ladakh fell to the invading Chinese forces.

In his letter to the Indian Prime Minister, Chou En-lai presented the Three Point Proposal to reopen 'peaceful negotiations' between the two countries.

The Government of India rejected the Chinese three-point proposal and reiterated its 16th October 1962 demand of the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese forces from the Indian territory occupied illegally after 8th September 1962, creating a favourable atmosphere for peaceful negotiation for the settlement of the boundary dispute.

OCTOBER 25TH : A.K. Gopalan, leader of the Indian Communist Party in the Parliament, condemned 'China's naked, treacherous and criminal aggression' and said that it had 'shocked the conscience of all those who value socialism and peace'.

OCTOBER 26TH : The President of India declared a State of Emergency in India. The Proclamation read : "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 352 of the Constitution, (Article 352 clause 1 reads : If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect'. Since, Independence, the President declared the State of Emergency, for the first time. - Editor), I, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, President of India, by this Proclamation declare that a grave emergency exists where by the security of India is threatened by external aggression."

National Defence Fund was opened in India.

China launched a massive attack in their attempt to capture Walong in NEFA.

All India Congress Party urged the Government of India for total mobilization of all available resources in the country to defeat the Chinese aggression.

Gamal Abdul Nasser, President of the U.A.R. advanced to India and China his four-point proposal to reach a peaceful settlement of the India-China border dispute.

OCTOBER 26/27TH : Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Heads of the Governments of the world about the Chinese aggression of India.

OCTOBER 27TH : Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, in his letter to the President of the U.A.R. gave full support to the U.A.R. proposals 'as broadly the same as those made in my reply to Prime Minister Chou En-lai'.

Prime Minister Nehru rejected the Chinese Government's three-point proposal and 'the line of actual control' theory of the Chinese. He demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese forces held prior to 8th September 1962.

Jawaharlal Nehru informed a group of Congress Members of Parliament that arrangements were being made to secure defence equipment from some friendly countries.

A Spokesman of the British Government said in London that a request had been made by the Indian Government for the supply of a small quantity of light arms.

Defence of India Ordinance Rules were announced.

Acharaya Vinoba Bhave, the Bhoojan leader, declared that 'our fight is with Communism, which the invader wants to impose on India. If we want to repel the invaders we must forge unity among all sections of the people'.

OCTOBER 28TH : Chinese launched a heavy attack at three points in Damchok area in Ladakh and captured Chang La also in Ladakh.

OCTOBER 29TH : Damchock in Ladakh fell to the Chinese invaders.

India made a formal request for an immediate supply of light arms to push back the Chinese.

Canada assured India for the military aid.

OCTOBER 30TH : Indian troops launched a counter-attack on a limited scale both in the Tawang and Walong areas in NEFA.

India told the U.N. General Assembly that if Communist China really desired a peaceful settlement of the border issue, it should accept India's proposal and restore the *status quo* as it was prior to 8th September 1962.

OCTOBER 31ST : Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, took over the defence portfolio from V.K. Krishna Menon. V.K. Krishna Menon took charge of the new Ministry of Defence Production.

Indian troops shelled the Chinese positions in the vicinity of Jang in the Tawang area.

NOVEMBER 1ST : Indian Communist Party denounced the Chinese aggression in unequivocal terms and pledged its unqualified support to the Government of India for the defence of the country.

Maharajkumar of Sikkim declared the complete solidarity with India in her fight against China.

Government of India took up the question of Indian prisoners of war with International and Indian Red Cross Organisation.

NOVEMBER 2ND : China rejected the four-point proposal made by President Nasser for settlement of the Sino-Indian border conflict.

NOVEMBER 3RD : Indian troops reoccupied three hamlets between Jang and Tawang in NEFA.

Chinese fired on Indian transport aircraft near Chushul in Ladakh.

Chinese probe patrol was beaten back near Walong in NEFA.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, declared that the Third Plan would be adapted to the war necessities.

Public Safety Ordinance was promulgated in India.

Rebel Naga leaders urged Nagas to fight against the Chinese.

NOVEMBER 4TH : Chou En-lai rejected Prime Minister Nehru's peace proposal and reiterated that his three-point proposal should be accepted.

Exchange of fire in the vicinity of Walong in NEFA.

Hindu Mahasabha, an Indian political Party, demanded a Five-Year Defence Plan.

Peking Daily, a Chinese newspaper, castigated the Soviet Union's 'pacifying role' in India-China border dispute.

NOVEMBER 5TH : Planned withdrawal of Indian troops a few days ago from the Indian post Daulet Beg Oldi.

Chinese intrusion into Subansiri Division challenged at 10 or 12 miles south of McMahon Line.

The National Development Council pledged to the nation ; "We are fight-

ing for our freedom and our honour, to save the democratic way of life adopted in our Constitution. With faith in the justness of our cause, we dedicate ourselves to protect our motherland."

Canada offered to India transport planes.

Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, deplored Western military aid to India.

By this date China had captured the entire Indian territory, claimed in 1960 and even at a few places more than that.

NOVEMBER 6TH : Indian troops shelled Chinese positions near Walong, NEFA, and Chinese fired back.

Digging of trenches by the Chinese in Tawang and harassment of local population were reported.

Government of India announced the composition and functions of the National Defence Council : Chairman—Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India ; Members—Morarji Desai, Gulzarilal Nanda, T.T. Krishnamachari, Lal Bahadur Shastri, V.K. Krishna Menon (all members of the Union Cabinet), Kamraj Nadar, Y.B Chavan, C.B. Gupta, Pratap Singh Kairon, P.C. Sen (all States' Chief Ministers), General P.N. Thapar, Vice-Admiral B.S. Soman, Air Marshal A.M. Engineer (all Service Chiefs), General Rajindrasinhji, General K.S. Thimmayya, Vice-Admiral R.D. Katai, Lt.-General S.P.P. Thorat (all retired officers of the armed forces), D. Sanjivayya, Asoka Mehta, Indira Gandhi, Khandubhai Desai, Naval H. Tata, the Maharaja of Patiala, N.R. Pillai (all well-known Indians), and R.K. Nehru, S.S. Khera, O. Pulla Reddi, D.S. Kothari and S. Bhagwantam (all officials of the Government of India).

The Functions of the Council are :

1. To take stock of the situation and arrangements for national defence from time to time and to advise the Government on matters relating to national defence ;
2. To assist in building up and suitable guiding the national will to fight the aggressor ;
3. To suggest to the Central Citizens' Committee such measures as may be considered necessary for utilisation of public enthusiasm for national defence ; and
4. To advise the Government generally on such matters as may be helpful in prosecuting the fight against the aggressor.

C. Rajagopalachari, an elder statesman and leader of the Swatantra Party of India, advised the Government that 'it is no use waiting for the Chinese to attack us. We should go over to attack'. He did not believe that Russia would ever come to India's help against her Chinese brother.

John Kenneth Galbraith, U.S.A. Ambassador in India, announced that the American military aid to India would not involve her in military alliance with the West or otherwise compromise her policy of non-alignment.

Tripartite consultation between U.S.A., Britain and Canada to co ordinate arms deliveries to India were reported from Washington.

Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, was reported to have rejected freeze on Kashmir to give a free hand to India to fight against the Chinese aggression. He called an emergency session of the National Assembly of Pakistan for November 21, 1962 to discuss Western arms aid to India.

Australian External Affairs Minister declared her country's readiness to give India arms aid if approached by India.

NOVEMBER 7TH : Indian troops repulsed Chinese attack near Walong. Chinese continue their build-up near Chushul,

V.K. Krishna Menon, Minister for Defence Production, Government of India, resigned from the Cabinet. The President accepted the resignation.

Some of the equipment secured from abroad reached at the front. Government of India assumed vide powers under Defence of India Ordinance.

Pro-Chinese Communists in India were arrested.

Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China, reiterated the Chinese Government's stand and the three-point proposal in his letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

NOVEMBER 8TH : Indian troops repulsed the Chinese attack near Walong. Indian troops shelled enemy positions in Jang area. Chinese forces attacked near the Spanggur Lake, a few miles from Chushul.

'In Peace Peaceful, In War Defiant', was the theme of the speech delivered by the Indian Prime Minister in the Emergency Session of the Lok Sabha while moving resolutions on emergency and Chinese aggression. Lal Bahadur Shastri, India's Home Minister, declared in the Rajya Sabha, "There can be no talks as long as aggression continues." All parties in the Parliament urged total mobilisation.

Mohammad Ali, foreign Minister of Pakistan, declared that his country would not allow arms supplies for India to pass through Pakistan territory.

NOVEMBER 9TH : Indian troops repulsed Chinese attack near Walong. Chinese shelled Indian forces in Walong area. Indian forces shelled enemy positions in Jang area.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, declared in the Parliament that on a more suitable occasion an enquiry would be held into India's military unpreparedness to meet the Chinese aggression.

Kuomintang Government protested against the USA acceptance of the McMahon Line.

France agreed to supply arms on a priority basis and fulfil orders for helicopters. She authorised Bank of France to give a 10 million dollar loan to Indian Industrial Finance Corporation.

Portugal secured assurance that Azores base would not be used for conveyance of US arms to India.

China lodged a protest against 'intensified persecution' of Chinese nationals in India.

NOVEMBER 10TH : Fire was exchanged between an Indian Patrol and a Chinese position in Walong area.

Committee on National Integration and Regionalism in a statement said : "Out of the evil of the Chinese aggression has come the unmistakable manifestation of the Indian People's deep rooted attachment to the unity and integrity of the Motherland. The danger from across our borders has instinctively drawn the fervently patriotic citizens of this country close to one another and made their age-old attributes of courage and sacrifice assert themselves."

NOVEMBER 11TH : Chinese Patrol was beaten back near Jang and a Chinese probe in Walong was repulsed.

NOVEMBER 12TH : Indian Patrol clashed with a Chinese position a few miles north-west of Walong.

India requested USA for equipment for the manufacture of modern weapons. B. K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador in USA signed an agreement for arms assistance by the USA Government.

The Indian Prime Minister announced that the question of breaking off diplomatic relations with China was under the constant consideration of the Government.

Lakshmi Menon, Minister in Ministry of External Affairs, India, informed the Lok Sabha that severe restrictions on Indian Mission at Lhasa and Indian Embassy at Peking were being imposed since early October.

K.C. Pant in the Lok Sabha that the Chinese text books show the South-east Asian landmass as area of China seized by the Imperialists.

NOVEMBER 13TH : Chinese fired at Indian position in the Walong area.

China criticised the C.P.I. resolution supporting the Indian stand against the Chinese aggression as 'self-styled Marxist-Lenninists who have departed from the basic interests of the Indian people.'

NOVEMBER 14TH : Indian troops launched an attack on a Chinese position north-west of Walong and raided a village held by Chinese near Jang.

Tibetan refugees reported economic crisis in Tibet.

Large number of Indian troops, reported missing earlier, returned to bases in NEFA.

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution was suspended for the duration of the Emergency. The Article reads : The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within territory of India.

Families of Indian officials in Shanghai and Lhasa were evacuated.

Y.B. Chavan, Chief Minister of Maharashtra, and T.T. Krishnamachari, Minister without Portfolio, Government of India, were appointed Minister for Defence and Minister for Economic and Defence Coordination respectively.

Lok Sabha unanimously passed the two resolutions moved by Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India,— one approving the Proclamation of Emergency by the President on October 26, 1962 and the other reaffirming "the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however long and hard the struggle may be."

Prime Minister Nehru in his letter to Premier Chou rejected the Chinese three-point proposal and reiterated the demand of the withdrawal of the Chinese forces to the line they held prior to 8th September 1962 for opening any negotiation.

NOVEMBER 15TH : Chinese launched a massive attack at several points in Walong area—the biggest after the first one of 20th October 1962.

C.P.I. Chairman S. A. Dange appealed to the Communist parties of the world against the unjustified and unprovoked Chinese aggression on India.

C. Rajagopalachari denounced non-alignment as very much ineffective in shooting war.

NOVEMBER 16TH : A massive Chinese attack was launched simultaneously from the north, north-west and west of Walong to capture the town. Walong and air strip on the outskirts of Walong were occupied by the Chinese during the night.

China announced the capture of 927 Indian officers and men since the war broke out on 20th October 1962.

Chinese launched massive propaganda drive to win over Monpa tribesmen in Tawang valley.

Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China wrote a very lengthy letter on the India-China boundary dispute to the heads of Afro-Asian nations.

Throughout Pakistan there were demonstrations against Western military aid to India.

NOVEMBER 17TH : Chinese shelled Chushul area in Ladakh and attacked two forward Indian posts east and south-east of Chushul. Indian forces withdrew 10/12 miles in Jang area and the Chinese were fighting within a mile or two off Sela Pass in the Jang area.

U.S.A. State Department officials assured Pakistan against the misuse of the United States' arms by India.

S. Radhakrishnan, President of India, declared : "At a time like this when we are faced with the dust of battle and darkness of crushing ideologies it is good to remember that there is the light of reason which gives us hope that as long as we act in the righteous way, victory is our."

NOVEMBER 18TH : Three successive attacks by the Chinese on one of the forward posts, few miles to the east of Chushul, were repulsed by the Indian troops. Second Indian forward post in Chushul area fell to the Chinese attack. Fresh Chinese troops were reported being brought into the Spanggur area. Chinese captured Sela Pass and carried out wide out flanking movemet, cut the road from Sela to Bomdi La. Indian troops fell back in Sela. Chinese attacked Indian patrol east of Taksing in Subansiri Division.

Civil population of Bomdi La was evacuated.

Rajendra Prasad, former President of India, urged the recognition of Tibet's independence.

President of Ghana suggested sending of an Afro-Asian mediation delegation to Peking and Delhi.

France stepped up the supply of the helicopters.

N.G. Goray, P.S.P. leader, warned the Government that "any lurking desire to give up Ladakh and keep NEFA will be most decisively rejected by the people."

NOVEMBER 19TH : Bomdi La fell to the Chinese attack. Chinese shelling heavily damaged the Chushul air strip which was in Indian hands.

In his broadcast to the nation, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, called upon the nation to steel itself to meet all reverses, to make its determination still firmer and to do all it can to repel and throw out the invaders from India. Nehru declared : "This is the first war of independent India to maintain her independence and India is not going to lose this war, however long it lasts and whatever harm it may do us.....We must stand up to it (Chinese Imperialism) not only we but all decent-minded countries who value their freedom anywhere—in Asia, Africa, Europe and America."

Y.B. Chavan, India's Defence Minister-designate accepted the Chinese challenge and declared : "Everyone should consider himself a soldier and every home should be turned into a fortress till the invaders are thrust out and the safety of our freedom is ensured."

NOVEMBER 20TH : Chinese made advance towards Foothills. Exchange of fire in Chushul area.

In his letter to British Prime Minister Macmillan, Prime Minister of India appealed for a massive arms supply on a continuing basis to help beat back the Chinese.

Lt. General J.N. Chaudhri assumed charge as Chief of the Army Staff in place of General P.N. Thapar.

Ceylon Prime Minister invited leaders of UAR, Indonesia, Ghana, Burma Cambodia to meet in Colombo to discuss steps to end Sino-Indian conflict.

Australia decided to send supplies including heavy woollen clothing for Indian troops.

The Defence Ministry of India announced the introduction of the Emergency Commissions in the Army.

NOVEMBER 21ST : Government of China announced unilateral cease-fire both on the Ladakh and NEFA fronts from the midnight. Chinese forces were to withdraw from 1st December 1962 20 kilometres behind the 'line of actual control' which existed between China and India on 7th November 1959. (Refer Section III for a detailed study of the Chinese proposals and what these meant to India).

Five Opposition leaders in Indian Parliament (excluding Communists) rejected the Chinese cease-fire offer and declared : We are convinced that this Chinese offer of unilateral cease-fire is only another of their notorious manoeuvres, calculated to cause confusion and disruption in our national front, gain time for consolidation and build up for another infamous offensive, prevent us from mobilising the resources from inside and outside and create doubts in the minds of our friends in world democracy. We trust that the Prime Minister and the Government would not allow themselves to be taken in, and weaken our resolve to strengthen our armed forces. We want the Government to assure the nation that it stands firmly by the policy clearly enunciated by Parliament in the resolutions unanimously adopted, and that the national war effort is continued with redoubled vigour, so that the spirit of national resistance is not at all allowed to be weakened by the latest Chinese tactical manoeuvre. We hope that Parliament will be kept in session and be informed at every state. We also hope that the friendly countries which have so readily and generously offered help would continue to speed up their assistance on a massive scale.

NOVEMBER 22ND : Prime Minister of India reported to the Lok Sabha that firing had ceased on the border.

British and USA diplomatic-cum-military missions arrived in New Delhi to assess India's defence needs. John Tilney and Averell Harriman headed the respective missions.

A gift of six Dakota aircrafts came from Canada. USA sent twelve C-130 heavy transport planes along with the American crew for transport purposes against the Chinese invasion.

Peter Thorneycraft, U.K. Defence Minister, declared that Britain would send troops to India against Chinese, if India demanded.

Australian Foreign Minister offered small arms and ammunition and other supplies to India.

Many Canadians offered to fight with Indians against the Chinese invasion on Indian territory.

USA Ambassador to Pakistan denied the allegation made by Mohammad Ali, Pakistan Foreign Minister, of the existence of secret military pact between India and USA.

NOVEMBER 23RD : India denied Pakistan's allegation of existence any secret military pact with USA.

Australian offer for the supply of arms and ammunition was accepted.

Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China, requested the Thailand Premier to help find out a settlement between India and China.

NOVEMBER 24TH : Government of India asked for clarification of the Government of China's cease-fire declaration.

Government of India approached the International Red Cross for information about Indian military and civilian personnel taken prisoners by the Chinese.

Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, joined the British diplomatic-cum-military mission in New Delhi.

An effort towards a mutual defence pact between China and Pakistan was reported being made.

Shilu Ao, Chairman of the Interim Council for Nagaland, called upon Nagas to organise themselves against the Chinese aggression.

NOVEMBER 25TH : Military members of the U.K. & USA diplomatic-cum-military missions visited NEFA to make 'on the spot study' of the defence problems.

A nine-member Military Affairs Committee with Y.B. Chavan as its Chairman was set up to review the situation and for the arrangements for national defence from time to time and advise the Government.

India declared that she was ready to sign a 'no war pact' with Pakistan.

Jayprakash Narayan, Sarvodaya leader, emphasised that China, notorious for her treacherous diplomacy, would never reveal her cards fully (cease-fire of 21st November 1962) and India should be on her guards.

India received reply to her clarification sought about the Chinese cease-fire proposals of 21st November 1962.

NOVEMBER 26TH : An official Indian spokesman stated that China wanted to retain all the Indian territory which she had conquered or occupied since November 7, 1959.

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, announced in the Lok Sabha that there was no possibility of India taking the Chinese aggression case to the United Nations.

Pakistan Minister Z. A. Bhutto said that Pakistan's friendship with China is unconditional and that Pakistan would not barter friendship for Kashmir or any other thing.

Australian Foreign Minister offered more arms aid to India against the Chinese attack.

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, declared : "With faith in the justness of our cause and confidence in our future let us dedicate ourselves to live or die for our motherland. Victory shall be ours."

NOVEMBER 27TH : A 'complete travesty of fact' was the Government of India's reaction to the Chinese account of events leading to the invasion of India.

An agreement for the supply of British arms and military equipment to India without payment but within an agreed financial limit was signed.

General Adams of the USA who returned from his study tour to Leh and Chushul praised in very warm words the courage, stamina and high morale of the fighting Indian soldiers. He said : "I have known the Indian Army in many places in the world and I have seen them fight magnificently all over the world. In the present situation, they have been in the position of a peaceful man struck by an aggressor. The aggressor has the advantages of surprise. I do not think there has ever been an army in history that did not experience some difficulty in the beginning when it was hit by surprise. Fighting in these mountains on the roof of the world, as the Indian Army has to fight at this time with their forces widely separated by some thing like 1,000 miles between two combat zones, is one of the most difficult problems that can face any fighting force."

NOVEMBER 28TH : Averell Harriman, U. S. A. Assistant Secretary of State, announced that US military assistance to India was of as much benefit to Pakistan as to India, the USA and the free world. He declared that the aid was without any strings.

Over 5,000 troops who were cut off in forward areas in NEFA returned to bases in Assam and more were reported coming.

U.K. launched a new airlift of arms urgently needed for India's defence.

Australia's External Affairs Minister now visiting Pakistan declared that arms supply to India from Australia was a commercial transaction, and delay in supply would defeat the purpose.

Lok Sabha passed the Defence of India Bill.

NOVEMBER 29TH : Prime Minister Nehru received a letter from Premier Chou on the Chinese cease-fire proposal. An Indian spokesman said that the Chinese clarification of the three-point proposal had attempted to identify the November 7, 1959 line of actual control with the positions now held by their troops in Ladakh.

NOVEMBER 29TH : Prime Minister of India and President of Pakistan agreed to make a renewed attempt to settle the Kashmir issue in an effort to improve Indo-Pakistan relations.

India voted for proposal to exclude China from an International Atomic Energy Conference scheduled for 1964.

NOVEMBER 30TH : India sought further clarification on the Chinese cease.fire and three-point proposal.

Jawaharlal Nehru assured that India would defend Sikkim at any cost.

China threatened the resumption of aggression 'if India does not co-operate.'

DECEMBER 2ND : Over 10,000 trapped Indian Jawans returned to Indian positions.

DECEMBER 3RD: Ram Manohar Lohia, Socialist Leader, demanded that a people's army should be raised immediately to fight the Chinese. When freedom and the future of democracy were threatened, it was not merely the duty of the troops to repel the invaders. He favoured immediate conscription. He also suggested a confederation of India and Pakistan.

Jayaprakash Narayan stated that India should recognise the right of the Tibetan people to independence and the Dalai Lama as the head of the exile Government.

C. Rajagopachari urged taking of the case of the Chinese aggression to the United Nations.

DECEMBER 4TH: Y.B. Chavan, Indian Defence Minister, announced that Russia would deliver a few MIG fighters to India this month. MIG plant however would be built as scheduled.

Rajendra Prasad, former President of India, urged the rejection of the Chinese proposal.

Government of Ceylon announced that the conference of the non-aligned countries would be held on December 10, 1962.

DECEMBER 5TH: Jawaharlal Nehru asserted that India would not subject herself to any invasion and China must vacate the aggression. He declared that 'there is no non-alignment vis-a-vis China'.

General Cariappa, former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian armed forces, suggested the formation of guerrilla units.

China handed over to Indian Red Cross 64 sick and wounded Indian prisoners at Bomdi La.

DECEMBER 6TH: USA announced to send American military advisors if requested.

Jawaharlal Nehru announced that India would not request for ground troops from any friendly country. India announced the closure of her missions at Lhasa and Shanghai and asked China to close her missions at Calcutta and Bombay.

DECEMBER 7TH: To Strength her armed forces against the Chinese aggression, India would send her military personnel for training in USA and UK.

KMT China attributed Chinese cease-fire declaration to military, political and economic difficulties of China.

DECEMBER 8TH: Nehru informed the Rajya Sabha that China wanted to retain civil posts of Dhola and Longju even after their withdrawal from the McMahon Line.

DECEMBER 9TH: China rejected the Indian demand of the Chinese withdrawal from the 8th September 1962 line as 'utterly unacceptable' and termed it 'India's brazen demands'. China threatend an open war if the Chinese proposals in toto were not accepted by India and the latter did not withdraw 20 kilometers from the 'line of actual control of 7th November 1959'.

Dean Rusk said that India must be given 'as much assistance as we can'

DECEMBER 6TH : Philippines Vice-President said that 'Chinese expansionism is a threat to the freedom of South East Asia.'

DECEMBER 7TH : Lok Sabha passed two Emergency Risk Insurance Bills.

DECEMBER 8TH : KMT supported USA and UK military aid to India.

DECEMBER 9TH : Averell Harriman declared that Chinese aggression had greater reasons than border dispute and "it is a very important issue for the free world." He pointed out that USA had no objection to India getting military aid from the Soviet bloc.

Ali Sabry of the UAR stressed that "India is justified in demanding Chinese withdrawal to September 8, line."

China submitted a memorandum demanding a clear and definite reply to the Chinese proposals on ceasefire. New Delhi interpretted it as an unveiled ultimatum to the coming Colombo Conference.

DECEMBER 10TH : Jawaharlal Nehru declared : "We cannot bow to any threat. We want peace but will face any attack that may come. All Indians are behind the Jawans."

Jawaharlal Nehru offered to refer the India-China boundary dispute to the International Court of Justice, subject to vacation of aggression by China.

Nehru ruled out any possibility of the Dalai Lama setting up any emigre Government in India.

Defence Minister of India announced to raise the army strength.

Communist Party M.P., H. Mukerjee denounced Chinese Government's unabashed expansionism.

Czechoslovakia's move to switch over agricultural and economic aid from China to India was reported.

Six Afro-Asian non-aligned nations (Ceylon, UAR, Ghana, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia) met in Colombo to find out a solution to the India-China border conflict.

DECEMBER 11TH : Ghanain Ambassador announced in New Delhi that Ghana "would not approve of any aggressor enjoying the benefits of aggression,"

DECEMBER 12TH : The Colombo conference concluded and adopted six point proposal to find out a solution to the problem

West German Ambassador in New Delhi assured West German's aid to India.

DECEMBER 13TH : President Kasavubu of Congo extended sympathies to India against China.

China handed over 26 Indian POWs to Indian Red Cross at Walong.

15,000 Chinese had been reported to have died in invasion on India, several thousands for want of warm clothing.

DECEMBER 14TH : Nehru declared that "We will have to finish the war with China before we can consider any Kashmir settlement."

Government of India lodged a protest against the aerial intrusion in Assam on December 10, 1962.

DECEMBER 15TH : It was reported that Chinese had taken along with while retreating a number of tribals from NEFA for indoctrination.

NATO gives moral support to India.

DECEMBER 17TH : Reports were received of Chinese attempts to indoctrinate Indian POWs.

Colombo Conference proposals were handed over to Jawaharlal Nehru by a special envoy.

British and United States officials met in London to improve coordination of military aid by the Commonwealth and the US Governments to India.

DECEMBER 18TH : President of India announced that India's policy of non-alignment had stood the test.

Nehru announced that Kashmir settlement could come before the end of India-China conflict.

DECEMBER 19TH : Arab League representative in India denounced Chinese attack.

Canada decided to step up production of 'caribou' transport planes for supply to India.

DECEMBER 20TH : Overseas Chinese Association of India characterised ceasefire as a "dirty trick" to dull Indian determination to kill Chinese expansionism.

DECEMBER 21ST : Massive military preparations were reported going on in Tibet for fresh Chinese invasion on India.

Colombo Conference special envoy arrived in Peking to hand over the proposal to that Government.

DECEMBER 22ND : Civil Administration at Darrang Dzong (Kameng Division) resumed its functions

DECEMBER 23RD : Panchen Lama was reported seen in military uniform in Lhasa.

DECEMBER 25TH : Civil Administration resumed its work at Walong (Lohit Division) and at Machuka (Siang Division).

DECEMBER 26TH : Sino-Pakistan joint communique said that the two countries had reached 'complete agreement in principle' on border alignment between China (Sinkiang) and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir,

China announced the capture of 2,156 Indian soldiers after November 16 in addition to 1,131 reported earlier.

DECEMBER 27TH : An Indian official spokesman announced that the Sino-Pakistan border agreement 'indicates close collaboration between Peking and Rawalpindi.'

DECEMBER 28TH : Ambassador Galbraith of USA made it clear that American arms aid to India was not contingent on Kashmir settlement.

DECEMBER 30TH : China announced that she had completed the withdrawal to the 'traditional customary line' in the Eastern Sector and 20 kilometres behind the 'line of actual control' in the Western Sector.

An Indian official statement announced that 224 Indian personnel were killed and 468 wounded and 1692 still unaccounted for during the Chinese invasion.

Maharajkumar of Sikkim said that Sikkim would not remain isolated in face of Chinese aggression against India.

China formally rejected India's demand for the restoration of September 8 line prior to opening of negotiations.

DECEMBER 31ST : Nehru announced that the alleged military unpreparedness in NEFA would be restricted in scope to 'some military appraisal' to 'guide us in future'.

An Indian official statement reiterated restoration of September 8 line as the minimum requirement before starting negotiations.

Government of India repudiated the Chinese allegation of persecution of Chinese nationals in India.

JANUARY 2ND : Jawaharlal Nehru denounced China's behaviour as like a big crocodile in the pond of Asia trying to devour small fish.

JANUARY 3RD : Chinese living in Soviet Union criticised Mao's attitude to Sino-Indian border conflict.

JANUARY 5TH : Pakistan and China signed mutual most-favoured-nation trade pact.

JANUARY 6TH : Pakistan was reported to get economic aid from China.

JANUARY 7TH : A joint Chou-Mrs. Bandarnaike communique issued at Peking said that China had given a 'positive response' to Colombo proposals.

JANUARY 8TH : Most of the military equipment returned to the Indians by the Chinese were found unserviceable and merely junk.

Foreign Minister Chen Yi announced China's 'positive response' to the Colombo proposals.

JANUARY 10TH : A Government of India spokesman said that China had breached her unilateral ceasefire on 34 occasions (in Kameng Division of NEFA) in the first 11 days of ceasefire.

JANUARY 11TH : Talks between Ceylonese and Indian Prime Ministers were started in New Delhi on the basis of Colombo proposals.

JANUARY 13TH : Aly Sabry of the UAR said in New Delhi that Indian stand against Chinese aggression was identical with Egypt's stand during Suez invasion.

JANUARY 15TH : New Peking regulation called up all Tibetans of 14 to 42 years for military training.

East German Communist leaders Ulbricht criticised Chinese for launching border operations against India.

British M. P. Soresen said that India's military resistance against aggression does not violate creed of non-violence.

JANUARY 16TH : Peking criticised S.A. Dange, Chairman of the Communist Party of India for his visit to the Soviet Union and to east-European countries and his anti-China statements.

India in her Note rejected Chinese accusation that Indian troops trespassed into Tibet across the Sikkim border in September 1962. The Indian Note wondered if these unfounded charges concerning the Sikkim border "are not a prelude to a new aggression!"

JANUARY 17TH : Prime Minister of India cautioned the nation that "it would be folly to expect easy or early solution of the dispute."

JANUARY 18TH : Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi said that Chinese troops had withdrawn in the Eastern Sector north of, and in the Western Sector 20 Km. north of the "actual line of control" of November 7, 1959.

Berlin Communist meet criticised the Chinese action against India. Chinese Delegate's remarks about India met with general disapproval.

JANUARY 19TH : China accepted the Colombo proposals in principle.

JANUARY 21ST : Indian Defence Minister informed Lok Sabha that China had made three air intrusions over Indian territory since October 20, 1962.

Prime Minister told in Lok Sabha that diplomatic break with China was not under active consideration.

JANUARY 23RD : Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru informed the Lok Sabha that the Government of India had agreed to the Colombo proposal in toto. Talks with China only on her acceptance in toto. The entire non-Communist Opposition advocated the outright rejection.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said that India's foreign policy had 'stood the test of time' in relations with the Soviet Union in the light of India-China conflict.

JANUARY 24TH : Prime Minister announced in the Rajya Sabha that the Government of India was bound to its previous stand of Chinese withdrawal to September 8, 1962 line prior to any discussion with China.

JANUARY 25 TH : President Radhakrishnan in his Republic Day message said that India did not wish to change her basic policies of democratic freedom, social justice and friendship among nations simply because "military conflict is thrust upon us to our great sorrow."

JANUARY 26TH : Nehru said that "Chinese cannot be trusted. We have to end the Chinese menace once for all, however hard and long the struggle might be."

Britain's Commonwealth Relations State Minister said his country will provide more aid to India to rebut Chinese aggression.

JANUARY 29TH : CPI Chairman S. A. Dange said that Chinese invasion of Indian territory was a grave blunder, and European communist parties also hold the same view.

Hectic efforts were reported being made by the members of the Colombo Powers, who had offered previously to China and India six-point proposals to resolve differences that China should accept the Colombo proposals and their

interpretations without any reservation as India had accepted earlier the proposals in toto.

JANUARY 30TH : Joint US-Commonwealth air mission arrived in New Delhi to find out the possibility to help India in her air defence.

FEBRUARY 1ST : USA set up a military supply mission in India. USA Asistant Secretary of State Talbot said in Rawalpindi that USA arms aid to India was essential for defence against China.

FEBRUARY 2ND : NEFA's special Commissioner said that Chinese had completely vacated NEFA including Thagla Ridge by January 20, 1963.

During their occupation of NEFA area Chinese soldiers had looted golden images and violated nunneries in Tawang which shocked the local Budhists.

Following the disturbance in Tibet China was reported to have imposed curbs on movement of Tibetans and Chinese nationals in Tibet.

FEBRUARY 3RD : Soviet Union was reported to have accused China of committing unprovoked aggression against India and warned her that Soviet commercial and military commitments to India would be carried out.

FEBRUARY 5TH : Indian official spokesman said that there could be no talks unless China accepted Colombo proposals and its clarifications.

Soviet Union delegation to Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference supported Colombo conference proposals.

Philippines representative at the United Nations said that China's long-term plan was to expand southward through Malaya and India.

FEBRUARY 6TH : The six non-aligned Colombo Powers were reported to be planning to make joint appeal to China to accept Colombo proposals in toto.

FEBRUARY 7TH : Indian Delegate at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference walked out of the Conference in protest against removal from agenda of the resolution on Sino-Indian conflict.

FEBRUARY 8TH : Prime Minister denied the existence of "air umbrella" scheme.

FEBRUARY 11TH : Averell Harriman said that USA military aid programme to India totalled \$60 million; Britain and Commonwealth countries contributing equivalent amount. Harriman said that China attacked India to destroy the image of India's success as a free nation and open Southeast Asia for further subversion.

FEBRUARY 12TH : The number of names of the India POWs submitted by China totalled 4,057.

FEBRUARY 13TH : USA-Commonwealth air force experts were understood to have completed study of Indian air defence needs.

FEBRUARY 14TH : Japanese Foreign Minister said that his country could contribute to strengthening India's defence.

FEBRUARY 15TH : Cambodia's Sihanouk said in Peking that Colombo countries would not act as arbitrators or judges in Sino-Indian conflict; their proposals were mere suggestions to help the two countries to enter into friendly negotiations.

FEBRUARY 16TH : Planning Commission of India decided to achieve closest coordination between defence and development.

FEBRUARY 21TH : Nehru said that there was no question of establishing foreign air bases in India. He said that India had to be defended by its own forces.

Lakshmi Menon was reported to have said that in case of a sudden Chinese air attack, India expected friendly countries to help her with their air power.

FEBRUARY 25TH : Prime Minister told Rajya Sabha that India would take as much foreign aid as possible but would never expect foreign Powers to become India's underwriters.

FEBRUARY 27TH : Prime Minister informed the Lok Sabha that India was free to send troops anywhere in border areas in terms of the Colombo proposals.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My thanks to all the individuals whose articles have appeared in the book ; to the Government of India for making available the relevant material ; to the A.I.R. for the reproduction of the articles by Dr. K. Krishna Rao, Sardar K.M. Panikkar and S.L. Poplai ; to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha for the permission to reproduce the speech by Jawaharlal Nehru delivered in the Lok Sabha on Nov. 8, 1962 (The Will to Fight by Jawaharlal Nehru Part II Page 65-71); to the Economist, London, the Financial Times, London and Die Welt, Hamburg, West Germany, for the permission to reproduce the articles by Economist, G.F. Hudson and Dr. Heinz Pentzlin respectively ; to Sudarshan Kumar Rana for the valuable cooperation and Ruma Rana for her inspiration to produce this book to put before the international public the case of the India-China Border Dispute.

SUBSCRIBE TO

FORTNIGHTLY JOURNAL

**VITAL
SPEECHES
& DOCUMENTS
OF THE DAY**

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

Rs. 24.00 or US \$7.00 or UK £2.10s.

Records the Most Important Speeches
and Documents from the world over

PUBLISHED BY

THE BOOK TIMES COMPANY
25 B/1 ROHTAK ROAD
NEW DELHI-5

